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Part I
Introduction and 
background

Chapter 1: 
Introduction
‘What's the point of having new legislation if it remains dead in the 
water?’ Frits Bolkestein, April 2003, Internal Market Commissioner.
The European Union (EU) consists of member states. Over the last 50 years it 
has developed a complex and highly developed system of law that directly 
influences the legal systems of its member states (Snyder, 1993). There are 
three types of EU law. Primary law includes treaties. Secondary law includes 
interinstitutional agreements, such as regulations, directives, decisions, 
recommendations, and opinions. Tertiary law includes the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). These three types of EU law, otherwise 
known, cumulatively, as the acquis communautaire represent the full set of dis-
tributive, constituent and regulatory European policies.
Each of these policies has a ‘life cycle’. The EU policy cycle is composed of 
three phases (Zeff and Pirro, 2001), namely: development, decision-making, 
and implementation. In the policy development phase, the European Com-
mission discusses, develops, and compiles new programs; it also drafts legis-
lation, and, finally delivers a proposal to the decision-making bodies. These 
bodies are the Council of Ministers (Council) and the European Parliament 
(EP). In the decision-making phase, the Council and the EP co-decide in most 
policy fields that fall under the Community method (Hix, 2005). The third 
phase, implementation, is defined as ‘the process by which national law is 
modified in accordance with Community law’ (Eijlander and Voermans, 
2000: 257). Member states involved in making EU legislation must imple-
ment Community legislation that induces policy change including the legal 
transposition, application and evaluation process (Prechal, 1995: 5-6; Kassim, 
Peters and Wright, 2000: 15; Dimitrakopoulos, 2005).
The first step, transposition, is defined as the process whereby European di-
rectives are incorporated into national law in order to make their objectives, 
requirements, and deadlines applicable in the member states. Application is 
defined as the process whereby full compliance with EU law is monitored 
and secured, and the effect posterior evaluated; in this step, non-compliance 
is systematically evaluated by national and supranational courts. Figure 1.1 
presents the different stages and sub-stages of the EU policy-cycle.
As displayed in Figure 1.1, ‘adapting and implementing legal rules are two of 
the most important mechanisms through which European integration influ-
ences member states’ (Sverdrup, 2005: 6). Transposition, in particular, is the 
first step in the implementation phase because it is here that ‘the goals and the 
objectives of the EU result or fail to result in real change for European states’ 
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(Zeff and Pirro, 2001: 16-19). More general, a swift coordination of the trans-
position process across member states appears to be a necessary condition for 
the functioning of the EU policy-cycle and especially of the internal market. 
Note, however, that transposition does not apply to the actual working prac-
tices, but only represent a change in formal law inducing policy change.
Implementation of European law – positive and negative legal obligation for full 
compliance:
Member states are obliged to comply with EC law, as dictated by Article 10 
(formerly Article 5). In the spirit of this article, states must adopt necessary 
legislative and regulatory measures, apply or execute them, and supervise 
and enforce their proper application in their respective territories. Article 10 
imposes the mandatory duties on member states, which have, however, some 
discretion in the carrying out of such actions. Failure to fulfill the duties of 
Article 10 can lead to infringement proceedings under Article 226 (formerly 
Article 169). Article 10 (2) also includes prohibitions for member states, who 
must to refrain from keeping or introducing any measure that might render 
ineffective the application of Community legislation. The ECJ has confirmed 
in numerous decisions that both the obligations and the prohibitions stated in 
Article 10 apply to all the authorities of member states, including the nation-
al courts for matters within their jurisdiction (de Búrca, 1992; Plata Martin, 
1994). The European Commission’s (Commission) primary role is to propose 
and monitor the implementation of EU legislation. It also acts as ‘guardian of 
the treaties’, taking responsibility for initiating infringement proceedings at 
the ECJ against non-compliant member states, i.e. when national legislation 
breaches EU law. 
Development
Decision
Transposition
Execution
Evaluation
Implementation
Figure 1.1: European policy cycle: Three policy phases – development, decision 
and implementation.
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1.1 Two big pieces of a puzzle
As a matter of fact, EU member states breach EU law – perpetuately. For 2005, 
the Commission’s scoreboard recorded a 1.3 percent deficit (European Com-
mission, 2006). The question, however, is whether this is a self-defeating fig-
ure. Should we bother? Why would the EU bother in the first place?
Indeed, this record appears vanishing small – at first sight. A closer look at 
the figures and the so-called fragmentation factor indicate, however, that the 
presence of an EU implementation problem seems clear and worth the re-
search– the forest just in front. On the other hand, scholars have responded 
to the challenges of European law; have developed unique concepts and ap-
proaches in their studies of the EU. But despite the fact that the translation of 
EU legislation into national law has been a burgeoning area of interest over 
the last years there is still plenty of room for improvement. A closer look at 
the paperwork, hence, unveils mainly two puzzling elements of empirical 
and theoretical natures. While the recorded implementation deficit across EU 
member states becomes even more troublesome when contextually assessing 
it in more detail, it is the dissatisfactory state-of-art of the implementation 
literature that puzzles the interested scholar.
1.1.1 The empirical puzzle: ‘Cannot see the forest for the numbers’
Since 1989, the Commission as EU’s supervisor of policy implementation 
has regularly published figures and tables, so-called scoreboards, to point 
to member states that do not comply with Article 10, or to find benevolent 
rhetoric for those that do. These scoreboards, by both name and content, call 
to mind sport events rather than EU politics. Yet they have displayed recent 
figures that tell of the awe-inspiring and steady improvement of member 
state’s implementation records. Figure 1.2 presents aggregate data from 1989 
to 2005, and shows that the average implementation rate has not only tre-
mendously increased, but that ‘laggards’ including Greece and Italy, have 
caught up in implementing EU legislation. Differences between the best and 
the worst performing member states have decreased over the years from 25 
percent to around 3 percent.1
In 2005, the average transposition rate of internal market directives reached 
98.7 percent, showing that the share of implemented directives is at a com-
forting high. At first sight, the trend over the last 16 years is good news, and 
the 1.3 per cent deficit appears vanishingly small.
1 Note that the slump in 1995 is due to the enlargement with Austria, Finland, and Sweden.
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At second sight, however, one begins ‘to discern the trees’. Figure 1.2 reveals 
some interesting findings and irregularities about the 2005 implementation 
figures. Accounting for the legal obligations in numbers and performances, 
it displays the results for the total number of directives in each member state 
of the EU 25.
First, the Commission’s figures are based on the total amount of directives that 
have accrued over the last 50 years, which forms a rather conservative meas-
ure for the actual implementation performance across member states (Börzel, 
2001; Mastenbroek, 2003). To put it differently, the enumerator varies little year 
by year. But the denominator increases steadily, which makes a deficit of 30 
directives in 2005 with a denominator of 2570 (1.2 per cent) appear very small 
compared to the same amount of directives still requiring notification in early 
1980s, with an average  number of directives to be transposed of 1280 (2.3 per 
cent). Although the actual deficit of 30 non-implemented directives remains 
constant, the denominator has doubled since the early 1980s, which decreases 
the percentage for non-implemented legislation by 100 per cent.
Table 1.1, furthermore, shows that an EU-wide implementation backlog of 1.3 
per cent means that, in 2005, each member state, on average, had 34 directives 
left to be implemented. Actually, this is a considerable number in a union 
where on average only 100 directives are adopted each year.2
2 Number of adopted directives in 2000 (78), 2001 (104), 2002 (96), 2003 (122), 2004 (123), 
2005 (90) (Eurlex).
The dashed line displays the best record, the middle line the average record of all 
member states, and the dotted line the worst performing member state record. 
Source: Information gathered from all Commission Internal market scoreboards 
published from 1989 to 2005.
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Figure 1.2: Member States’ transposition record (1989 –2005).
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At last, the total number of directives to be transposed (denominator) var-
ies across member states, namely between 2547 in the United Kingdom and 
2607 in Belgium – a difference of precisely 60 directives, which may have a 
warping effect on the results. In addition, table 1.1 shows that the numbers of 
delayed notification differ respectively, namely between 4 in Lithuania and 
80 in Italy, which compounds the distorting effects of this scoreboard. It ap-
pears that with every closer look, the data tell a very different story than that 
of ultimate success. Do we begin ‘to see the forest for the trees’? Are the origi-
nal appearances, then, deceiving? 
Fragmentation factor – Nine per cent deficit in the EU or 772 notifications awaiting
A final look at EU data, however, may even exceed our earlier concern about 
an implementation deficit in the EU. Next to the chronological overview of the 
Commission scoreboards, and the recent figures for 2005, the so-called ‘frag-
mentation factor’ (European Commission, 2006: 15) has found its way to the 
implementation debate. It exemplifies the percentage of the overall outstand-
ing directives that have not been implemented in at least one member state.
Table 1.1: Transposition of EU directives in the member states on 18 July 2005. 
Total number of 
directives
Delayed 
transposition
Percentage of non-
transposed directives
Lithuania 2601 4 0.15
Poland 2577 13 0.50
Denmark 2549 13 0.51
Finland 2548 18 0.71
Spain 2570 20 0.78
Germany 2553 20 0.78
Slovenia 2585 21 0.81
Hungary 2579 22 0.85
Malta 2582 25 0.97
Austria 2556 26 1.02
United Kingdom 2547 28 1.10
Netherlands 2552 29 1.14
Belgium 2607 30 1.15
France 2552 30 1.18
Ireland 2565 31 1.21
Estonia 2561 35 1.37
Cyprus 2582 37 1.43
Latvia 2602 39 1.50
Sweden 2535 39 1.54
Czech Republic 2584 40 1.55
Slovakia 2594 48 1.85
Portugal 2592 56 2.16
Greece 2556 67 2.62
Luxembourg 2557 70 2.74
Italy 2561 80 3.12
EU 25 average 2570 34 1.31
Source: European Commission 2005 (Asmodee II)
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The fragmentation level for 2006 is 9 percent. This means that 9 percent of 
the internal market directives have not achieved their full effect. In absolute 
terms, this means that 144 Internal Market directives were not implemented 
in at least one member state. In 2006, hence, the Commission was still waiting
for 772 notifications of national transposition measures. This fact is quite a
bit more worrying than the 1.3 figure of success referred to in the scoreboards. 
The presence of an EU implementation problem seems clear – the forest 
directly in front of us. The problem has been noted by a considerable number 
of scholars in the field (Curtin, 1990; Mendriou, 1996; Sverdrup, 2004; Versluis, 
2004; Börzel, Hoffmann and Dudziak, 2005;  König, Luetgert and Mäder, 2005; 
Falkner, Hartlapp, Leiber and Treib, 2005; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2005; 
Borghetto, Franchino and Giannetti, 2006; Giuliani, 2006), seems clear – the for-
est just in front of us.
Image marring and costly
Regardless of which statistics the Commission goes by, the member states’ 
non-compliant behaviour is punished. Every year the Commission initiates 
hundreds of infringement proceedings against member states before the ECJ 
in an effort to induce them to comply with their legal obligations, which, in 
the end, may become both image damaging and pricy for the denunciated.
Some member states have proclaimed to take implementation very seriously, 
because poor performance in this stage can stain one’s image. For example, 
French Prime Minister Raffarin (2004) declared implementation to be high 
on the political agenda, and set out to take care of France’s backlog, so as not 
to loose face in Europe. Nonetheless, despite such efforts by some member 
states, the latest available annual report of the ECJ (2004) tells that the Com-
mission initiated 193 proceedings against member states. During the same 
year, Nicolaides and Oberg (2006) report that the ECJ found in 144 out of 155 
cases that a member state had failed to fulfil its obligations. This means that 
in more than 90% of cases the Commission was right to take action against 
one or more member states. Failing to fulfil obligations, however, does not 
necessarily indicate that states are guilty of non-compliance with EU legisla-
tion. Few of those infringement proceedings culminated in an ECJ judgment, 
against a member state, of ‘guilty.’ But, fines will be imposed as a punishment 
for failure to fulfil obligations. The amount owed by member states in fines, 
in the meantime, has reached astronomical dimensions. It seems unlikely that 
most member states will be able to pay up in times of constraint budgets. Yet 
the Commission just recently announced an even tougher policy on the deter-
mination of fines for non-compliance.3
3 The ECJ has imposed fines on Greece, Spain, and France. In 2000, Greece became the first 
member state to adjudged a daily fine of 20,000 EUR. It took Greece six months to comply 
and ended up paying a total of 4.7 million EUR. In November 2003, Spain became the first 
member state to be fined twice for the same infringement. Its penalty was modest, only 
625,000 EUR per year (Nicolaides and Oberg, 2006). In July 2005, France harvested the 
largest penalty in EU history, which was both a lump-sum of 20 million EUR and an ad-
ditional biannual sum of 57.7 million EUR if it continued to ignore EU legislation relating 
to fishing - amounting to a daily fine of 321,000 EUR.
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Legal uncertainty
Non-compliant behaviour implies legal uncertainty; this hampers the Euro-
pean regulatory framework in which businesses operate. Late and incorrect 
transposition can have reverberating effects on the EU legal zeitgeist. It frus-
trates further European integration, including the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital (Article 3(1)c). It jeopardizes market competitive-
ness, national growth, and employment performances in Europe and beyond.
To understand the importance of legal certainty, consider the case of France’s 
dealings with Directive 96/92/EC. In December, 1996, the energy ministers 
of the 15 member states adopted the directive, which concerns common 
rules for the internal market in electricity. However, France caused major ir-
ritations among its neighbouring countries. The French were heavily criti-
cized for being very slow in opening their natural gas and power markets 
to competition. In December 2000, almost two years after the first transposi-
tion deadline, France passed legislation to only begin the electricity sector’s 
liberalization. The last transposing measure was adopted in February 2003. 
In total, it took France six years (four years after the deadline) to adopt the 
European directive on natural gas deregulation into French law.
These four years transposition delay has injured the internal market, in gen-
eral, and the common electricity market, in particular. Critics claim that, in the 
meantime, France has benefited from European privatizations while keeping 
a protected share of its home market. Electricité de France (EdF), the French 
utility manager, in particular, has used the proceeds from its unchallenged 
market position in France to buy major assets across Europe.4 This behav-
iour has sparked hostility among member states, and in the Commission, too. 
The Commission ruled, lately that EdF had been charged unjustifiably low 
corporate income taxes, therefore EdF had an unfair competitive edge in the 
European energy market. EdF was condemned to repay a record sum of 889 
million euros (Sprongenberg, 2006), plus interest. 
Renewed Lisbon strategy 2005: Better regulation for competitiveness, growth and 
employment
Finally, non-compliant behaviour impairs day-to-day operations of the in-
ternal market which precludes the successful achievement of the so-called 
Lisbon strategy and of which the EU and member states plead guilty. On the 
European level, after successive summits (Lisbon, March 2000); Stockholm, 
March 2001: Gothenburg, June 2001; Laeken, December 2001; and Barcelona, 
4 EdF acquired major stakes in Germany’s EnBW, (Energie Baden-Württemberg), in Spain’s 
Hidrocantabrico, in Italy’s Edison, and in a number of eastern European companies. It 
also owns the UK’s London Electricity Group, and other partnerships or acquisitions are 
currently being explored. Similarly, in 2001, Gaz de France’s (GdF) gas foreign sales rose 43 
percent. More recently, GdF has bought a 24.5 percent stake in the Slovak company SPP for 
1.4 billion euros and German assets of Preussag Energie, a subsidiary of the TUI group, for 
859 million euros. 
10 Chapter 1
March 2002) and the devastating mid-term evaluation of the Lisbon strategy 
by the Kok report (2004), the Commission laid down an improved strategy, 
entitled Better regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union. One key 
objective of the renewed Lisbon Strategy, launched in 2005, is to focus exclu-
sively on ensuring a simple and high quality regulatory environment, which 
is subsumed under the buzz word: better regulation (Radaelli, 2007).5 Simpli-
fication within EU competitiveness policy entails legislation (Barrosso, 2006) 
which carefully strikes the right balance between the cost and benefits of leg-
islation. Since effective, timely transposition of internal market legislation af-
fects the costs and benefits of the new policy, timely and correct transposition 
is the first action point falling under the Lisbon action plan (European Com-
mission, 2005) adopted by the member states in February 2005. In line with 
Allio and Fandel (2006:7), I argue that better regulation cannot be achieved 
without serious attention to transposition, enforcement and evaluation.
In parallel, on the national level, most of the member states are seriously con-
cerned about the persistent transposition deficit in the European Union, as 
well as its causes and consequences. This concern makes the transposition 
issue an interesting field of research. In the UK, the Bellis report (2003) lays 
out guidelines to improve the implementation of EU legislation in the United 
Kingdom. In Germany, a federal government modernising committee has 
made a lot of noise in its discussions about reforming German federal consti-
tution; in particular, the committee has been pushing for expedited processes 
of implementing EC directives. In the Netherlands, in November 2004, the 
secretary of state of Foreign Affairs and the minister of Justice announced six 
recommendations on how to improve the speed of transposition on short no-
tice. Even better performing member states, like Sweden, have reconsidered 
their coordination system (Kaeding, 2007) and moved the EU co-ordination 
secretariat from the ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister’s office 
to better coordinate the policies towards the EU in general and  to improve 
their transposition records in particular.
Obviously, from an empirical point of view, EU implementation is a puzzling 
phenomenon. On one hand, compliance with EU legislation stands reputedly 
high on governments’ agendas, which alone is crucial for the achievement of 
the Lisbon goals set for 2010. Furthermore, full implementation of EU legisla-
tion is a legal obligation enshrined in the treaties. Nevertheless, on the other 
hand, it is yet not followed by most member states. Demystifying the Com-
mission’s implementation deficit figure of 1.3 per cent, the fragmentation fac-
tor uncovers that 9 percent of the internal market directives have not achieved 
their full affect in 2006, with more than 770 notifications still pending. At the 
5 The current EU initiative on ‘better regulation’ has its origins in the Edinburgh European 
summit of December 1992. EU heads of state decided to make the task of simplifying and 
improving the EU regulatory environment one of the Community’s main priorities.
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same time, the ECJ recently set record fines for non-implementation, penal-
ties that have the damaging effect on a ‘laggard’s image. ‘What’s the point of 
having new legislation if it remains dead in the water?’, Why do some mem-
ber states refuse to comply with EU law, despite the image-marring effect and 
costly consequences?
1.1.2 The theoretical puzzle: ‘Plenty of room for improvement’
Interestingly, in EU studies, each component of the policy cycle has garnered 
different degrees of attention. For a long time, studies about European inte-
gration focused mainly on the coming about of European integration (Haas, 
1958; Spinelli, 1972; Mitrany, 1966; Moravcsik, 1991; Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet, 1997).6 In the mid-1990s, there was an upsurge in Europeanization 
studies dealing  with the effects of European integration on the member states 
in general (for an overview see Olsen, 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; 
Mair, 2004). However, it was not until a few years later that studies on the im-
plementation phase became a burgeoning field of scholarly interest that they 
are today. Over the last couple of years, the field has grown out of childhood 
and entered adolescence.
Some puzzling features, however, indicate that additional scholarly efforts in 
the field are compulsory in order for it to finally reach maturity. Five areas of 
improvement are eligible. Each will be executed successively here, and in the 
literature review chapter in more detail. The improvements are: increases in 
empirical and conceptual strength; a lesson from the 1970s implementation 
literature; a straightforward combined methodological approach; a contribu-
tion to existing cumulative data; a theoretical motivated selection of cases.
Indeed, the first ‘two waves’ (Mastenbroek, 2005) of the implementation lit-
erature were either eclectic in nature or failed to facilitate the ex-post formula-
tion of clear predictions. Only recent efforts of the so-called third wave (ibid) 
have started to engage in a more analytical research (Haverland, 2000; Héri-
tier, Kerwer, Knill, Lehmkuhl, Teutsch and Dourillet, 2001; Giuliani, 2003; 
Treib, 2003; Falkner et al., 2005) by bringing in ‘political’ variables that may 
capture the overriding power of substantive positions of domestic policy 
makers. They have set in to leave aside the foremost ad-hoc legal and public 
administration explanations (Krislov et al., 1986; Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988; 
Pappas, 1995) and the spurious and deterministic goodness-of-fit argument 
(Duina, 1997; Börzel, 2003) which have been critically assessed in Masten-
broek and Kaeding (2006). 
6 For a detailed overview see Rosamond (2000).
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When theorizing policy outcomes of the subsequent implementation phase, 
most existing EU implementation studies give no attention to the adoption 
phase of the EU policy-cycle. In other words, scholars have not taken on board 
Pressman and Wildawsky’s (1973) notion that ‘implementation should be part 
of design,’ suggesting that policy theory is formulated ‘with a view toward its 
execution’ (ibid: 189). Since we should consider ‘the EU as a laboratory [even] 
for testing and advancing theories and models of implementation in general’ 
(Sverdrup, 2005: 5), scholars may follow recent efforts (Mastenbroek, 2003; 
Kaeding, 2006) to include policy design-related and policy implementation-
related factors in the theoretical models. Features of the European legislation 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in the decision-making phase may have 
considerable influence on the outcome of the subsequent national implemen-
tation process, such as national transposing instruments.
In terms of methodology, scholarly work in the field has been dominated 
by the use of monostrand research designs (Gabel, Hix and Schneider, 2002; 
Nyikos and Pollack, 2003; Jupille, 2005). The scholarly work on EU imple-
mentation has especially been been driven by case study oriented research 
(Versluis, 2004; Beach, 2005; among others). Some recent contributions have 
added quantitative research designs (Lampinen and Uusikyla, 1998; Börzel, 
2001; Mbaye, 2001; Bursens, 2002; Sverdrup, 2002; Giuliani, 2003; Linos, 
2007; Perkins and Neumayer, 2007). Nevertheless, these two methodologi-
cally divided groups often stand apart. In line with recent developments in 
other academic fields (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003) the implementation lit-
erature may improve its empirical and conceptual strengths using combined 
approaches.  An integrated strategy may improve the prospects of making 
valid causal inferences in cross-national research by drawing on the distinct 
strengths of a so-called mixed-method approach. Lieberman’s article (2005) 
in the American Political Science Review may prove a helpful guide for carrying 
out such work. 
In addition, more attention should be given to the improvement of the data 
quality of large-n studies. The limited number of scholars consists of two 
generations. Whereas the first generation relies exclusively on existing Com-
mission scoreboards and infringement data, the second generation (Mas-
tenbroek, 2003; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2005; Berglund, Gange and van 
Waarden, 2006; Haverland and Romeijn, 2007; Kaeding, 2006) has started to 
improve the data quality by cross-checking; as a result, these studies have 
and replenished existing EU data with national sources.
Last but not least, implementation research may further profit from select-
ing untended but theoretically relevant member states and policy areas. 
Why is it that despite its importance for European integration and its theo-
retical relevance in terms of its centralist politico-administrative structure in 
Europe, France is rarely covered in comparative implementation projects? 
Even smaller member states, such as Austria, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, 
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Portugal and Sweden, have not attracted much scholarly attention (Masten-
broek, 2005). An additional look at the policy areas corroborates the selection 
bias found in the literature. As in the case for EU studies in general and the 
implementation literature in particular environmental and social policy are 
clearly the most-researched policy areas (Ostner and Lewis, 1995; Eichener, 
1995; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Haverland, 2000; Falkner et al., 2005; Haver-
land and Romeijn, 2007). For a better understanding of the EU policy out-
comes, and in line with Franchino (2005), scholars may invest more time 
in older policies that are at the core of the Union and still follow the theo-
retically relevant regulatory style, such as transport (Alesina, Angeloni and 
Schuknecht, 2005).
All in all, the EU implementation phenomenon is puzzling in two ways. 
Although full implementation of EU legislation is a legal obligation enshrined 
in the treaties, and also a necessary step in meeting the Lisbon goals in 2010, 
it is yet not followed by most member states. More than 770 notifications still 
pending and coincide with ever new ECJ record fines. Why do some mem-
ber states refuse to comply with EU law, despite the image-marring effect in 
posterior EU negotiations and costly consequences in times of tight budge-
lines and swooning domestic confidence with the EU (Anderson and Kaed-
ing, 2006)? Even more bewildering, existing EU implementation studies have 
left the research community with some additional inconsistencies. While a 
considerable number of studies lack empirical and conceptual strengths and 
do not draw from earlier findings such as the implementation literature of the 
1970s or recent scholarly efforts to improve quantitative data. Moreover, this 
area of research yet has not attempted combined research designs that draw 
on the distinct strengths of the important approaches which at present divide 
the scholarly contributions along the artificial lines of rivalling quantitative 
and qualitative camps.
1.2 Research question
Until now, this paper applied the terms compliance, implementation and 
transposition interchangeably. However, in line with Giuliani (2005), I argue 
that the concept of compliance ‘goes well beyond the process of transposition 
of legal provisions’(ibid: 1).7  In the remaining chapters, this current study 
will only refer to transposition as the term action that denotes the  ‘process 
of transforming directives into provisions of national law by the competent 
national legislative body or bodies’ (Prechal, 1995: 5).
7 It includes the implicit recognition of firmly-established ‘ways of doing things’, the observ-
ance of loosely-established pacts, rational compliance with self-interested agreements, the 
observance of appropriate conduct with the EU ‘club’, the fulfillment of rather severely 
controlled and sanctioned obligations and duties’ (Giuliani, 2005: 1).
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Two transposition aspects, according to Articles 10 and 249 EC, are important, 
namely: timeliness and correctness. First, transposition of EU legislation en-
tails that member states transpose legislation on time. Second, member states 
must adopt national legislation that is in line with the contents of the origi-
nal EU law. Also, with regard to timely and correct transposition, directives 
are of particular interest. ‘A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave 
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.’ (Article 249 EC). 
Hence, directives are not directly applicable at the national level, but have to 
be incorporated into national law first.
This study focuses on the time aspect of national transposition processes of 
European directives across member states. Posed to unravel the implementa-
tion puzzles, the main and subsequent research questions are as follows:
Main question:
Why do member states miss deadlines when transposing EU internal market directives?
Subsequent questions:
What factors determine delays when transposing EU directives?
How do these factors influence the timeliness of the national transposition processes?
Under what conditions are transpositions of directives delayed?
To give a satisfactory answer to the main research question ‘Why member 
states miss deadlines when transposing EU internal market directives’ and its sub-
questions, this study opts for a combined research design. To review, the first 
research sub- question (‘What factors determine delayed national transposition 
processes?’) calls for an investigation of the underlying correlations between 
the dependent and independent variables. The second research sub- question 
(‘How these determinants influence the timeliness of the national transposition proc-
esses?’) addresses the underlying causal effects. The third research sub- ques-
tion (‘Under what conditions these national transposition processes are delayed?’) 
assesses the relative importance of the causal mechanisms identified by the 
second research sub- question and lying underneath the correlations speci-
fied with the first research sub- question.
1.3 The Theoretical argument
To address the abovementioned research question and in line with some 
recent burgeoning rationalist explanations for EU policy implementation 
outcomes (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000; Franchino, 2005; Steunenberg, 
2006; 2007) this study presents an actor-centred theoretical framework. The 
argument will be developed in subsequent chapters, at length, but can be suc-
cinctly summarized as follows:
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To start, this study argues that a transposition process normally induces policy 
change at the member state level. Decisions on policy change are, quite often, 
fundamental bargaining problems about who gets what and when. Drawing 
from the war of attrition games in economics literature this study refers to the 
transposition outcome as a bargaining game between groups of actors who 
must agree, within an allotted timeframe, on a new national policy. National 
transposition actors, such as administrators and politicians, must, within a set 
deadline, agree on how to implement the policy in a manner complying with 
EU law. They are able to weigh every choice against its alternatives and they 
invariably choose the most preferred option. Assuming that the demands are 
incompatible, the actors can either reiterate the previous demand and wait for 
the opponent to lower his demand or actors can change their demand. Wait-
ing (i.e. delaying national transposition processes) can be costly. Who ends 
the game and when, depends on the player’s expected payoff. There exist 
payoffs to certain actors that choose to wait for a particular waiting time. The 
expected flows of payoffs to an actor equals to the difference between benefits 
and costs, while both elements are affected by particular factors. Whereas 
both include the time component that determines the flow of benefits and 
costs, respectively, they vary in terms of additional elements: rent proportion, 
rent-seeking costs and discount factor.
Indulged by the new policy and the total amount of waiting time expected 
during the encounter, each player must choose a moment of agreement at 
which he plans to concede in the event that the other payer has not already 
conceded.  The first player to quit the contest cedes the reward to the other 
side. Increasing the rent proportion decreases the benefits and increases the 
risk of waiting. Furthermore, it is the rent-seeking costs, i.e. the cost of the bat-
tle in the pursuit of these benefits that determine the flow of payoff. Increasing 
the cost determinant increases the cost-side of the difference and decreases 
the likelihood of a complicated and time-consuming negotiation process. In 
addition, increasing an actor’s waiting time increases the waiting costs with 
every additional unit per time. Therefore, payoffs decrease over time. Last 
but not least, players discount future payoffs. The higher the discount rate 
(the less players discount future payoffs), future cost/benefit payoffs are per-
ceived as almost similar to the current ones.
In sum, three sets of explanatory factors for the timeliness of national trans-
position processes that influence the cost/benefit structure of the actors can 
be identified combining legal, administrative as well as political factors: EU-
level, national-level and crises-related multipliers. While the European level 
indicators are policy-design related, national are policy-implementation 
related and crises-related factors stand on their own.
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Policy-design related:
This study acknowledges that transposition actors cannot modify the policy 
in ways that are substantially different from the draft adopted by the Coun-
cil. If already existing national measures lie within the margins of discretion 
controlled by the Commission, then no new national transposing instrument 
has to be agreed upon.  If the national status quo lies outside the discretionary 
margins set by the directive, then, new legislation has to be adopted (Steunen-
berg, 2006). The higher the amount of discretion, ceteris paribus, the more difficult to 
settle an agreement on time.
Furthermore, delays can be minimized if sufficient time is allotted, that is, 
if the deadline gives member states ample time to act. A comfortable trans-
position timeframe extends the time-horizon and discounts future payoffs 
considerably which increases the likelihood of a swift transposition. The more 
time a member state has to transpose a directive, ceteris paribus, the swifter the na-
tional transposition process.
In addition, the fixed transposition deadline affects the rent-seeking costs per 
unit of time which are constant until the deadline. Only with its expiry the po-
tential threat of a likely cumbersome, time-consuming and image damaging 
infringement procedure becomes real and adds an additional cost function to 
the payoff equation. Therefore, this study argues that there is a positive, uni-
directional probability of a compromise at the transposition deadline- dead-
line effect (Carré, 2000). Actors come to an agreement around the date of expiry.
Policy-implementation-related:
Depending on the form of the national implementing instrument, the number 
of actors varies and affects the timeliness of transposition (Steunenberg and 
Voermans, 2005). The more actors that are involved, the more difficult it is to 
coordinate and to reach a settlement of the conflict (Shepsle and Boncheck, 
1997). N- games are more complicated to resolve due to problems common to 
group interaction (Raiffa, Richardson and Metcalfe, 2002). Since delay is cost-
ly, this study suggests that countries with a good deal of political fragmenta-
tion commonly adopted policy change later (Haverland, 2000; Giuliani, 2003; 
Steunenberg, 2006). The fewer actors involved in the making of a legal instrument, 
ceteris paribus, the less likely a delayed transposition process.
Member states often use one national transposing measure to transpose a 
handful of EU directives at the same time, in what is known as a national 
transposition package approach. Depending on the position of the EU direc-
tive within the transposition package, which is determined by the package’s 
size and range of deadlines, the rent-seeking costs may remain low; however, 
they are raised tremendously after the expiry of the deadline of the first EU 
directives in the package. Due to actors’ cost function, a national transposition 
package increases the probability of delayed settlement of the first directive in the 
national transposition package, whereas, in turn, it accelerates a settlement of the last 
European directive.
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Depending on its timing, a national general election can have either a retard-
ing or accelerating effect. Its affect hinges on the value of the discount factor 
of the future. While general elections that fall at the end of a national transpo-
sition process increases the costs of waiting dramatically (threat of withdraw-
al or new introduction due to ‘legislative deadline’), the actor discounting 
future payoffs very marginally. If transposition is not concluded before the 
start of the next legislative term, a general election will shelf it, along with all 
other unfinished legislative projects. Hence, all non-adopted legislation in the 
concluding legislative term would have to be re-introduced in the forthcom-
ing term, which would increase the discount rate unbearably, making trans-
position before the end of the legislative period more likely. Whereas a national 
general election falling at the beginning of the transposition procedure decreases the 
probability of a problem-free settlement, a general election at the end of a transposi-
tion process accelerates the adoption of new national legislation.
Crisis-related:
Exogenous shocks that aggravate economic conditions increase the cost of 
not adopting reforms and thus prompt a solution to the bargaining problem 
(Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Analogically, situation-
al changes in member states also affect the progress of transposition. Such 
changes, for the purposes of this study, include accidents which occur rela-
tively often in the transport sector – the later focus of this study. These acci-
dents add additional costs to the constant rent-seeking costs additional costs, 
unbalancing the payoff equation and thereby increasing the probability of a 
fast settlement. An accident increases the probability of a timely settlement.
1.4 The research design
In order to answer the main research question and its three subsequent ques-
tions and to test the hypotheses derived from the study’s theoretical frame-
work, different methods are required. Following Lieberman’s systematic 
guide (2005) for carrying out a combined design, I first test the correlations of 
explanatory variables with a large-n data set applying an ordered multinomi-
al logistic regression analysis.  This large-n analyses will guide case selection 
and provide direction for more focused case studies and comparisons. Then, 
four case studies are presented; they corroborate existing findings by the ear-
lier technique, but also, uncover the causal mechanisms that lay beneath the 
correlations between the timeliness of the national transposition processes 
and the individual components of the theoretical framework. In particular 
these case studies are used to generate theoretical insights from off-liner 
cases. Finally, I end with a concluding test of the hypotheses (that is generated 
from the large-n and small-n research) by running an intermediate research 
technique: the fuzzy set technique. Next to its test for generalizability of the 
case studies’ findings, the fuzzy set technique develops better measurement 
strategies to bring the relative significance of single and combinations of con-
ditions forward.
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Generally speaking, this study will show that a ‘triangulation’ of research 
techniques can eventually result in a rich and well-rounded understanding of 
the national transposition processes. Quantitative analysis can offer overall 
trends in deceptively similar national transposition records that based upon 
coded national transposition instruments. Qualitative analysis can potential-
ly explain ambivalent statistical results produced by those data. Special at-
tention here is paid to the added value given by the diversity-oriented fuzzy 
set technique which has not found its way yet in EU studies, in general, or EU 
implementation, in particular.
More specifically, the population of cases to which the theory is meant to 
apply are all national transposition instruments. The dependent variable is 
timeliness of a national transposition process of a EU directive operationalized as 
transposition delay. In order to test the hypotheses, a selection of observa-
tions from this population is required. This study, therefore, will focus on 
the transport acquis communautaire adopted between 1995 and 2004. The largely 
ignored transport sector is selected because it represents, among other things, 
the predominantly regulatory character of EU policies with a comparatively 
high number of directives –the focus of this study. Since social science cannot 
be explained without comparison, this study opted to compare nine member 
states, namely: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Nether-
lands, Greece, Sweden, and Ireland. All dimensions of the explanatory variables 
are covered through these nine states.
Drawing from recent scholarly efforts the collected data on the dependent 
and independent variables are of second generation.  First, I have tried to rely, 
as far as possible, on what Moravcsik (1998: 80) calls ‘hard primary sources’, 
with a strong preference for contemporary official European and national 
data bases available for citation and replication by other scholars. I supple-
ment and cross-check these official data through additional political data 
provided by the European Journal of Political Research and newspapers. In ad-
dition, I carefully used insider publications, such as Agence Europe, and con-
ducted interviews with key officials from EU, who are rich sources of behind-
the-scenes information about the national transposition processes. Interviews 
with experts provide the possibility of obtaining the information required 
for the theoretical framework, and also provide deep and accurate informa-
tion that cannot be expected from surveys or from data content analysis. The 
policy experts interviewed were selected according to their knowledge of the 
EU directives and the national transposition instruments, respectively. Gen-
erally, since they were active participants of the negotiation and the national 
transposition process, they had first-hand knowledge of the situations inves-
tigated.
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1.5 Outline of the book
The book is divided into four parts. The first part is devoted to acquainting the 
reader with the several potholes in the existing EU implementation literature, 
and with the main characteristics of EU transport policy. A look at the inner-
workings of the transport sector will support the application of an actor-cen-
tred theoretical framework to explain the timeliness of national transposition 
processes. This framework forms the second part of the study. The third part 
of the study is devoted to the analysis of the research. Some time will be de-
voted to present the ways in which one can improve the quality of existing EU 
data, which then will accurately assess the EU’s problematic implementation 
deficit. What follows is a broad array of quantitative and qualitative evidence 
aimed at testing the expectations derived in the theoretical chapter, measuring 
the timeliness of national transposition processes. A large-n analysis is suc-
ceeded by four case studies fleshing out existing findings and pinpointing an 
important missing factor. Then, the fuzzy set technique tests the hypotheses 
generated from the large-n and small-n research.  Furthermore, it develops 
better measurement strategies to bring the relative significance of single and 
combinations of conditions forward. The fourth part of this study summarizes 
the findings and elaborates on their contributions and broader implications.
Part I – Introduction and background:
Chapter two: Literature review
This chapter provides a critical assessment of the existing body of literature that 
is most relevant to the theoretical, methodological, and empirical focus of this 
study. It announces major problematic characteristics that plague the literature 
on EU implementation: ad-hoc, little explanatory power, deterministic, myopic and 
biased. This chapter especially embraces the recent efforts of the so-called ‘third 
wave’ implementation studies by researching the role of domestic politics on 
processes of implementation, in order to generate clearer predictions that can 
be empirically tested. In the subsequent chapters, this study attempts to add to 
these recent improvement efforts and to address the theoretical, empirical, and 
methodological weaknesses of EU implementation studies.
Chapter three: Development of EU transport policy (1957-2006)
This chapter examines the historical development of the EU transport policy 
field. A look into this field will later inform the theoretical framework by ex-
plaining why member states miss the EU directive transposition deadlines. 
After reviewing the scarce political science literature on EU transport policy, 
the chapter presents the European institutional setting in terms of transport 
policy. Subsequently, it is put forth that the integration process can be char-
acterized as recent, gradual, uneven, complex, and crises-driven. The EU’s sub-
sequent rounds of enlargement, as well as the shifting of the Commission’s 
approach toward transport, have shaped the development of EU transport 
policy. Yet, it is reasoned that transport policy is particularly shaped by sub-
sector specific crises.
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Part II – The timing of transposition:
Chapter four: Theoretical framework
Chapter four develops an actor-centred theoretical bargaining framework for 
the timeliness of national transposition processes. It offers a series of testable 
hypothesis tailored to the transport sector, but which can be generalised to 
any EU policy area. Drawing from the war of attrition logic, first, this chapter
walks through the ways in which policy change occurs; a look at the effects of change 
follows. Next to European directive specific and national forms and methods of imple-
mentation, which form the first two parts of the theoretical framework, this chapter 
also identifies the particular role of transport-related accidents in the transposition 
phase. All these factors affect timeliness of national transposition processes. 
Who ends the bargain and when, depends on the players’ expected payoff, i.e. 
the cost/benefit structures of the actors for waiting a particular time. Where-
as the flow of benefits to actors is positively related to the rent proportion 
and negatively related to time, the flow of costs is determined by the play-
ers’ cost determinant and time. Furthermore, discounting the future benefits 
shadows on the players’ decisions on whether to delay, wait and hold out for 
the reward in question, i.e. waiting in the hope that the other will make some 
significant concession.
Part III – Analysis within a combined research design:
Chapter five: EU 1995-2004 transport transposition data set
This chapter presents a high quality data set of basic variables that helps us 
make a deductive, systematic, empirical, and analytical study of the EU trans-
position performance of member states. This new, more reliable data set covers 
almost two-third of the full population of the EU transport acquis from 1995 to 2004. 
It includes EU directive specific features, and the characteristics of the na-
tional implementing instruments of nine member states, namely: France, Ger-
many, the UK, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Sweden, and Italy. First, this 
chapter addresses the choices on selection of, among others, the policy field, 
the member states, and the time period of investigation. Subsequently, it pres-
ents the sources of information and assesses the completeness of the data set, 
devoting some attention to missing values. It then conducts first descriptive 
analyses of the national implementing instruments.
Chapter six: Transposition deficit – Statistical illusion or reality?
This chapter offers a more advanced assessment of the new data set. It shows 
that especially the Netherlands, France, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Germany have 
serious transposition problems in their transport sectors. Based on the information 
of 367 national implementing measures, this chapter shows that EU transpo-
sition deficit is more than just a statistical illusion. Almost 50 per cent of the na-
tional transposition instruments are not transposed on time, and in fact are delayed 
up to almost five years. Cross-country variance is respectable, the difference 
between the laggard the Netherlands and the champion Sweden, remarkable. 
Furthermore, differences in median and mean values of delay uncover that 
70 percent of delayed directives are more than six months tardy (mean value). 
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Consequently, this chapter identifies three groups of outcome: on time, delayed by less 
than six months, and delayed by more than six months.
Chapter seven: Determinants of transposition delay
In this chapter, the independent variables are operationalised and the follow-
ing research methods presented. With a dependent variable coded trichoto-
mously (no delay, short and long delay) this study runs an ordered multino-
mial logistic regression and discusses its results. By these, existing arguments 
in the current literature are confirmed and challenged. Comparing three 
groups of transposition outcomes it shows that EU directive specific charac-
teristics explain short delays, but national level explanatory variables explain 
long delays. The statistical results strongly support the central argument that Euro-
pean level, national level, and crises-related factors together account for transposition 
delays and that an actor-centred model has some explanatory power.
Chapter eight: Case selection
There are clear benefits of using large-n and case study research designs 
concomitantly in EU implementation studies in particular. As an example of 
how to undertake such a challenge, this chapter deals with case selection for 
the subsequent case study chapter which will help to further fine-tune the 
findings and address some remaining limitations of the prior results. First, 
it presents the criteria for case selection. A case is eligible if the fit of the sta-
tistical model is relatively satisfying or not, depending on the calculated de-
viant residuals. This study opts for carrying out a model-testing and -improving 
approach. A most-similar/most-different design, then, guides the selection of 
four national implementing measures: two well-explained (on-the-line) cases 
and two outlying (off-the-line) cases. The four cases include three countries 
and two transport sub-sectors.
Chapter nine: Four case studies – Two on- and two off-liners
This chapter carries out the case study analysis. The structures of the four 
case studies, which are traced back, are outlined. They include: the French 
implementing process of Directive 1998/55/EC of July 1998 on minimum re-
quirements for vessels, the Spanish transposition process of Directive 2001/14/
EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity, the German transposi-
tion process for Directive 2002/59/EC on Community vessels traffic monitor-
ing and information system, and the French implementing process of Directive 
2001/53/EC on marine equipment. The evidence from these cases shows that 
the process-tracing method is a helpful research tool and contributing to the 
underlying mixed-method research design of this book. It strongly confirms 
overall expectations about the conditions under which member states miss transpo-
sition deadlines. It also pinpoints a missing explanatory variable: political priority 
assigned to the specific transposition process.
Chapter ten: Necessary and sufficient conditions for timely transposition
Since it would be problematic to account for political priority in 365 cases a 
third method is presented. Completing the combined design, chapter ten pro-
vides an additional test of the extended list of hypotheses generated from the 
small-n research for a ‘middle range’ set of data. Futhermore, in addressing 
some limitations of the earlier analyses, it is the so-called fuzzy set technique, 
which, eventually, identifies usually necessary and sufficient set of conditions 
for timely transposition. Its ‘calibrated data’ of the outcome and the causal 
factors, individually, can show that logic of partial membership conveys the 
diversity of the real world, rather than the artificial research dichotomies of 
yes/no assignments. The results of four usually necessary conditions, which exert 
their effect independent of all other factors and are present in all instances of an out-
come, are discussed.
Part IV: Conclusions:
Chapter eleven: Discussion, conclusion and outlook
In this chapter, the findings of the empirical examination are synthesised. 
The evidence bearing on the hypotheses of the transposition framework is 
assessed. The findings of this study are mainly twofold, namely: empirical, 
and methodological. It is argued that the EU has a multifaceted implementa-
tion problem. Seven driving factors crucial to the timeliness of national transposi-
tion processes of EU legislation are identified. They are subsumed under three 
broader groups: policy design-related (EU level), policy implementation re-
lated (national level), crisis-related factors. Potential generalisations, from the 
empirical data to the broader range of EU legislation, are suggested. From a 
methodological point of view, it is suggested that, despite epistemological in-
consistencies, one can employ the correlational, case study and the fuzzy set 
techniques, which is not yet used in EU studies, to enrich knowledge on the 
implementation of EU legislation. Whereas regression analysis is concerned 
more with the effects of a cause and case studies on the causes of the effect, the 
diversity-oriented fuzzy set method allows asking under which assumptions 
given causal factors might be necessary or sufficient for an outcome. Hence, 
the mixed-method approaches, in general and the fuzzy set technique, in particular, 
are, in EU implementation studies, heralded as ‘diamonds in the rough’.
22 Chapter 1
Chapter 2: 
Literature review
’Lost in translation? Responding to the challenges of European Law’ 
(Title of twenty-seventh report of UK House of Commons Committee 
of Public Accounts (2005-2006), 1 February 2006).
Responding to the challenges of European law, scholars have developed 
unique concepts and approaches in their studies of the EU. Both the EU’s 
effects on member states (Europeanization), in general, and the EU’s effects 
on the translation of EU legislation into national law, in particular, have been 
areas of interest. 
2.1 Introduction
This particular body of literature will be screened to assess its potential to 
answer the research question: ‘Why do member states miss deadlines when 
transposing EU internal market directives?’ Reviewing this implementation 
literature accordingly, I identify five puzzling main features. First, while all 
three neo-institutionalisms have offered ‘potential’ explanations for policy 
change, the sociological has clearly attracted the most scholarly attention. 
Absorbed in the so-called goodness-of-fit literature, however, this perspec-
tive has limits. A clear problem is its overly deterministic nature: it presup-
poses that national governments and parliaments want to maintain the status 
quo (Duina, 1997). Second, the methodological approach is biased toward 
mono-method designs (small-n qualitative case studies), with an exclusive 
focus on a handful of member states and very few policy areas. In addition, 
most studies are recent and isolated from the decision making process on the 
European level in Brussels. This study, however, argues that we must engage 
in the carry-over of the development and decision-making phases to the im-
plementation phase. This amalgamation of ideas is important in the sense 
that states may be more or less likely to transpose depending on the extent to 
which the European directive agreed upon at the European level conforms 
with national forms and methods of implementation, capacity, and interests.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it sketches the bottom-up Euro-
pean integration literature and then the top-down Europeanization literature, 
which closes the loop of the three-step EU policy cycle by bringing back the 
domestic level to EU studies. Then, I review the comparative politics imple-
mentation literature 8 in light of the research question. In particular, I assess 
8 Note that I do not address the IR compliance literature, which has been reviewed exten-
sively elsewhere (Haas, 2000; Tallberg, 2002; Mbaye, 2001; Börzel, Hoffman and Dudziak, 
2005, Linos, 2007). For an assessment of potential theoretical approaches to compliance see 
Giuliani (2005).
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the main contributions to the rich scholarly field, and identify five puzzling 
main characteristics.  To conclude, the study summarizes the findings that 
will further guide the current study’s line of argumentation.
2.2 European integration and Europeanization
For the past several years, the main focus of comparative politics has been 
on the bottom-up process of institution-building and political integration at 
the European level. There exist two inter-related processes at the European 
level. First, policy competences are delegated to the supranational level to 
achieve particular policy outcomes. Second, a new set of political institutions 
are established, with executive, legislative, and judicial powers (Goetz and 
Hix, 2000). Different integration theories have emerged over the last decades 
(Rosamond, 2000), namely: neo-functionalism (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963), 
intergovernmentalism (Hofmann, 1966; Taylor, 1982), federalism (Spinelli, 
1972), liberal-intergouvernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993; 1998), multi-level 
governance (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996), historical institutionalism 
(Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1997), and sociological constructivism (Risse in 
Diez and Wiener, 2003). Scholars who have systematically applied one, two, 
or all three new institutionalisms to European integration have been reviewed 
extensively elsewhere (Pollack, 2001; Jupille and Caporaso, 1999; Aspinwall 
and Schneider, 2000; Dowding, 2000).
Less attention, however, has been paid to the reverse top-down relationship, 
namely how European integration might impact EU member states. How-
ever, with the re-launch of the integration process in the mid-1980s, the Euro-
pean Community (EC) had become a polity – a political system that can be 
analyzed with the tools of most domestic systems. In the end, the term ‘Euro-
peanization’ was coined to mean the effects of integration. Europeanization 
represents a response to the challenge to bring the domestic level back to 
European studies and, consequently, ‘closes the loop’ (see Figure 2.3).
Generally speaking, Europeanization is a recently expanding field of research 
as well as a ‘highly contested concept’ (Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000: 235). 
Europeanization, like globalization, is not one thing. The impact of European-
ization varies across countries, sectors, and regions (Börzel, 2003). Further-
more, Europeanization is not political integration, which belongs rather to the 
ontological stage of research. Instead, Europeanization is concerned with what 
happens once EU institutions are in place and produce their effects (Capo-
raso and Wittenbrinck, 2006; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003: 35). European-
ization is not tantamount with convergence (Ladrech, 1994), which can be a 
consequence of Europeanization; nor, in fact, is it synonymous to harmoniza-
tion, which reduces regulatory diversity.
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But, then, what is Europeanization?  Recent studies (Olsen, 2002; Feather-
stone and Radaelli, 2003; Buller and Gamble, 2002; Green Cowles, Caporaso 
and Risse, 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000; Vink, 2003; Giuliani, 2004) iden-
tify a number of understandings, as follows. First, Europeanization is the de-
velopment of institutions of governance at the European level (Green Cowles 
et al, 2001). Whereas Sbragia (2001) focuses on policy changes, Risse (2001) on 
normative changes, and Checkel (2003) on constitutional changes, Cowles fo-
cuses on state-society relations. Much of this literature, hence, deals with both 
direct and binding pressures of EU legislation more specifically for national 
adaptation and the implementation of EU legislation in particular.  Second, 
it is the end goal of political unification in Europe. Third, Europeanization 
is the European form of organization and governance that is being exported 
from Europe. Fourth, it is a process in which domestic politics becomes in-
creasingly subjected to European policy-making. Finally, Europeanization is 
a ‘smokescreen for domestic policy manoeuvres’ (Buller and Gamble, 2002).
Later, a considerable part of the Europeanization literature review that fol-
lows deals with the implementation of EU legislation, which is defined as 
the processes through which European norms are transposed, enforced, and 
evaluated. In this context, scholars have turned their attention to the institu-
tional patterns of adjustment to European policies, and in particular to the 
national implementation of EU law, the latter of which is central in this book 
and will be the focus of the remaining literature review.
European Union 
   
Top-down
European integration      Europeanisation 
institution-building                            effects of European
and political integration integration on
domestic level 
  Bottom-up
     
Member States 
Figure 2.3: European integration and Europeanization.  
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2.3 Literature on EU implementation: RELATIVELY RECENT, 
WITH LITTLE EXPLANATORY POWER, MYOPIC AND BIASED
Some scholars put the impact of European integration, understood here as 
the impact of the EU on national legal output, in perspective (Bovens and 
Yesilkagit, 2004; van Kersbergen and Lauwers, 2005). Testing the ‘80% thesis’ 
9 figures for the Netherlands uncover that only about 12.5 per cent of Dutch 
legal measures were influenced by EU law. UK figures reveal that, for exam-
ple, in 2002/2003, 41 per cent of regulations originated in the EU. Irrespective 
of the broader debate about whether implementation is an interesting and 
important field of research in political science, the literature in the area has 
flourished since the late 1980s. The literature on EU implementation is com-
prised of a mixture of studies that offer ‘potential’ theoretical explanations of 
the extent to which Europeanization occurs. Mastenbroek (2005) identifies 
three waves of scholarship on EU implementation which inherently have the 
following characteristics (see also Treib, 2006).
2.3.1 Recent and ad-hoc explanations with little explanatory power:
The first wave (Mastenbroek, 2005) was rather eclectic in nature, proposing nu-
merous legal and politico-administrative explanations about the implementation 
deficit in member states (Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler, 1986; Siedentop and 
Ziller, 1988; Metcalfe, 1994; Pappas and Arpino, 1995; Ciavarini Azzi, 2000; 
Demmke, 2001; Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998; Mastenbroek, 2003). Pappas 
(1995) examines the implementation of Commission decisions by national 
administrations and identifies the role of national parliaments, the seniority 
and level of centralization of coordination units across the national ministries 
crucial. Siedentop and Ziller (1988) study the implementation of 17 European 
directives in various member states look for ‘national patterns of enforcement 
of EC law’ (ibid: 57). More particularly, the variables that these studies invoke 
to explain regulatory dynamics are usually located at the national level. For 
example, national legislation and legal framework (Peacock, 1988), national 
policy-making processes and such as the consultation of national representa-
tives of workers and employers (Richardson, Gustafsson and Jordan, 1982: 
1-26), national business cultures (Vogel, 1986), national regulatory agencies 
(Kelman, 1988), the national civil service (Vogel, 1986), national public (Vogel, 
1986).
The second wave has focused on the goodness-of-fit hypothesis and has resulted 
in contradictory findings. The goodness-of-fit can be usefully presented as a 
historically institutionalist argument (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2004). The cen-
9 According to several scholars in the field (Hix, 1999: 3), at least 80% of member states’ 
legislation is derived from EU legislation, suggesting a very high impact of the EU on 
national legislation and administration.
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tral claim is that existing institutional paths are resistant to change. If Euro-
pean policy demands can be accommodated within the confines of the path 
already taken, adaptation will be smooth. Conversely, if a directive requires 
profound changes of the existing institutions, EU adaptation will be time-
consuming and initially incorrect. Underpinning this relationship are one of 
two mechanisms depending on whether the, rational choice or sociological in-
stitutionalism perspective is ascribed to. Some focus on the cost-awareness of 
national actors (Duina, 1997; Börzel, 2003; Knill and Lenschow, 1998). Others
 suggest normative notions, bringing the logic of appropriateness to the fore-
front (see Héritier et al., 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Knill, 2001).
Although a handful of scholars have argued that successful implementation 
depends on the fit between European policy requirements and existing in-
stitutions at the national level (Duina, 1997; Duina and Blithe, 1999; Green 
Cowles et al, 2001; Börzel, 2003; Börzel and Risse, 2003), studies have shown 
that a ‘good fit’ is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for problem-
free implementation (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Haverland, 2000; Héritier et 
al., 2001; Falkner et al. 2005; Mastenbroek and Van Keulen, 2006). Focusing on 
national administrative traditions, Knill and Lenschow (1998), for example, 
hypothesize that implementers’ responses to EU requirements are institu-
tionally framed. Striking a more critical note, Haverland (2000) finds that the 
goodness-of-fit is not pivotal in explaining the implementation of a directive 
on packaging waste. Despite a high misfit, the UK, for example, implemented 
the directive relatively on time and correctly. Germany, on the other hand, 
only faced moderate adaptation pressure, but implemented the directive two 
years late. The key to these puzzling results, according to Haverland, are the 
institutional veto points.
Despite these examples most of the second wave models of the implementa-
tion literature, however, do not facilitate the formulation of clear predictions, 
but formulate any ex-post explanations of virtually every implementation 
pattern, which often jeopardizes their necessary explanatory power (Masten-
broek and Kaeding, 2006). The connections between the research and the the-
oretical, substantive, and political concerns that motivate such research have 
little meaningful connection to the actual empirical process (unit of analysis 
and unit of observation problematic). In addition, the second wave models 
are very often overdetermined by adding more and more variables to the 
initial hypothesis. This clearly is not helpful because it leads to overly com-
plex models, which do not allow for ex ante hypothesizing on implemen-
tation outcomes lacking parsimony (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006).
All in all, the goodness-of-fit models lack empirical and conceptual strength. 
Often the relationship between the status quo and the response to the EU 
is spurious, as both variables are contingent upon the preferences of do-
mestic political and administrative actors. This shortcoming in strength has 
been recognized by advocates of the thesis, who have crafted more dynamic 
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frameworks revolving around the goodness-of-fit by bringing in ‘political’ 
variables that may capture the overriding power of substantive positions of 
domestic policy makers. 
The third wave of the implementation literature is characterized by its attempts 
to theorize and research the role of domestic politics on the process of implementa-
tion (Mastenbroek, 2005) paving the way for future research in the field. Héri-
tier et al. (2001) identify a country’s stage of liberalization, its reform capac-
ity, and its dominant belief system as explanatory factors. Haverland (2000) 
argues that the presence or absence of institutional veto positions allow do-
mestic actors to hamper implementation. Along these lines, Mbaye (2001) 
and Giuliani (2003) investigate the effects of the number of veto players; Treib 
(2003) argues that  a party’s political preferences of national governments 
shape transposition records of member states. Falkner et al. (2004) posit that 
the effect of domestic opposition on timely transposition is mediated by a 
member state’s culture of implementation.
More general, rationalist explanations are only recently burgeoning, and are 
still very limited.  An insightful example of an institution-based model, that 
focuses on the role of domestic politics on processes of implementation, is a 
model of implementation developed by Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000) 
based on insights from game theory and analytical politics. A second promis-
ing application is Franchino’s (2005) work on formal models of delegation 
in the European Union, which are closely linked to the issue of implemen-
tation. Last but not least, Steunenberg (2006; 2007) analyses the transposi-
tion problematic by focusing on an actor-oriented approach of transposition 
coordination in the domestic policy arena. Domestic actors are taken as poli-
cy-specific veto players, which is illustrated by two cases of decision-making 
on EU directives in the Netherlands, namely: the cocoa and chocolate prod-
ucts directive, and the laying hens directive. These studies provide empirical 
and conceptional strong research in the field.
2.3.2 Myopic:
Another investigative look at the existing literature on EU implementation 
unveils that scholars have not been inspired by the 1970s public policy imple-
mentation studies (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Bardach, 1977; Berman, 
1978; Mazamanian and Sabatier, 1981). ’This field of research gradually lost 
academic prominence’ (Giuliani, 2005: 5). However, its rich contributions in-
clude an interesting finding that may prove helpful for theoretical approaches 
that model national implementation processes: the link between the adoption 
phase and the subsequent implementation phase. Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1973: 189) argue that ‘implementation should be part of design,’ suggest-
ing that policy theory is formulated ‘with a view toward its execution’ (ibid: 
189). So far, only few recent contributions (Jonsson and Tallberg, 1998; Mas-
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tenbroek, 2003; Kaeding, 2006 among others) explicitly refer to policy design-
related and policy implementation-related factors in their explanatory statis-
tical models.
2.3.3 Methodological divide:
Another characteristic of the EU implementation literature is a clear meth-
odological divide, namely: qualitative work and quantitative contributions. 
This study shows that the implementation literature has not used a so-called 
mixed-method approach, such as, for example, the welfare state literature, 
but primarily uses monostrand designs.10 The scholarly work on EU imple-
mentation, which aims at developing and testing explanatory factors for the 
implementation deficit in member states and in particular policy sectors, 
has been dominated by case study oriented research (for example, Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998; Haverland, 2000; Héritier et al., 2001; Falkner et al., 2005). 
Here, the thorough selection of cases is crucial. Poorly applied, one of the 
greatest pitfalls in the exploratory study involves premature conclusions: the 
findings may seem convincing enough for their inappropriate title of ‘conclu-
sions’. Another hazard of case study analysis is the tendency to extend the
exploratory phase, and to inadequately represent diversity. Only recently 
contributions have added quantitative research designs to the implementa-
tion debate,with the aim of drawing more generalizable findings.
2.3.4 Statistical data of first and second rounds:
Nevertheless, quantitative research on the implementation of EU law is still 
‘wet behind the ears’. The group of scholars consists of two rounds. Whereas 
the first generation relies exclusively on existing EU data, the second genera-
tion has further improved the quality of the data.
First generation:  (a) Commission scoreboards and infringement proceedings
Commission scoreboards: The first proxy for non-implementation of EU law is 
the Commission’s records that monitor the application of Community laws 
that are implemented11. Relying on scoreboards published by the EC, Lamp-
inen and Uusikyla (1998) show that critical mass opinion towards the EU 
does not influence implementation behaviour. On the other hand, member 
states traditionally labelled as corporatist succeed better than non-corporatist 
10 ‘These design use a single research method or data collection technique and correspond-
ing data analysis procedures to answer research questions. They are also known as single-
phase designs.’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003: 711).
11 Since the late 1970s, under the Jenkins’ Presidency, the Commission started pursuing a 
rigorous policy of enforcement by gradually establishing CELEX, which grew into an in-
dispensable interinstitutional information source for non-implementation.
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ones. In line with Bursens (2002), Giuliani (2003) and Sverdrup (2004), who 
tested implementation performance in different countries, Borgehetto et al. 
(2006) assess the causes of noncompliance with the transposition deadlines 
of 2179 EU directives, using the Commission data adopted by the Italian au-
thorities. In the same vein, but for all EU 15 member states, König, Luetgert 
and Mäder (2005) gathered procedural information on all directives initiated 
by the Commission between 1984 and 2002. In total, they piled up 21,227 
cases. Their findings reveal that the larger the level of EU conflict, the more 
EU legislative actors involved: moreover, the findings suggest that the more 
qualified majority voting is applied in the Council, the higher the probability 
is for compliance. The more controversial a directive is, the more likely the 
Commission and other member states will demand compliance: but meeting 
the prescribed deadline may be slightly eased in these cases if the member 
states government welcome EU legislation as an opportunity to circumvent 
the domestic legislative arena by means of secondary instruments.
Commission data, however, have serious shortcomings. The data are very 
unreliable because the scoreboards depend entirely on the notification of the 
national implementing measures by the member states to the Commission 
(Börzel, 2001). Moreover, the validity of the Commission’s data, in light of 
the alleged transposition deficit, is deceptive. By the end of 2003, 2553 direc-
tives were part of the acquis communeautaire (Commission, 2003). Most of the 
directives are in force for many years leading to considerable ‘upward bias’ 
(Mastenbroek, 2003).
First round: (b) Infringement proceedings
The number of infringements within the different stages is usually taken as the 
second indicator of member state performance when implementing Commu-
nity law. Scholars and policy-makers alike base their assessments on statistics 
published in the Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Communi-
ty Law. Focusing on the determinants of the opening up of infringement pro-
ceedings (Börzel, 2001; Tallberg, 2002; Sverdrup, 2004; Beach, 2005; Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2007; Linos, 2007), Mbaye (2001) gathered infringement data from 
1972 to 1993. She broadens the horizon by systematically drawing from the
implementation literature in IR, EU studies, and American federalism. She 
argues that cases of non-implementation in the EU rise with bargaining power 
in the Council, length of membership, and regional autonomy. Börzel et al. 
(2005) and Tallberg (2002) have also collected data on infringement proceedings, 
resulting in large-n data sets, with the goal of garnering more reliable data 
on implementation. Sverdrup (2002) takes the Nordic countries as a focus and 
points at a ‘Nordic model’ of good implementation culture. However, these 
scholars focus solely on explaining infringements, which implies a different 
empirical focus, and is only a crude proxy for timely and correct implemen-
tation.
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Again, there are a few reasons to question whether infringement proceed-
ings are valid and reliable indicators of implementation deficit. Infringement 
proceeding are ‘no indicator of the actual or absolute level’ of non-implemen-
tation in the EU (Börzel, 2001: 808). Since they only cover a fraction of the vio-
lations of Community law in the member states, infringement proceedings 
can only serve as indicators of relative non-implementation (Bursens, 2002). 
Mbaye (2001: 268) argues that a selection bias could even lead us to question 
the representativeness of the infringement data. The Commission may strate-
gically select cases to be brought before the ECJ (Börzel, 2003).
All in all, the shortcomings of the existing data show that the Commission’s 
records would be helpful only if the non-implementation cases prosecuted by 
the ECJ and the Commission were a random sample of all non-transposition 
cases. Börzel (2001) concludes that there are no existing data that allow us to 
draw any valid conclusions about whether the EU has an implementation 
problem.
Second round of  statistical data:
More recent larger-n work, which still represents an exception in the case study 
dominated field of EU implementation studies (Gabel, Hix and Schneider, 
2002; Nyikos and Pollack, 2003), has succeeded in improving the quality of 
existing EU data. In line with the notion that the Commission’s data on mem-
ber states’ infringements and its scoreboards on monitoring the application of 
Community law, in particular, can serve as indicators for non-compliance (as 
long as scholars carefully control for potential selection bias), Mastenbroek 
(2003) created a more reliable database on non-transposition. She constructed 
a database, derived from Celex, containing all EC directives enacted in the 
Netherlands from 1995 to 1998. In addition, she consulted extra overviews 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a list of measures notified to the Commis-
sion by the Dutch government, and a database compiled by the TMC Asser 
Institute (see also Steunenberg and Kaeding, 2007) for all 229 directives. In the 
end, she and others following her example (Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2005; 
Berglund, Gange and van Waarden, 2006; Haverland and Romeijn, 2007; Kae-
ding, 2006), have demonstrated that around 60 per cent of the acquis is not 
notified on time. Although cross-checking with national data is cumbersome 
and time-consuming, it is, for the sake of data quality, necessary. Furthermore, 
it shows the direction by which further quantitative studies in the field can 
enrich and further improve the mainly small-n scholarly work in the field.
2.3.5 Bias in selection of member states and policy areas:
A final characteristic that resonates throughout the remainder of the book 
is that existing implementation literature covers only a marginal number of 
policy areas and member states alike. As is the case for EU studies, in general 
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(Franchino, 2005), environmental policy and social policy clearly rank highest 
as the most-researched policy areas in the implementation literature (Ostner 
and Lewis, 1995; Eichner, 1995; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Haverland, 2000; 
Falkner et al., 2005; Haverland and Romeijn, 2007; Linos, 2007; Falkner, Hart-
lapp and Treib, 2007; Toshkov, 2007).
Although they clearly represent a considerable percentage of all EU directives 
(environment 9,3%, social policy 8%) there are ‘some worrying signs that we 
are spending too much time and resources on some clearly secondary policies 
and ignoring core ones.’(Franchino, 2005: 246). Some important areas, such 
as free movement, agriculture, transport and competition deserve at least as 
much attention as do social policy and environment. For a better understand-
ing of the EU policy outcomes, scholars may invest more in older policies that 
are at the core of the Union. While agriculture represents on average 23.4 % 
of all EU directives, transport directives represent 6% of the total amount of 
EU directives (Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht, 2005). Acknowledging the 
requirement of a theory-driven case selection of policy areas, transport fol-
lows the regulatory style underlying the well-researched policy areas such as 
environment and social policy.
Next to the dominance of environmental and social policy areas in the im-
plementation literature which are exemplary for the regulatory style of EU 
policies, a group of member states is almost always part of comparative re-
search designs, namely: the UK, Italy, and Germany. The smaller member 
states, such as Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden, have 
attracted almost no scholarly attention (Mastenbroek, 2005). France, despite 
its importance for European integration and its theoretical relevance in terms 
of its centralist polico-administrative structure in Europe, is, relatively, not 
often covered in comparative implementation projects. However, Mbaye’s 
study (2001), for example, would have been more powerful had Greece not 
been dropped out of the analysis because the unavailable data on veto play-
ers for Greece. To account for the number of veto player shaping both the 
speed and the quality of implementation of EU law (Haverland, 2000) Greece 
would have been a theoretically interesting case scoring, between 1974 and 
2000, unspectacularly ‘1’ such as the UK and Spain.12 The UK and Spain have 
performed well in terms of EU implementation, whereas Greece has been one 
of the main laggards since its membership to the EU.
Outstanding in the field, however, is the work by Falkner et al. (2005; 2007), 
who held numerous in-depth interviews for six social policy directives in all 
15 ‘old’ Member States. Their study, therefore, represents the first research 
that provides first-hand evidence to suggest that the EU suffers a pan-Euro-
pean implementation problem.13
12 The figures differ only in 1989 (1,50) and 1990 (1,24). 
13 For a critical assessment see Toshkov (2007).
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2.4 Conclusion
This literature overview has given a critical assessment of the mainstream 
Europeanization literature that discusses the implementation of EU policies 
across member states in particular. Screened to assess its potential to answer 
the research question Why do member states miss deadlines when transposing EU 
internal market directives?, this chapter distilled five theoretically major prob-
lematic characteristics that will be subsequently addressed in the remainder 
of this study.
In order to advance the scholarly understanding of why member states miss 
deadlines while transposing EU directives, a well-founded conjecture needs 
to be put forward for scrutiny. Since ontological debates about perspectives 
that are not meant to be refuted seem good at inspiring scholars to think in 
new ways, such debates, however, must not be taken for advances in knowl-
edge (Goldman, 2005). Methodologically speaking, whatever the connection 
may be between factors, on the one hand, and outcomes, on the other hand, 
the relationship between a factor and an outcome are logically independent 
of each other (synthetical). Thus, the relationship is not only an analytical one, 
but an empirical regularity. Second, the nature of that regularity can only be 
discovered by means of empirical research, for example, by testing hypoth-
eses against a body of data. Thus, there is no a priori valid knowledge about 
the relationships between factor and outcomes, as any hypothesis about such 
a link can be refuted by empirical evidence.
The assessment of the implementation literature shows that there is still area 
for improvement. The third wave of the implementation literature points to a 
promising direction for improvement. Scholarly work may further elaborate 
particular frameworks within the third wave of the implementation literature 
by researching the role of domestic politics on processes of implementation, 
in order to generate clear predictions that can be tested empirically to answer
the research question. Therefore, more attention may have to be given to 
data quality improving designs, following the study by Mastenbroek (2003). 
Research should include often untended but theoretically relevant member 
states and address under-researched and theoretically relevant policy areas, 
however well fitting the regulatory character of EU policies under which 
environment and social policy can be subsumed. Last but not least, this re-
view realises that the implementation literature has not yet profited from a 
so-called mixed-method research design which, however, has brought some 
helpful insights to other fields of research (Brady and Collier, 2004) and there-
fore seem well worth the effort of following here.
Before sketching a theoretical framework to explain why member states miss 
the deadlines while transposing EU Internal Market directives, I, however, 
assess the characteristics of the development of another regulatory policy 
area (Lowi, 1964; Hood, 1983), namely: EU transport policy. Whereas the 
selection of the sector will become fully clear when discussing the data set in 
chapter five, these policy-related characteristics will guide the set-up of the 
theoretical framework in chapter four, in particular, and the overall analysis, 
more generally.
34 Chapter 12
Chapter 3: 
Economic integration in transport services
‘Time and again the common transport policy has been the saddest 
chapter in the history of European integration.’ (Jürgen Erdmenger, 
Senior member of the Commission’s transport directorate in 1983)
3.1 Introduction
The EU is the most advanced model of economic integration 14 in the world. 
Beginning as a preferential trading area in 1958, it has evolved into a single 
market in which goods, services, capital, and labour can move between its 
25 Member States with virtually no restriction – theoretically. Practically, the 
EU has been very successful in creating a single market for goods. However, 
recent discussions about the European stock markets, the so-called national 
champions in the energy market and the transitional arrangements for work-
ers from the ‘new member states’ illustrate that the EU does not have a strong 
single market with regard to services, capital, or labour.
In the service sectors, a striking contrast to a single market is exemplified 
by the 30-year-old policy of anthemion, which bestows national exclusive 
rights for network industries independent as if they were independent of the 
internal market. The implementation of Article 86 was a ‘taboo’ in the EU for
decades (Pelkmans, 2001: 140). ‘The Member States have continued to go 
their own ways on economic strategy, protecting national markets and corpo-
rations, and wrestling independently to deal with high unemployment, low 
investment, and slow growth.’ (McCormick, 2005: 159).
Transport is an important policy area affected by the Lisbon strategy (2000) 
and linked to the worldwide growth of trade flows. It is an example of net-
work industries in general, and another regulatory EU policy area in par-
ticular whose 50-years history this chapter will trace back through the major 
developments. Generally speaking, it could be characterized as one of the 
saddest pieces in the history of European integration. More clearly, the eco-
nomic integration of transport in the EU can be characterized as recent, gradu-
al, uneven, complex and crisis-driven.
This study will show that three main driving and/or constraining factors 
account for its development, namely: member states’ attitudes precondi-
tioned by their geographical characteristics, EU institutions with the Europe-
an Commission (Commission) as the agenda-setter, the Council of Ministers 
14 Economic integration describes a process in which the economies of independent coun-
tries are progressively unified as a result of the removal of barriers to trade (Pelkmans, 
2001).
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and the European Parliament (EP) as co-legislators, the European Court of 
Justice’s (ECJ) as the judicial power, and the occurrence of transport-related 
crises. Subsequent rounds of enlargement in economic policies extended the 
group of member states and with it the transport sub-sector specific attitudes. 
In addition, the policy approach towards EU transport policy by the Com-
mission has shifted over the years. Whereas the first decades of EU trans-
port policy were characterized by so-called negative integration (Tinbergen, 
1965; Rehbinder and Stewart, 1984), i.e. the removal of impediments to the 
establishment of single market), from the late 1990s the Commission imple-
mented positive integration measures, setting up transport policies to shape 
the conditions under which markets operate (Scharpf, 1996). A final charac-
teristic of the development of the transport sector is its vulnerability to influ-
ences from the external environment. Recent ecological disasters in the seas 
and rivers have affected water travel, whereas strained economic conditions 
have affected air travel; both kinds of travel occur in our more complex and 
globalised world. With regard to train and automobile travel, the decreas-
ing market share of the rail sector along with devastating railway accidents 
across Europe and the rising number of casualties in car accidents resulted 
in further EU legislation.  To conclude the different environmental factors 
in the different transport sub-sectors have led to the gradual adoption of EU 
legislation in the form of packages unevenly distributed across the different 
transport sub-sectors since 1992.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it reviews the very scarce politi-
cal science literature on EU transport policy, and argues that the EU trans-
port policy debate is conducted mainly in policy specific, technical and eco-
nomic journals, leaving EU scholars only a few studies to reference. Second, 
this chapter presents the European institutional setting for transport policy, 
which illuminates the historical development of EU transport policy. Third, 
four phases of integration are identified; it is put forth that, in general, the 
integration process can be characterized as recent, gradual, uneven, complex 
and crisis- driven. This is especially clear from the closer transport sub-sec-
tor point-of-view. Fourth, it is argued that the EU’s transport policies were 
formed by the subsequent rounds of enlargement in economic policies, as 
well as the shifting of the Commission’s approach towards transport. Finally, 
it is reasoned that, over the last decades, EU transport policy has further been 
shaped by transport sub-sector specific crises.
3.2 Literature on EU transport
Scholars’ attention to Common transport policy has been, for years, con-
demned to insignificance in all first-class edited volumes, which cover stand-
ard policy areas such as common foreign and security policy, environment, 
monetary union, social policy, and agriculture (Wallace and Wallace, 2000; 
Wallace, Wallace and Pollack, 2005; George and Bache, 2001; Bomberg and 
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Stubb, 2003; Cini, 2003; Dinan, 1999; Nugent, 1999; Hix, 2005; Graziano and 
Vink, 2006). Although Common transport issues have always been consid-
ered important for the economic integration of the EU, their practical signifi-
cance is not mirrored in scholarly output (Franchino, 2005).15 Transport pol-
icy has intrested those scholars as the fringe of economics and infrastructure 
issues (Lewis, Semeijn and Vellenga, 2001; Bolden and Harman, 2002; Nash 
and Sansom, 2001). Subsequently, research on transport policy is often very 
technical in nature, and covers expectations of traffic growth, infrastructure 
and vehicles design, traffic restraint, economic and commercial pricing poli-
cy, and the methodological tools available to predict and assess the effects of 
alternative policy options.
However scarce, the scholarly work in the field of EU transport policy in po-
litical science can be divided into two groups: studies covering all different 
modes of transport, and those focusing on only a single mode. In discussions 
primarily focused on the slight advancement in the Common transport pol-
icy as a whole, Erdmenger (1983) and Abbati (1987) investigate why Euro-
pean transport policies failed to make the expected progress in all five modes: 
road, inland waterways, rail, air and maritime. With more theoretical motiva-
tions, Aspinwall (1999) identifies the parameters of two distinct governance 
subsystems in EU transport: domestic security, and supranational regula-
tory network. He traces the changes that have occurred in the EU transport 
policy, accounts for them, and describes the emerging system of governance 
in EU transport in general (see also Schmidt and Giorgi; 2001; 2003). Stevens 
(2004), in another blend of practioner insight, focuses on the very different 
considerations that affect transport by land, sea, and air. Inspired by a rather 
eclectic approach, namely, neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, 
and institutions and networks, he advances a new model of how three policy-
making environments – practical, political, and organizational – interact with 
each other over time to open windows of policy-making opportunity.
Next to these comprehensive contributions covering transport in general 
terms, studies of specific modes of transport have emerged, namely: road, 
inland waterways, rail, air and maritime. Most of these studies came to frui-
tion in the late 1990s. It is worth noting that not all transport sub-sectors have 
attracted the same attention. Table 3.2 refers to the different accounts.
Whereas inland waterways transport has not yet been investigated, and mar-
itime transport has garnered scholarly attention only recently (Aspinwall, 
1995; Paixoa and Marlow, 2001; Pallis, 2002), the aviation sector has enjoyed 
the most research of any transport sector. Demands from society for the open-
ing of competition in the air transport industry brought forth a supportive 
15 Note, however, recent descriptive studies on transport issues by Zeff and Pirro (2006; 
2007)
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response from the Commission, which was initially rejected by the national 
governments (O’Reilly and Stone Sweet, 1998). Continuing internal and ex-
ternal pressures, as well as the supportive rulings of the ECJ, which invited 
the application of the EC’s competition rules to air transport, together brought 
forth a succession of EC agreements. By 1997, these agreements had removed 
internal barriers to competition in air transport and moved Regulation to the 
EC level. Armstrong and Bulmer’s (1998) rendition of air transport liberali-
sation closely follows O’Reilly and Stone Sweet’s analysis. Armstrong and 
Bulmer emphasize the pressures of transnational business, the mobilizing ac-
tivities of Etienne Davignon, the leadership of Jacques Delors, and the inspi-
ration of Arthur Cockfield as four major catalysts to air transport liberalisa-
tion. Assessing CTP up to the mid-1990s, they show that conflicting member 
states’ preferences and autonomous supranational organizations are constant 
factors in EU policy-making. Moreover, Armstrong and Bulmer suggest that 
varying outputs may, therefore, be explained more efffectivly by the opportu-
nities offered through institutional structures in which these decision-making 
processes are embedded, and also by the availability of credible solutions for 
the policy problems under discussion (see also Lawton, 1999; Button, 1996; 
Buttton et al., 1998; Kerwer and Teutsch, 2001; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986; 
Stevens, 1997; Dienel and Lyth, 1998).
Table 3.2: Overview of scholarly work in the field of EU transport policy.
General
scholary
contri-
butions
Erdmenger (1983); Abbati (1987); Whitelegg (1988); Ross (1998); Aspinwall (1999); 
Banister, Dreborg, Hedberg, Hunhammer, Stehen and Akerman (2000); Greaves 
(2000); Schmidt and Giorgi (2001; 2003); Kerwer and Teutsch (2001a); Baur (2004); 
Stevens (2004)
Mode-
specific 
contri-
butions
Road (6) Rail (5) Maritime (3) Air (8) Inland 
waterways (0)
Button (1984); 
Young and 
Wallace (2000); 
Héritier (1997); 
Héritier et al. 
(2001); Kerwer 
and Teutsch 
(2001b)
Dobbin (1993); 
Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 
(2000); Héritier 
et al. (2001); 
Dobbin (2001); 
Kerwer and 
Teutsch (2001); 
Héritier (2002)
Aspinwall 
(1995); Paixoa 
and Marlow 
(2001); Pallis 
(2002)
Wheatcroft and 
Lipman (1986); 
Stevens (1997); 
Amstrong and 
Bulmer (1998); 
Button, Hayes 
and Stough 
(1998); Dienel 
and Lyth (1998); 
O’Reilly and 
Stone Sweet 
(1998); Lawton 
(1999)
n.r.
n.r. = no reference; numbers in brackets refer to the number of contributions
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Dobbin (1993) illustrates the diverse conceptions of the railway market and 
the very different conceptions of the relationships between state, market, and 
individual economic actors. Dobbin argues that these conceptions must be 
reconciled if Europeanization is to be successful in exploring the different 
varieties of markets found in French and British high speed train policy. 
Focusing on the liberalization of the rail sector, Héritier (2002) concludes that 
technological innovation accounts for the different performances in the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Germany and France.
Focusing on road haulage in the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, 
Héritier (1997) finds four different profiles of responses to the European in-
vitation to reform domestic policies; responses varied by nation. In the same 
vein, Kerwer and Teutsch (2001) conclude that domestic factors were more 
important than European factors in bringing about this change. European 
influence did not severely curtail national policy-making autonomy. Ap-
parently, in transport policy, Europeanization was elusive because national 
institutional intermediation largely muffled the impact of European policy-
making.
Covering the last two modes of transport comparatively, Kerwer and Teut-
sch (2001: 26) show that both road and rail transport reflect the high demand 
of consensus as a basis for European decisions. Although the researchers’ 
assessments of common transport policy development focus on two of the 
five modes, they make strong claims about the overall developments of com-
mon transport policy. Yet, without research about maritime shipping, air, and 
inland waterways transport, such claims may not be warranted. This ten-
dency of generalisation can also be found in the other modal contributions. 
Whereas case studies from within the different modes of transport are helpful 
to account for causal mechanisms at a specific time in EU transport history, 
they ‘block the view on the whole.’ Comparing different modes of transport 
with such case studies focus is methodologically problematic. Researchers 
can rightly assume that member states’ preferences have not considerably 
changed over the years (Scheerlinck and S’Jegers, 1998). Holding this variable 
constant, they could investigate the influence exerted by the EU and nation-
al institutional settings upon member states’ preferences. This is, however, 
methodologically debatable if one wants to deal with more than one mode 
of transport, because enlarged member states’ preferences, and institutional 
settings’ preferences, too, differ also for every single mode of transport. This 
variability will be accounted for in the remainder of this study.
40 Chapter 13
3.3 Driving and constraining forces of EU transport 
policy-making
3.3.1 Basic attitudes among member states:
Two ‘ideal types’ of transport policy describe the main ‘rupture points’ or 
cleavages across member states, namely: the state-led approach, and the 
liberal market approach (Schmidt and Giorgi, 2001). The traditional state-
led approach assumes that transport primarily serves structural inequalities, 
especially in regard to the regional level. Under this policy framework, 
transport planning is guided by the goals of regional cohesion and develop-
ment, and emphasis is placed on infrastructure investment by the state as the 
main instrument for achieving these goals. Environmental sustainability, in 
this respect, is important, but must be balanced against social sustainability 
and regional cohesion. The liberal market approach to transport development 
considers regulation of the transport sector important, and this is achieved 
primarily through economic instruments. Particularly relevant under this 
scheme are pricing instruments and taxation, and so are liberalization and 
privatization when associated with greater accountability and transparency 
in operations. Ultimately, however, the role of transport is said to support 
economic development through faster and more efficient mobility of goods. 
Environmental impacts are recognized as negative externalities and, as such, 
also pose questions of fair pricing in conjunction with technological upgrad-
ing. Although reallife transport policy cannot be confronted clearly with the 
two-fold typology, I try to group the member states accordingly.
State-led approach towards transport
Large member states tend to favour the traditional state-led approach. France 
is a large country that is relatively less dependent on international trade, 
with a widely dispersed population, and a large domestic transport market. 
France’s deep roots in the tradition of government support for domestic ob-
jectives of economic policy, have made French transport policy-makers no-
tably reluctant to open France’s markets to foreign competition. Germany is 
also a large country that favours the state-led approach. Its surface transport 
industries are potentially exposed to competition, particularly from opera-
tors based in the the Netherlands and in the new Eastern member states. In 
Germany, there is a corporatist tradition supported by government policy 
and reinforced by a strong partnership between unions and management, 
which has tended to make transport policy officials cautious about competi-
tion, particularly foreign competition. The traditional state-led approach has 
also been supported by some smaller EU member states.  For example, the so-
cial importance of its dense network of island services led Greece, until very 
recently, to defend a protective regime for coastal shipping whilst supporting 
a more liberal regime in international relations, and particularly in the bulk 
shipping trades, where Greek owners are strongly represented.
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Liberal market approach towards transport
Other member states tend to follow the liberal market approach. The UK and 
the Netherlands, in particular, advocate this approach. Their motivation in 
this respect is obviated by their positions as key players, with high stakes in 
the evolution of international air transport policies.  The world-wide network 
of air routes link Britain and the Netherlands with their colonies and do-
minions.  London is a natural hub for air traffic between North America and 
much of Europe, and Amsterdam is a connecting airport. The Netherlands, 
furthermore, is a small country with a great river whose ports link the North 
sea to the industrial heartlands of Northern Europe. Its transport industries 
could not prosper on the business generated by the Dutch economy alone. 
They need competitive open markets.
3.3.2 European institutional setting:
Member states’ attitudes towards transport policy hinge on their respective 
European institutional settings. The Commission as the agenda setter, the 
Council and the European Parliament (EP) as the legislative powers in EU 
decision-making have gained and lost institutional power, i.e. the rules con-
straining and enabling actors in EU policy-making have been amended with 
every proposed revision of the existing treaties.
With the Single European Act (SEA) since 1987, transport including air and 
sea has been subject to qualified majority voting (QMV). Taking measures 
further, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 gave the European Community (EC) in-
frastructure. In the Council, there are two basic voting rules, namely: unanim-
ity (UV), and QMV. Changes of voting strengths and the QMV threshold have 
affected the relative power of member states. During the second European 
Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) enlargement, the UK, Spain, and Italy argued 
that the addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden would alter the type of coa-
lition needed to achieve a QMV. Their arguments resulted in the 1994 Ioninna 
Declaration, which foresaw 26 votes (30%) as the blocking minority (Hix, 
2005: 85). A similar argument arose in the negotiations on voting weights in 
the Nice Treaty, where a blocking minority was reduced from 30% to 26%.
The Commission’s approach towards transport policy has evolved over the 
years as well. Its approach towards EU transport policy, as the agenda setter 
in EU policy-making, can be characterized by either a sub-sectoral or an inte-
grated approach. Whereas the sub-sectoral approach calls for equal competi-
tive conditions to be achieved within each transport sub-sector, the integrated 
approach to transport demands a greater equality of competitive conditions 
between the different transport modes.
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In addition, over four decades the EP has changed from a largely consulta-
tive assembly to a genuine co-legislator that has itself evolved considerably 
beyond the original EC, both in scope and in powers (Corbett, Jacobs and 
Shackelton, 2005: 5). The EP’s transport committee actively influences policy-
making in the field (Häge and Kaeding, 2007) and actually happens to be one 
of the most active committees in EP (EP conciliation committee report, 2004).
The ECJ represents the last important player in the policy-making process. 
It hears actions brought against member states for failures to comply with 
obligations, and the ECJ has the power of judicial review, as well as the power 
to issue preliminary rulings on references by national courts. Importantly, 
the ECJ’s rulings in the 1970s obliged member states to construct an internal 
market in transport services.
3.3.3 Transport specific crises:
Last but not least, it is transport specific crises that instigate European integra-
tion in the transport sector. Next to the divide between member states along 
the state-led and the liberal market line, and the European institutional set-
ting – which allowedly holds true for a lot of policy areas – it is this third fac-
tor that plays an important role for the overall development of EU transport 
policy and its sub-sectors, in particular. Be these crises the actual numbers of 
fatalities in car accidents, the ecological disasters in the maritime or inland 
waterways sector, the shrinking market shares of railways, or the economical 
challenges faced by the aviation sector in a globalized and terror- plagued 
world, crises in any transport sub-sector have considerable impact on the 
policies of the transport sector.
3.3.4 Summary
This study argues that the EU’s transport policy developed as it has because 
of three important factors: First, member states’ approaches toward transport 
shaped by economic geography and national needs in the different transport 
sub-sectors. Second, the underlying institutional settings with the Commis-
sion as agenda-setter, the EP as co-legislatior and the ECJ as the guardian of 
the treaties; second, the member states’ approaches towards transport (both 
in general and towards specific modes of transport), and the conflicts sur-
rounding these –conceptually, as well as on in practice with reference to ac-
tors’ strategies and alliances. These conflicts can be seen, on the one hand, in 
the significant disagreement as to the role of the market and the role of the 
state, and on the other hand, in the executive, judicial and legislative powers 
of the Commission, ECJ and the EP respectively, which have evolved over 
the last 50 years, shaping the development of the policy area. The agenda 
-setter’s approach towards the policy is decisive, initiating transport legisla-
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tion in terms of sub-sectors or integrated. The third important factor in the 
EU’s transport policy development is the transport related crises. They clear-
ly affect the shape of EU transport policy. Adopted in so-called packages, a 
number of regulations and directives spawned from crises indicate the need 
of response to situational changes of the external environment.
After having outlined the driving and constraining factors accounting for the 
development of the EU transport field, I approach the analysis as follows. 
Taking the Treaty of Rome (1957) as the starting point, the following chapter 
assesses the developments in the field up to 2006. Newspaper articles and 
official documents of the European communities will help me trace back the 
major steps in EU transport policy in general and the different sub-sector spe-
cific developments in particular. Interviews with Commission and member 
states’ civil servants serve to complement the overall assessment which fol-
lows.
3.4 The paths of EU transport policy: Recent, gradual, uneven 
and complex
The overall development in EU transport policy can be divided into four 
phases of distinct time periods: 1957-1984, 1985-1991, 1992-2000, and 2001-
2006. This analysis focuses on these phases, in addition to its particular atten-
tion to all five sub-sectors of transport, namely: road, rail, inland waterways, 
maritime, and air. In the following discussion, each phase is addressed sepa-
rately, starting from a general assessment of Common transport policy (CTP) 
and moving to a sub-sector specific analysis. Tables 3.3.1-3.3.4 summarize the 
key developments for the different periods in the policy sub-fields, identify-
ing the member states’ general purposes of CTP, the Commission’s key goals 
and specific proposals, and the crises that occurred over the last six decades.
3.4.1 30 years of deadlock (Phase I: 1957-1984)
Between 1957 and 1985 the CTP did not amount to much more than the stated 
intention to facilitate pan-European transport between the member states. 
During the first thirty years of the EC, transport policy was to a large ex-
tent under the control of individual governments, and was ‘dominated by 
deadlock’ (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000: 7) and ‘false starts, of politically inept 
Commission proposals, or persistent Council inaction, of divided govern-
ment views’ (Héritier, 1997: 31). The 1961 Schaus Memorandum, for example, 
presented the first guidelines for a community-wide action programme in 
transport, but member states showed little real interest in following up with 
these guidelines Commission proposals were debated, but few of any signifi-
cance were adopted. Most European governments, especially until the first 
round of enlargement in 1973, regarded transport as a public service which 
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could not be left solely or even primarily to the private sector. Consequently, 
member states often intervened extensively in transport policy at the national 
level, not just to ensure that services were provided, but also to guarantee that 
peripheral regions were not disadvantaged, so that interventions were used 
as instruments of regional development policy.
Road and railway
In the road sector, the European rules did not oblige member states to de-
regulate inland transport until the first enlargement in the mid-1970s. In the 
railway sector, also, there was practically no competition. The national rail-
way companies had traditionally ‘cooperated’ for cross-border services, but 
the efficiencies in pricing, work practices, allocation of slots on the networks, 
terminals procedures, technical incompatibilities, service quality, and frontier 
problems ‘confirmed people’s worst beliefs about monopoly practices’ until 
the early 1990s (Pelkmans, 2001: 146).
Inland waterways
In inland waterways, too, there were hardly any provisions of secondary Com-
munity law. The important reason is the existence of the Revised Convention 
for the Navigation of the Rhine, signed in Mannheim on 17 October 1868. 
This and later additions have given the Rhine an international river regime, 
providing the principle of the freedom of navigation. This regime applying 
to the Rhine seriously hindered the achievement of economic integration in 
the inland waterways sector. Certain national delegation repeatedly rejected 
the Commission’s proposal by invoking the Mannheim Convention (Stevens, 
2004).
Maritime
For a long time, maritime navigation was not even considered to fall under the 
EC responsibility. Twenty years after the Treaty of Rome, in 1974, finally, the 
ECJ in Luxembourg dispelled the controversy about Article 84 (2). Its judg-
ment overturned the arguments against including sea transport in the integra-
tion process. The Court ruled that sea transport was not covered by the provi-
sions on transport (Articles 74 and 83) but that the general rules of the EEC 
Treaty nevertheless applied unless express exemption was made in the Treaty 
or by the Council. This particular judgment, shortly after the enlargement 
of the Community, helped ‘to start the ball rolling’ (Stevens, 2004). This was 
especially seen after the accession of the UK and Denmark, which brought 
two major shipping nations into the Community, and with them, their special 
interest in world shipping. However, the Community did not enter shipping 
safety until Spring 1978, following the Amoco Cadiz accident off Brittany. 
Pressured by their constituencies, the Council adopted decisions including 
checks on tankers entering Community ports, employment of deep-sea pilots 
in the North Sea, and ratification of the various IMO (International Maritime 
Organisation) Conventions on the safety of life at sea and on the prevention 
of pollution from ships.
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Aviation
The 1974 ECJ ruling dispelling the controversy about Art. 84 (2) applied not 
only to maritime, but also to air transport. In 1978, the Council of Ministers, 
lead by the UK, decided on the basis of preliminary work by the Commission 
to adopt a first priority program of measures in the field of air transport. This 
program was based on the Chicago Convention, whose article 82 expressly 
states that member states must annul all obligations that are inconsistent with 
the terms of the Chicago Convention.
3.4.2 Watershed (Phase II: 1985-1991)
The year 1985 is often regarded as a ‘watershed for supranational transport 
policy’ (Krewer and Teutsch, 2001: 29). The volume of passenger numbers and 
goods kilometres by car, train, shipping, air, and inland waterways transport in 
the EU had increased by 246% between 1965 and 1989 (European Commission 
statistical yearbook, 2000; 2001; 2002). In addition, Europe was experiencing 
a general shift towards regulatory policies favouring market mechanisms 
(Majone, 1994). Responding to increasing demands for mobility and the ideo-
logical shift in politics, the SEA changed the institutional settings for the Coun-
cil of Ministers by replacing unanimity with qualified majority voting for meas-
ures in the fields of sea and air transport (Article 80.2). Furthermore, accession 
to Spain, Portugal and Greece shifted the balance of sub-sectoral interests in 
favour of maritime and road transport. By the end of the 1980s, transport 
policy as a European policy area finally got off the ground, leading to liber-
alization.
Some ECJ rulings and the Commission in particular helped stimulate the 
development of EU transport policies. On 22 May 1985, the Court of Justice 
ruled on case 13/83. These proceedings, which were instituted by the Parlia-
ment, ruled against the Council for failing to bring about the freedom to pro-
vide international transport services, and failing also to create the conditions 
required for non-resident carriers to have access to national transport services 
in a member state. This ruling was given immediately after the Commission’s 
White Paper, ‘Completing the Internal Market.’ The White Paper identified re-
strictions on the provision of transport services as a serious barrier to open 
trade. In order to achieve the SEA’s 1993 objectives, the Commission decided 
that developing the CTP according to a sub-sectoral approach, i.e. achieving 
equal competitive conditions within each sub-sector, was an absolutely nec-
essary measure.
Road
In the sub-sector of road haulage, the EU introduced the right of non-resident 
transport haulers to operate in foreign markets. The Cassis de Dijon case con-
firmed that the Council should induce the member states to liberalize the 
inland transport sector according to the principles of the European Treaty. 
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In the 1980s, the member states started to abolish all quantitative restrictions 
on entries in road, and to limit their interventions to regulate the qualitative 
conditions that operators were obliged to meet in order to obtain access to the 
profession (Ponti and Cappiello, 2000).
Inland waterways
Whereas Regulation 3921/91 granted cabotage on inland waterways from 
1 January 1993, with derogations for FR and DE until 1 January 1995, the late 
1980s marked a difficult period for the Community fleet, and demanded a 
European approach. The size of the EC-registered fleet in worldwide shipping 
had decreased from 32% of world tonnage in 1970 to 14% in 1995. Over-capac-
ity in the world market had worsened the conditions of competition for EC 
shipping lines as compared to those from countries with lower costs. In 1986, 
the Council was enlarged by Spain, Portugal and Greece, which had been 
traditionally powerful maritime actors. Subsequently, the Council adopted 
four measures which were important landmarks in the development of the 
Common maritime transport policy (see table 3.3.2). Just two and a half years 
later, in August 1989, the Commission sent the Council a second package of 
key measures to improve the operating conditions and competitiveness of 
Community shipping. 
Aviation
The ECJ’s Nouvelles Frontières case in 1986 represents the turning point for 
EU aviation (EU Court reports, 1986: 1425-1473). Since 1987, the policy has 
been set to phase out the bilateral system between states and inter-airline 
agreements in Europe so as to establish a genuine Single Market in civil avia-
tion. The first package of measures was adopted in December 1987. It limited, 
among other rights, the right of governments to object to the introduction of 
new fares. In June 1990, a second package of measures opened up the market 
even further, allowing greater flexibility over the fare setting, and capacity 
sharing.
3.4.3 Enlarged set of objectives (Phase III: 1992-2000):
Whereas the Treaty of Rome described the tasks of the EEC in purely eco-
nomic terms, the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) granted the Commission new powers for transport safety and 
for transport infrastructure. The Commission’s influence as the principal 
spokesman and negotiator for the Community in international bodies deal-
ing with transport policies, especially within Europe, was continuing to grow 
(Rhinard and Kaeding, 2006). This development was bolstered by the third 
round of EU enlargement with Sweden, Finland and Austria, which were all 
known for their high environmental standards. These developments coin-
cided with the Commission’s new approach of ‘sustainable mobility for the 
Community as a whole.’ The approach was signalled in the 1992 White Paper, 
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‘The Future Development of the Common Transport Policy’ and was followed by, 
and specified through, the common transport policy Action Programs from 
1995 to 2000 (European Commission, 1995), and 1998 to 2004 (European Com-
mission, 1998). The sub-sectoral approach was exchanged by an integrated 
approach, i.e. increasing attention was given to achieving greater equality of 
competitive conditions between the different transport sub-sectors. Further-
more, the approach enlarged the set of objectives to be achieved by the CTP to 
include sustainability and social cohesion, both of which led to a shift toward 
more environmental friendly sub-sectors through the support of better trans-
port system management that included combined transport and an emphasis 
on inter-modality. However, like the first and the second phases, the third 
phase was still a (narrow) triumph on points for the market-led tendency 
(see listing of EU transport legislation in the Appendix). Especially in the rail-
way and inland waterways sub-sectors deregulatory legislation dominated, 
whereas in the road and maritime sub-sectors, harmonization hold sway over 
the agenda.
Inland waterways and railways
Regulation 1356/96 extended equal access to all inland waterways, but the 
first attempt to liberalize the European railways was made in 1991 by a Direc-
tive on the development of the Community’s railways. In 1995, two pieces 
of legislation were adopted on the licensing of railway companies and the 
allocation of and charging for infrastructure. A year later, in 1996, a Commis-
sion White Paper was published on the revitalization of the European rail-
way companies, which stated, notably, that the recovery could be achieved by 
rationalizing their financial situation, ensuring freedom of access to all traffic, 
and public services and promoting the integration of national systems and 
social aspects. At the end of year 2000, a first rail liberalization package was 
agreed upon.
Aviation
Like the 1980s for the maritime sector, the early 1990s were problematic for 
the air industry. Europe’s leading airlines suffered heavy losses between 1990 
and 1993 due partly to the Gulf wars. Additionally, in a climate of increas-
ingly fierce international competition, airlines continued restructuring their 
progress in hopes of improving productivity. The three Regulations (2407/92, 
2408/92, and 2409/92) that constitute the third package of internal liberaliza-
tion make up the core of what is called the acquis communautaire in air trans-
port. They provide for free access of European airlines to any European air-
port on merely commercial considerations (air cabotage).
Maritime
The Community continued to build its maritime safety policies on the basis 
of the IMO Conventions and rules. Nevertheless, a number of stricter EC 
measures were deemed necessary in the aftermath of dramatic shipping ac-
cidents, such as those involving the Herald of Free Enterprise (1987) and the 
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Exxon Valdez (1989). In particular, concerned member states, such as the UK, 
France, Spain, Sweden and Geramny, pushed for stricter regulations. In 1994, 
the Council adopted a Directive on the minimum level of training of seafar-
ers, a Directive on ship inspection and surveys, and a Regulation on tonnage 
measurement of ballast spaces in segregated ballast oil tankers. A Directive 
on Port State Control was adopted in June 1995, and in December 1995, the 
Council adopted a Regulation on the safety management of ro-ro passenger 
ferries. The grounding of Aegean Sea (1992) and the Braer (1993) led to a com-
mon policy on safe seas–another safety package with a total of 8 Directives.
Road
In road transport, traffic related accidents attracted major EU attention, with 
more than 40,000 lives and more than 1.7 million people injured. On 30 No-
vember 1993, the Council created a Community database (CARE) on road 
accidents, which would lay the basis for further harmonization of operating 
conditions in road passenger transport, and recommend maximum permit-
ted blood alcohol levels.
3.4.4 Consolidation (Phase IV: 2001-2006)
Whereas the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam led to further reinforcement of en-
vironmental provisions in the transport sector and strengthened the EP’s 
role in the co-decision process, the Treaty of Nice did not change any articles 
concerning transport policy. In September 2001, the Commission released 
its ‘White Paper on transport policy: European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to 
Decide’ (European Commission, 2001) which emphasised the integrated ap-
proach towards transport policy, with inter-modality playing an important 
role. The idea behind the integrated approach was to bolster the railway’s 
share in the transport sector, which had dropped considerably, while road 
transport then accounted for more than 63 percent. Consequently, the em-
phasis was placed on road pricing for freight and especially heavy goods 
vehicles, which was considered the way forward for redressing the balance 
between modes (especially road and rail). This redressed balance, in turn, is 
expected to contribute to resolving both the congestion and the environmen-
tal problems facing transport. The 2001 White Paper has carried the ball deep 
into the state-led approach of transport policy which , however, has been re-
laxed recently by the mid-term review of the Commission’s 2001 White Paper 
(2006; Kernohan, 2005).
Road
For road transport, a decision was made concerning a genuine European elec-
tronic road toll service. The toll is predicted to guarantee interoperability of 
road toll systems in the internal market, and also contribute to the develop-
ment of infrastructure charging policies on a European scale. By 2009, at the 
latest, road cabotage will be opened with respect to all new member states.
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Aviation
To deal with the disaster of 9/11, the Council adopted Regulation 2320/2002, 
which establishes common aviation security arrangements based on ICAO 
and ECAC recommendations. In the air transport sector, a Regulation was 
adopted to safeguard European airline industries against unfair third coun-
try airline practices. The European Parliament and the Council also agreed 
on a package of Regulations establishing common rules of air traffic manage-
ment throughout the Community,hereby, creating a single European sky.
Maritime
Europe’s enlarged coastline and numbers of ports means that the maritime 
sector is a valuable alternative to land transport as illustrated by the Commis-
sion’s concept of the ‘motorways of the sea’ (2004). The expected growth of 
sea transport has already started to be absorbed through an improved EU’s 
ports infrastructure. Where maritime transport is concerned, the Commission 
adopted a proposal for a Directive on access to the port service market. The 
prosposal´s scope was to improve the competitiveness of Community ports, 
to establish a legislative and regulatory framework for the provision of port 
services, and help reduce port congestion and environmental pollution. On 
the question of maritime safety, the sinking of the Erika in December, 1999, 
the Estonia in 2002, and the Prestige in November, 2002, prompted new meas-
ures in establishing European policy on maritime safety, aimed in particular 
at the environmental risks caused by oil tankers. The measures proposed 
cover, among others effects, the ban on single hull tankers, the establishment 
of a Community monitoring, inspection and information system for mari-
time traffic, and the establishment of a compensation fund for oil pollution 
damage.
Inland waterways
In regard to inland waterways, the Commission approved a proposal for a 
Directive on harmonized river traffic information systems (RIS), which is 
aimed at modernizing inland waterways infrastructure (European Commis-
sion, 2004: 1-3). Whereas river transport accounted for only 3% of overall 
freight transport before enlargement, in an EU-25 on certain corridors (Dan-
ube for example) their share exceeds 40%. The Commission’s Naiades pro-
gram sets out an action plan for further promoting river transport (2006).
Railway
Whereas the aforementioned legislation for the four sub-sectors of trans-
port has harmonized the sectors, the railway sector was to see a couple of 
liberalizing Directives in 2001 (first railway package on freight liberalization). 
Another big step towards the integration of the rail transport market was 
taken in April, 2004 with the adoption of the second railway package. This 
package intended to ensure a high standard of operational safety on the rail-
ways, and to remove obstacles to cross-border services, with a complete liber-
alization of the European market for rail freight set for January 2007 (Euro-
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pean Commission, 2003). The legal framework for rail freight transport will 
be completed by 2007. At the end of 2004, then, the Commission proposed 
further instruments with its third railway package. The third railway pack-
age will also open international passenger transport. The proposal attempts 
to influence three issues: first, opening up international passenger transport 
services to greater competition, second, ensuring that passengers’ rights are 
respected more effectively, and third, ensuring better recognition of the pro-
fessional qualifications of train drivers and crews performing safety-related 
tasks. The safety issue, in particular, attracted attention after the fatal South-
hall accident (1997), the Hatfield crash (2000), and the Potters Bar crash(2002) 
in the UK, the Enschede ICE crash (1998) in Germany, and the Paris-Vienna 
train inferno (2002), which claimed the lives of numerous people.
3.5 Results
In the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Com-
munity, the creation of a single market for intra-Community transport was 
judged as one of the necessary conditions for achieving the ‘four freedoms.’ 
Articles 74-84 of the Treaty of Rome (Appendix) form the legal basis of the 
Common transport policy.
The study identifies four general phases in the development of transport 
policy from 1957 to 2006: (a) deadlock (1957-84), (b) watershed (1985-1991), 
(c) new integrated approach (1992-2000), and (d) consolidation (2001-2006). 
Although 1992 was the completion date of the internal market for transport 
it was very much the starting date. Until the early-1990s, the EU did not have 
a comprehensive approach towards transport policy. Despite the Treaty of 
Rome’s attention to its importance, the transport sector was one of the great 
failures of the single market. For example, little had been done to deal with 
problems such as an airline industry split along national lines, time-consum-
ing cross-border checks on trucks, national systems of unconnected motor-
ways, air traffic control systems using 20 different operating systems, or 70 
computer programming languages. Transport policy is relatively recent EU 
policy area despite its mentioning in the Treaty of Rome.
From a transport sub-sector specific perspective, the integration process has 
been very complex too. This analysis demonstrates that even a discussion 
about a comprehensive EU transport policy is difficult because of its com-
plexity. Five different modes of transport have undergone varying develop-
ments. The process is gradual and uneven with respect to advancements. In 
the road sector, the first liberalizing measures were put forward in the early 
1970s. The maritime and air sectors were liberalized in the late 1980s. The first 
railway packages came in the 1990s. Every mode of transport is de-regulated 
and regulated by different packages, and these packages were adopted un-
evenly. The first railway directives were not adopted before mid-1990s, road 
legislation started in the 1970s.
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This chapter shows that the economic integration of EU transport policy 
has been recent, gradual, uneven, and complex as a result from the interaction 
between member states. Important interactions include member states’ ap-
proaches to transport policy, respectively, in a regularly modified institution-
al setting with supranational constitutionally guaranteed bodies and, also, 
responses to crises. Assessing the historical development of EU transport 
policy in general, this study shows that member states, in the mid-1980s, ini-
tially endeavoured to remove impediments to the free movement of goods 
and services (negative integration). But since the mid-1990s, member states 
are becoming more and more involved in harmonizing the relevant national 
policies (positive integration). More specifically, it was the member states’ 
attitudes towards different sub-sectors of transport that shaped EU transport 
policy actively from the early 1990s. Each round of enlargement and each 
revision of the existing treaties represented a potential challenge to the in-
stitutional balance. Maastricht extended the scope of the existing treaties to 
include safety and infrastructure issues. The Northern enlargement did not 
interfere with inland waterways protagonists such as Germany, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and Luxembourg.
In addition, the Commission’s approach towards transport policy has shift-
ed from a more policy sub-sector approach (modal approach) in the 1980s 
– working to achieve equal competitive conditions within each mode – to-
wards an integrated approach demanding a greater equality of competitive 
conditions between the different transport modes.
  Phase                             I                         II                           III                     IV
1970s    1980s                1990s    2000 
Note: Each ellipse indicates a EU package including regulations and directives applying 
to the transport sub-sector in question. For further detail on the content of ellipses see 
Table 3.3.1-3.3.4. 
Rail
Road
Air
Maritime
Inland
waterways 
Figure 3.4: Development of EU transport policy- recent, gradual, uneven, and 
complex. 
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Table 3.4 maps the 50-year history of EU transport policy, focusing on the 
changing key objectives and paying particular attention to the Commission’s 
modal or integrated approach towards transport policy. In particular, the 
Commission’s White Paper on transport policy: European Transport Policy for 
2010: Time to Decide’ (European Commission, 2001) represented a clear pur-
suit of the integrated approach towards transport policy, with inter-modality 
playing an important role. Bolstering the railway’s share in the transport sec-
tor, which had dropped considerably, while road transport then accounted 
for more than 63 percent, the ideology-driven emphasis was, then, placed 
on road pricing for freight and especially heavy goods vehicles, which was 
considered the way forward for redressing the balance between modes (es-
pecially road and rail) and carried the ball deep into the state-led approach of 
transport policy, which, however, has been relaxed by the recently released 
mid-term review of the Commission’s 2001 White Paper (European Commis-
sion, 2006).
Last but not least, the study has shown that EU transport policy has been 
driven by crises, so to say by political answers to crises – coinciding with the 
Commission’s commencing shift in approach towards EU transport in the 
mid-1990s. Transport related accidents have affected the development of the 
EU transport acquis considerably since. Situational changes in the external 
environment evoked actions by the Commission (the agenda setter) in con-
cert with the member states and the EP, the ECJ and following crises within 
transport-subsectors.
Table 3.5 highlights the major accidents on land, water and air for the last 15 
years. While the annual statistics on alcohol induced road fatalities (Euro-
pean Commission, 2002) have resulted in a serious of EU legislation, in the 
maritime sector, it was major tanker calamities that initiated new legislation. 
Table 3.4: EU transport policy: Four phases between 1957-2004. 
Member states' approaches towards transport policy
Liberal market approach
(negative integration)
State-led approach
(positive integration)
Commission 
approach 
towards EU 
transport 
policy
Modal 
approach
        
Integrated 
approach
1993 – 2000
1985 – 1992
1957 – 1984
  2001 – 2004
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The sinking of the car ferry MS Estonia, for example, which, in September 
1994, capsized in a heavy storm in the Baltic Sea and sunk with over 900 pas-
sengers, while less than 200 survived, lead to the adoption of four consecu-
tive EU directives dealing with safety standards for passenger vessels, of port 
state control, the registration of passengers on ferries and the mandatory sur-
veys for ro-ro ferries in particular.16 Other major fatal incidents in the mari-
time sector followed with Erika in 1999 and Prestige in 2002.
Furthermore, the Paris-Vienna train inferno in 2002, where a fire swept 
through on of the sleeping cars of Paris to Vienna killing twelve passengers, 
and a numerous other fatal train accidents since the mid-1990s on British and 
German soil lead to the adoption of the second railway package including, 
among others, detailed provisions for safety certification, and accident inves-
tigation.
In the aviation sector, a plane crash over the lake Bodensee in Summer 2002 
underscored the necessity for additions to a common aviation security ar-
rangements and better coordination of human resources policy in the air traf-
fic control sector. In the night from 1 July to 2 July 2002, an aircraft of Bashkir 
Airlines and a freight Boeing-757 collided at a height of 11,000 m. The Russian 
airliner was carrying mainly children who were going on holiday in Spain, 
but then perished over the lake Bodensee. After investigations, the reason was 
verbal and computer instructions from Swiss air traffic controllers to the Rus-
sian crew which put the planes on a deadly new collision course. Also, the 
reasons for the 2001 Milan Linate plane collision between a SAS aircraft and 
a business jet on the runway killing 118 people had been traced back to the 
defective behavior by air traffic controllers who were, later on, charged with 
16  Directives 98/18/EC, 98/25/EC, 98/41/EC, 99/35/EC.
Table 3.5: Transport related accidents in Europe.
Accidents Road Rail Inland
waterways
Maritime Air
Phase III: 
Integrated 
approach 
(1992 -2000)
Yearly fig-
ures about 
fatalities 
in car acci-
dents
Southhall crash 
(1997); ICE 
Enschede crash 
(1998); Landbroke 
Grove collision 
(1999); Hatfield 
crash (2000)
Numerous col-
lisions on the 
Rhine (Pallas 
& Co)
St. Ann´s Head 
(1996); Pallas 
(1998); Erika 
(1999);
Cherbourg 
(2000); Ievoli 
Sun (2000)
Brigenair (1996); 
Essex (1999);
Concorde (2000)
Phase IV: 
Consolidation 
(2001-2005)
Puddington rail 
crash and Potters 
Bar crash (2002); 
Paris-Vienna train 
Baltic Sea 
(2001);
Prestige (2002)
Milan (2001);
Bodensee (2002)
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manslaughter. The SAS aircraft had crashed into a baggage-handling build-
ing when it veered off the runway after hitting the Cessna aircraft, which 
had crossed its path. Investigators named poor visibility and human error 
the causes of the accident. But others claimed that the out of service ground 
radar was liable. The EU adopted regulation 552/2004 on the interoperability 
of European air traffic management network in 2004 and discuss a Commu-
nity air traffic controller license (ATCO license) based on the Commission’s 
proposal from 12 July 2004.
In the following, these findings will further guide the analysis of the study 
more general and the theoretical argument in particular which will be the 
focus of the next chapter.

Part II
The timing of 
transposition

Chapter 4: 
A theoretical framework 
for apt transposition
‘Good things come to those who wait’ – Proverb
4.1 Introduction
As has been argued in the literature review chapter of this book, comparative 
politics literature on implementation is rich in sociological (Dimitrova and 
Rhinard, 2005) and, to a lesser extent, historical institutionalist (Haverland, 
2000) explanations. The few rational choice contributions that do exist rep-
resent the beginning of what in all likelihood will become a burgeoning field 
(Treib, 2003; Franchino, 2005; Steunenberg, 2006; 2007). Here, in the second 
main part of the study, I engage in the theoretical debate on transposition, 
in particular, by drawing from a simple bargaining model, in particular, that 
has a number of appealing features: war of attrition games. In this light, it re-
fers to the transposition outcome as a bargaining between groups of actors of 
administrative and political nature who must agree on a new national policy. 
That is, actors are able to weigh every choice against its alternatives, and they 
invariably choose the most preferred option. Since their demands are incom-
patible, the actors can either reiterate the previous demand and waiting for 
the opponent to lower his demand or lower her own demand. Two parties 
choose the lengths of time to hold out for the prize in question. Waiting, i.e. 
delaying national transposition processes, is one of the actors’ strategies, but 
can be costly.
Formal war of attrition models have subsequently been applied by econo-
mists to a variety of economic conflicts, such as price wars and economic 
reforms (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Rodik, 1994; 
Haggard, 1990; Casella and Eichengreen, 1994; Sachs, 1994). Recently, a small 
group of political scientists has also begun using the war of attrition games, 
in a more informal way, to describe proliferation and warfare (Fearon, 1998; 
Smith and Stam, 2004; Adamsky, 2005). In comparative studies, however, no 
study has yet applied the underlying logic of  those war of attrition models to 
societal problems. In the following I will present the basic concepts of war of 
attrition reasoning.
This book will identify three main groups of dynamics that influence timely 
transposition, such as European specific variables. Having an effect on the cost 
structures, also examined are member states’ individual transposition forms, 
including the number of actors, and member states’ individual methods, 
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including the national transposition package approach17, general elections, 
the allotted transposition time and the so-called ‘deadline effect’. As a third 
set of factors this study leans on Hirshman’s research (1985) which suggests 
that crises play an important role in determining when to cooperation in 
bargaining. Following his argument, here, I assess the effect of timeliness of 
transport-related accidents across member states.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, it presents the foundations of for-
mal war of attrition games. To determine the outcome of the game (when and 
who ends the game?) it is necessary to determine the players’ expected pay-
offs, i.e. the difference between benefits and costs. Then, I briefly discuss the 
individual components of the cost and benefit functions affecting the overall 
payoffs. Hereupon, the chapter bridges to the transposition setting in mem-
ber states presenting a theoretical framework. It argues that transposition is 
a bargaining process over the sprawling rent-seeking costs, the rent propor-
tion and time. Eventually, six hypotheses are generated to explain the timing 
effects of a) the number of veto players in the national transposition process, 
b) the amount of discretion granted by the directive’s provisions (number of 
issues), c) the fixed transposition deadline in the directive, d) the so-called na-
tional transposition package approach, e) general elections, and f) transport-
related accidents. 
4.2 War of attrition games  – The basic model
Political decision-making is often fundamentally a bargaining problem about 
who gets when and what. A bargaining problem, hence, is the essence of stra-
tegic decision-making between states, parties, bureaucrats, leaders, players – 
groups of actors. It refers to a situation where actors are confronted with a di-
lemma. There are multiple agreements or outcomes that would be preferred 
by all actors to no agreement, but the actors disagree in their ranking of the 
mutually preferable agreements (Fearon, 1998: 274). A second characteristic 
of bargaining problems is that they are resolved through time, in sequences of 
offers and counteroffers or with one or both parties ‘holding out’ in hope that 
the other will make concessions (Rubinstein, 1982). A final significant aspect 
of bargaining problems is that they typically involve uncertainty about the 
minimum that the other side would accept or private information about what 
the other side’s true preferences and payoffs are. In this section, I describe the 
foundations of the bargaining model which account in particular for ‘wait-
ing’ as one of the actors’ strategies often referred to as war of attrition.
17 Understood as using one national implementing measure to transpose numerous EU direc-
tives.
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To start there are two players who try to maximize their expected payoff. 18 
In the beginning, both players announce simultaneously what they want 
from themselves. Player 1 demands her share to be x offering 1-p1 to player 
2. If p1+p2=1, the demands are called compatible and the players will split 
the money at the middle of their proposals (divide-the-dollar). When the de-
mands are incompatible, the players proceed to the war of attrition stage. 
The actors are assumed to have conflicting preferences over two issues. Both 
would prefer coordinating on either one of the two outcomes to noncoopera-
tion, but they differ over the ranking of their preferred outcome. So the play-
ers’ strategies are concerned with the moment when they decide to stop the 
game. Bargaining over which of two possible deals they will implement the 
players decide simultaneously what to do out of two options: Reiterating her 
previous demand and waiting for her opponent to lower his demand, or lowering her 
own demand.  Eventually, the aim of the game is to find a player who ends the 
game at a specific date a (agreement).
Who and when the game ends, depends on the players’ expected payoffs, i.e. 
the payoff to the actors for choosing a particular waiting time. The expected 
flow of payoffs to an actor i equals to the difference between benefits and 
costs: the benefits (Bi) based on the interval from the point of agreement (a) to 
infinity and the costs (Ci) based on the interval from the start of the negotia-
tions (0) to the moment of agreement (a).
Benefits: The aim of negotiations is rent sharing. Before the deal, actors earn a 
proportion of the full rent and they want their share (benefit) to rise. If player 
1 gets his way through, then, he wins a reward--which is private information 
to player 1 at the beginning of the game. The rationale behind this is that each 
individual picks a time that they are willing to display for and that when the 
lesser of these has elapsed the corresponding individual leaves and the other 
collects the reward (Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson, 1988). Here, the motto is: 
the earlier the better. The flow of benefits to actor i for choosing a particular 
18 Originally, the war of attrition games was introduced by Smith (1974) in his study of the 
evolutionary stability of certain patterns of behaviour in animal conflicts. In particular, 
he notes that they often engage in a fight over prey. If one animal were to back down, its 
opponent would obtain the prey. If both animals were to back down simultaneously, then 
each would have an equal chance of obtaining the prey. Smith also notes that, in the animal 
kingdom, delaying cooperation entails fighting which is costly in terms of energy output 
and personal injury. Because fighting results in the diminution of strength, each animal 
prefers as short a fight as possible. 
0     t = a ∞
                   C B
time
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waiting time is positively related to the rent proportion, pa, and negatively 
related to time, t: Bi (pa , t).
Costs: Next to benefits, costs represent the second element of actors’ pay-
off functions. Actors pay so-called rent-seeking costs. As Tullock (1967) has 
pointed out for market-distorting effects of monopolies, the real costs of ac-
quiring rents can be much bigger than the ‘second-order triangle losses from 
allocative distortions’; the big losses from an existing policy might not be 
the reduced trade in monopoly settings, but the cost of the battle to gain the 
monopoly. So-called rent-seeking costs emerge when players use advertis-
ing to increase their influence. Informative advertising has some social ben-
efits, but to the extent that advertising is just ‘gloss and glitter’, it represents 
wasted resources. Studies, meetings, legislative hearings, and floor debates 
are all part of the political process needed to make expropriation threats cred-
ible whenever milder bills are proposed or the other way around. Hiding 
resources to avoid their expropriation likewise imposes deadweight losses 
(Shughart II and Razzolini, 2004: 387). Competition for benefits will cause 
scarce resources to be diverted from other, more socially valuable purposes 
and the cost to society of this competition might be as large as the value of the 
benefits themselves. Furthermore, these costs represent the costs of the status 
quo. The players’ costs depend on the rent-seeking cost determinant, but also 
have to be paid per unit of time as long as the actor competes and until the 
second actor has quit. So, the flow of costs is determined by the player’s cost 
determinant, Xi, and time, t: Ci (Xi , t).
Expected payoff:
The actors’ payoff structures consist of both, benefits and costs while both 
elements are affected by particular factors. Whereas both include the time 
component determining the flow of benefits and costs respectively, they vary 
in terms of additional elements which determine the actors’ payoff flow. 
Generally speaking, the expected payoff of both players depends on the ben-
efit indulged by the new policy and the total amount of time the player can 
expect to wait during the encounter. In addition, it is the rent-seeking costs, 
i.e. the cost of the battle in the pursuit of these benefits. The players’ payoffs 
are similarly affected by the amount of time they wait. Waiting is assumed to 
be costly to both players for a number of reasons. Payoffs decrease over time. 
For the time being and simplicity, I assume that the loss in payoffs of both 
players while waiting is a linear function of the total amount of time they wait 
during the encounter. However, last but not least, however, players discount 
future payoffs. If the discount factor is low, the future cost/benefits are cur-
rently perceived as almost negligible; if the discount factor is high, future 
cost/benefits are perceived as being similar in value to the current ones.
µi = [ Bi  (pa , t, d) – Ci (Xi , t, d)]  with
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t  =  time;
pi =  is player i rent proportion; pt i is the player i rent proportion before agree-
ment; pa is player’s i rent proportion claiming after agreement; with 
a = moment of agreement (when a player takes decision to accept his 
opponent claim);
Xi =  rent-seeking cost determinant;
d =  the percentage rate required to calculate the present value of a future 
payoff;
Bi (pa ; t) is the benefit function positively related to pa; and negatively related 
to t;
Ci (Xi , t) is the player i rent seeking cost function positively related to Xi; and 
negatively related to t.
In order to maximise the payoff, each player must choose a moment of agree-
ment a at which he plans to concede in the event that the other player has not 
already conceded. An actor quits on time (a) which determines how long he 
will incur the rent-seeking costs in the hope of getting a better deal, because 
at any time player i earns a higher return if the other concedes first. The actor 
conceding first is normally referred to the leader (L), whereas the actor who 
does not end the game is the follower (F). The follower’s payoff function is:
F = B (p0 , t) – C (Xi , t, d);
if p0 + pa = 1 then p0 = 1- pa, and F= B(1-pa , t, d) – C (Xi ,t, d)
As a leader the player receives an expected payoff of:
L = B(pa , t, d) – C (Xi , t, d)
All four payoff parameters, p, X, t, d, affect the benefits and costs of player 
i differently. Both actors choose lengths of time to hold out for the reward 
in question (here, the better cooperative deal) i.e. waiting in the hope that 
the other will make some significant concession first (back down).  The first 
player to quit the contest cedes the reward to the other side. Increasing the 
rent proportion p increases the benefits and increases the risk of waiting. 
The point of waiting is to let someone else volunteer first, but waiting can be 
costly. Increasing the cost determinant increase the cost-side of the difference 
and decreases the likelihood of a complicated and time-consuming negotia-
tion process. Increasing the waiting time a of the player increases the waiting 
costs with every additional unit per time while reducing the benefit.  In this 
respect, discounting the future plays an additional important role. Players 
discount the future flow of payoffs affecting the perception of them. With a 
discount rate close to 1, the less player discount future payoffs and the more 
future cost/benefit payoffs are perceived as similar in value to the current 
ones. On the other hand, a discount rate close to 0 entails cost/benefits to be 
almost negligible.
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In the following, I apply this waiting game logic to the EU’s transposition 
problem without any claim for formalisation since there are a few difficulties 
in the basic war of attrition model which would make a formalisation very 
cumbersome. On the one hand, the assumed two actors’ logic does not apply 
to most real applications in political science; in particular, it bears almost no 
relation to national transpositions of EU directives. The transposition process 
at the national level, for example, normally involves more than two actors. 
The need to forge a parliamentary majority in both chambers in case of legis-
lative acts or a domestic consensus among relevant bureaucracies and other 
transposition actors may make it very costly for a state in general and minis-
ters in particular to generate a new policy that they had signed at the Council 
of Ministers meeting. In addition, actors often bargain about more than two 
issues with EU directives’ number of articles varying between a few to  dozens
(Kaeding, 2006). Furthermore, national transposition processes are con-
strained by so-called transposition deadlines set in the EU directive. So, we 
must add an additional factor that reflects the ability of the EU to legally open 
cases, and impose sanctions on the players, after the passing of the deadline 
in the directive.
Examining the timeliness of national transposition processes across member 
states, the following theoretical framework will adapt some of the basic com-
ponents of the basic game described here, follows its reasoning in broader 
terms.In summary, this study will account for a transposition deadline that 
alters the payoff structure of n transposition actors. Furthermore, these 
actors, who are administrative and political in nature, are said to deal with 
several policy issues at once.  Finally, I determine additional factors that may 
affect the players’ expected payoffs, namely: effects of national transposition 
packages, general elections and external shocks. The next section reviews the 
study’s theoretical framework.
4.3 The timing of transposition – what makes national 
transposition processes timley?  – The theoretical 
framework
As an empirical matter of fact, Fearon (1998) argues that international bar-
gaining often take the appearance of a war of attrition – two sides holding 
out, waiting in the hope that the other will make some significant concessions 
first. I argue that this holds also true for the transposition of EU legislation 
across the Member States. Member states must comply with new legislative 
measures passed by the Council of Ministers. Compliance is achieved through 
both the legal transposition process and the practical implementation of new, 
national legislation. In the following, this study focuses exclusively on the 
first stage, the legal transposition process which ‘denotes the process of trans-
forming directives into provisions of national law by the competent national 
legislative body or bodies’ (Prechal, 1995: 5) within the margins of discretion 
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guaranteed and the transposition deadline in the EU directive. In the follow-
ing, I address every single component of the transposition bargaining proc-
ess, namely: number of actors, set of possible deals, the transposition dead-
line and other effects on the expected payoffs determining the timeliness of 
national transposition processes.
Number of actors:
To start, this study argues that a transposition process normally induces pol-
icy change at the national, member state level. This policy change must be 
implemented by national transposition actors, who must come to an agree-
ment of how to implement policy in a manner complying with EU legislation. 
Transposition actors are administrators and politicians, responsible for the 
adoption of national legislation. Whereas ministers and political appointees 
sign the ministerial orders and control the interpretation of the content of the 
directive, respectively, it is the ministry’s administration that provides the 
technical and juridical know-how in the legal transposition stage.
The number actors on the state is contingent on the chosen type of national 
transposing instrument. Whereas member states transpose EU directives by 
using national implementing measures, the types of the legal instruments 
differ. Questions about how many ministries to be involved, and how many 
national legal instruments needed may depend on strategic calculations or 
may be preconditioned by national trajectories. Predicated mostly on admin-
istrative and ministerial traditions, one legal instrument is preferred over an-
other. For example, in France the choice of an instrument to transpose an EU 
directive is affected by the question of whether its contents requires ‘legisla-
tive’ or ‘executive’ actions, that is, the introduction of law, or the introduction 
of government regulations. It is the State Council of France that determines to 
which branch the content of a directive belongs (Steunenberg and Voermans, 
2005). Based on this advice, preparations to transpose a directive can begin. 
In Denmark, the bulk of transposition, about 85% of all directives, takes place 
by means of Ministerial orders. Over time, the trend has been to ‘use more and 
more delegation to a Minister to pass certain provisions’ (Steunenberg and 
Voermans, 2005: 83). In Italy, laws and legislative decrees represent 40% of 
all implementing measures, whereas ministerial orders are applied in about 
60% of the cases. In 2004, for example, 52 of 87 notified Italian transposition 
measures were ministerial orders, 31 were ordinances, and only 1 was a law 
(Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005: 190). Obviously, the number of transposi-
tion actors varies considerably and not seldom go beyond two.
In general terms, the classical war of attrition literature, however, has focused 
on games with only two players, competing for rewards which is private in-
formation by actor i from the beginning of the game. While many of the exam-
ples do involve only two players, multiple player games are important. In line 
with Bulow and Klemperer (1997), I consider a generlised war of attrition in 
which n-persons are competing for n-rewards, so that n-1 players must con-
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cede for the game to end. More players, however, create coordination prob-
lems (Shepsle and Boncheck, 1997). So to say, n-games are more complicated 
to resolve due to problems common to group interaction (Raiffa, Richardson 
and Metcalfe, 2002: 390):
– ‘People talk at the same time. No one can make himself heard or, worse, 
hear anybody else;
– People don’t listen carefully. They think about their next input;
– Too much time is spent on trivia and not enough on substance;
– Often the discussion breaks down into several parallel meetings, reach-
ing inconsistent understandings’.
Imagine a handful of groups of transposition actors that want to pick an inter-
pretation of an EU directive. Player A wants to opt for a and player B want to 
defend b. It might be possible to link those two. But now add some more par-
ties, who will impose additional restrictions on the decision. Player C wants 
to push c; player D wants d. Now it does not seem very easy to make everyone 
happy. The difference is that in a game with two players we get down to one 
actor immediately, and so only have to incur costs running through the high-
est value of actor A and highest value of actor B. In a n-actors setting, all possi-
bilities must be run through in real time, and the amount of time required for 
the transposition actor to shake down from n-actors to the remaining winner 
(follower) may far exceed the time needed to get from 2 to 1. To put it differ-
ently, complexity increases with the number of players. A deal between two 
players is less complex than a deal with four because the number of possible 
combinations is much greater. Complexity can delay the process consider-
ably. The more actors involved the more time needed for policy change.
Set of issues:
A directive has to be transposed into national legislation, which requires 
‘the adoption of general measures of a legislative nature’ (Prechal, 1995: 5). 
A directive’s text determines the baseline policy and the latitude enjoyed 
by the member state in the transposition of the policy (Steunenberg, 2006). 
In accordance with Article 249, third paragraph, EC, a directive is binding 
in terms of the result to be achieved in each member state to which it is ad-
dressed. But, directives leave the choice of form and methods to the national 
authorities. The leeway afforded to member states in this regard, however, 
invariably depends on the result that the Council or the Commission wish to 
see achieved, i.e. the set of issues granting some degree of discretion.
National transposition actors, regardless their number, cannot modify the 
policy in ways that are substantially different from the draft adopted by the 
Council of Ministers. Otherwise, their action can be subject to infringement 
procedures (Art. 223) and, eventually, a Court’s judgment of failure to com-
ply with Treaty obligations. Since Maastricht (1992), member states can also 
expect to be charged with penalty payments. However, the Commission only 
challenges adopted national implementing measures that take extreme lib-
erty with the competence, also known as margins of discretion, assigned to 
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member states by the directive. Hence, if already existing national measures 
lie within the margins of discretion, then no new national transposing instru-
ment has to be agreed upon. The member states simply notify the Commis-
sion directly about the existing legislation before the deadline of transposi-
tion. Whereas most transposition processes require new national implement-
ing measures, i.e. the national policy status quo lies outside the directive’s 
margins of discretion, the new European policy determines each member 
state’s ability to interpret a directive’s provisions.
But transposition bargaining often deal with more than two issues (points on 
which actors may disagree). EU Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway infra-
structure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and 
safety certification, for example, left the transposition actors with a compara-
tively high amount of discretion. It was for the transposition actors to decide 
whether the infrastructure manager were to provide all necessary informa-
tion on the charges imposed (Article 7), whether member states were to levy 
mark –ups on the basis of efficient transparent and non-discriminatory prin-
ciples (Article 8), whether member states were to establish a framework for 
the allocation of infrastructure capacity (Article 14), whether applications for 
infrastructure capacity were to be made by railway undertakings and their 
international groupings  and member states were to allow other applicants to 
apply for infrastructure capacity on their territories (Article 16), and, finally, 
whether member states were to require railway undertakings to be involved 
in assuring the enforcement and monitoring of their own compliance of the 
safety standards and rules (Article 29). Hence, this example illustrates that 
transposing this specific EU directive raised six issues with considerable lee-
way for interpretation. If we apply a dichotomous interpretation, alone they 
already stand for 6! (240) different combinations – policy combinations that 
have to be addressed one by one which is very time-consuming and rent-
seeking cost-intense.
Again, the coordination of different interpretations are cumbersome and 
complicated. Those at a meeting may fail to agree on the purpose of their 
gathering. They do not agree on what they should be talking about at any 
particular moment – what they need to decide, what information to share 
and so on. Combined with a growing number of actors the negotiations are 
easily sidetracked, and time wasted on irrelevancies. Each additional person 
has a new interpretation of an issue to discuss, and the same arguments are 
rehearsed again and again, ‘without persuading anyone’ (Raiffa, Richardson 
and Metcalfe, 2002: 392).
Transposition deadline:
Whereas most war of attrition models allow negotiations ample time as infin-
ity, most real applications of the war of attrition models simply cannot allow 
infinity. i.e. there is a change in the payoff structure after some moment in 
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time. This also holds for the transposition of EU directives. After being adopt-
ed at the European level, EU directives must be transposed within a specific 
allotted timeframe set in their texts that can be normally found under the pe-
nultimate article of the EU directive. Therefore, this study takes a fixed dead-
line into the timing game (Ponsati, 1995) into consideration, which yields a 
discontinuity in the payoffs that actors can enjoy over time by leaving the 
assumed constant-cost but allowing costs to shoot up with the expiry of the 
deadline.
As long as the transposition actors have not settled their bargaining game, the 
status quo can proove very costly for the government. After the deadline has 
expired lawsuits at the national or European level become a real threat – rep-
resenting additional costs to the already existing rent seeking costs of player i. 
A well-known example of such a lawsuit is the Francovich case. 19 The costs of 
being among the non-transposers of a European directive, individual trans-
position actor’s costs of holding out which may differ for actors, i.e. delaying 
the transposition of the EU directive, include the private costs of enduring 
pressure from the administration, and the public costs, borne by all actors, of 
delaying passage of the legislative text. The delay increases public frustration 
with the political process, delays the legislative text’s benefits, increases the 
probability of the text failing and left the actors less time to work on the rest 
of their agenda.
To put it differently, whereas in an infinite time horizon rent-seeking costs per 
unit of time are constant until the date of agreement, with the expiry of the 
transposition deadline the pattern changes. Additional costs of noncoopera-
tion occur  reflecting the potential threat of a likely infringement procedure 
which is cumbersome, time-consuming, image damaging, distracting and 
with a possible costly outcome.
Both, the constant and variable element form part of the cost-side of the pay-
off function. Whereas until now players would spend an amount smaller than 
the benefit in their pursuit of the benefits, costs to society of this competition 
might be as large as the value of the benefits themselves or could even exceed 
the benefits. Introducing a deadline allows the rent-seeking costs to rise ex-
ponentially.
So, altering the game to one in which individuals must meet a deadline entails 
two consequences. One consequence: evolving around the fixed transposition 
deadline itself. The second consequence is the length of the transposition pe-
riod granted in the EU directive. A fixed transposition deadline adds to the 
assumed constant rent seeking cost function a second cost component; This 
19 Additional examples include, among others, Commission vs. UK, Case C-218/02, Com-
mission vs. Ireland, Case C-494/01; Commission vs. Belgium, Case C-27/03.
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component reflects the potential  national court and European infringement 
costs (Conant, 2002). Furthermore, the length of the transposition period de-
fined by the EU directive has an impact on the date of agreement. The longer 
the transposition timeframe the more costs accumulate per unit. This accumu-
lation leads to an agreement while costs exceed the benefits of delay. The flow 
of benefits to actor i for choosing a particular waiting time is negatively related 
to time. Whereas a comfortable generous timeframe allows the actor to trans-
pose timely and correct, consequently, the less transposition time guaranteed 
by the directive, the more prevalent are the players’ benefits – leading to more 
complex and time-consuming bargaining.
Additional effects on players’ expected payoffs
Effects of national transposition packages:
European directives rarely require more than one national transposing mea-
sure in order to be adequately implemented. But member states often use 
one national legal instrument to transpose a handful of EU directives at the 
same time, in what is known as a national transposition package approach. 
These national transposition packages can include two or more EU directives 
whose full transposition is, quite often, not due in the same year. They are 
applied to reduce coordination costs within the ministries since they allow 
to transpose a couple of directives with only one national legal instrument. 
Decisions on whether to apply the package approach, and how many EU di-
rectives the package would include, are made by the same institutional actors 
who decide what national legal instrument to use and how many are needed 
in terms of correct transposition. For example, in France, the decision-makers 
are the SGCI (Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel pour les questions de 
coopération économique européenne), who consult with the State Council and the 
SGG (Secrétariat Général du Gouvernment); in Spain, the Potestad Reglamentaria 
(Article 23 of ley 50/1997 de 27 noviembre, del Gobierno) is responsible for indi-
cating what circumstances require a law (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005: 
129).
Due to its endogenous character a national transposition package should 
only positively affect the transposition speed assuming that member states 
always try to meet the deadlines. However, to what extent the package ap-
proach accounts for the timeliness of the national transposition process is 
contingent on when it occurs (timing). Since a transposition settlement will 
be reached as soon as the costs of non-transposition surpass the benefit of the 
existing policy, the package approach will trigger policy change at different 
pace by increasing the costs of non-transposition steadily. Depending on the 
position of the EU directive within the national transposition package, the 
costs may remain for a longer period below the costs for policy change. How-
ever, a break-even point will occur when costs of maintaining the status quo 
surpass the rent-seeking costs of implementing the new policy. Hence, the 
usual time margins of transposition are set by the deadlines in the first and 
last directives in the package. Depending on those and following the earlier 
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mentioned logic of an additional ‘infringement threat’ cost component, the 
accumulated costs may increase considerably for the first EU directives after 
the deadlines and remain relatively low for the last directive whose allotted 
timeframes are longer.
Effects of general elections:
Elections are the usual mechanism by which modern democracy fills offices 
in the legislature. They are universally accepted as a tool for selecting rep-
resentatives in modern democracies. Elections can be set and postponed by 
Presidents and Head of States, and they vary in frequency and time needed 
for execution. Because elections attract a lot of attention by voters and office 
seekers, they have an impact on the internal policy-making procedures in 
a member state. Whereas elections can cause political crises, as in the case 
of Ukraine general elections in 2004 or the Italian general elections in 2006, 
elections are often characterized as destabilizing and disequilibrating factors 
in a country’s policy-making system. Incumbent decision-makers perceive 
general elections as a threat to the status quo to which a responsive decision is 
necessary (electoral campaign). It unbalances the regular heartbeat of day-to-
day politics and directly affects the size of actors’ rent-seeking costs.
National general elections reduce rent seeking efforts of government officials 
by channelling all their attention away from day-to-day policy-making to-
ward the electoral campaign (keyword: parliamentary recess). With regard to 
transposition, depending, however, on when a general election occurs in the 
point in time of the transposition process (timing), a general election can have 
either a retarding or accelerating affect. For analytical reasons, I distinguish 
between general election falling at two points during a national transposition 
process: either at the beginning, or at the end. Although elections reduce rent-
seeking costs in general, elections that fall at the end of a national transposi-
tion process increase the cost of waiting dramatically. The underlying reason, 
here, is with the potential threat of infringement costs, which coincide with 
the ‘legislative deadline’. Future payoffs shadow on the national transposi-
tion process with a discount factor close to 1. National implementation pro-
cedures that have not been finalized by the end of the parliamentary term 
often expire and must be re-tabled in the new legislative term. If they are 
not adopted before the end of the legislative term, however, they automati-
cally extend the duration of a national transposition process considerably. 
Any legislative project that the institutions have not passed by the ‘legislative 
deadline’ must be reconsidered from scratch, which is a time-consuming en-
deavour. Considering the potential infringement costs after the expiry of the 
transposition deadline, such reconsideration represents a financial and image 
marring threat. Therefore, on the one hand, it is the national administrations 
that use the ‘political vacuum’ to push their efforts of special interests in order 
to obtain preferential treatment by using the machinery of government – reg-
ulations and legislation. A member state’s administration increases its stand-
ing with other ministries if it takes the lead in more and more dossiers from 
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Brussels. On the other hand, politicization of public administrations across 
political systems has become a ‘reality of modern government’ (Peters and 
Pierre, 2004: 288). Some positions in the public service will always be political 
which makes administrations very much dependent on politics and general 
elections respectively.
To the contrary, general elections that fall at the beginning of a national trans-
position process do not encounter infringement costs in the short run. Politi-
cians still have all the legislative term ahead and, first, probably prioritise 
election pledges. Administrators have less incentive to maximize their influ-
ence at the beginning of a legislative term compared to the end of a legislative 
term. Generally speaking, they regard transposition of EU law as a low prior-
ity, not in the least because they associate it with a lot of  additional workload 
from Brussels. This work is believed, and rather accurately so, to be in terms 
of  prioritizing and coordinating across different units (of one or more min-
istries).
Effects of external shocks:
Exogenous shocks that aggravate economic conditions increase the cost of 
not adopting reforms and thus prompt a solution to the bargaining problem 
(Drazen and Grilli, 1990; Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Regardless of the kind 
of crisis20, considerable influence is enacted on the timeliness of the transpo-
sition process by such upsets. According to Brecher’s definition (1977:32) a 
crisis is a
sudden and unforeseen ‘situational change in the external or internal environment which creates 
in the minds of the incumbent decision-makers of a state a perceived threat from the external envi-
ronment to the basic values to which a responsive decision is deemed necessary.’  (italic added)
In the context of transposition, crisis add to the constant rent-seeking costs 
additional costs of external shocks. A crisis that immediately shoots up over-
all costs, increases the cost of non-transposition more general, and thereby 
increases the probability of a fast settlement.
Thus, the external shock costs reduce the benefits, settles bargaining issues, 
and increases the probability of settlement in even the most conflicted bar-
gaining processes. In line with this theoretical framework, the following sec-
tion proceeds with the presentation of seven testable hypotheses.
20 The word crisis comes from the Greek word krinein meaning ‘to decide.’ It is defined as 
a crucial time, a climax, or a juncture and is often depicted by the Chinese symbol that 
means danger and opportunity. This paper argues that crisis may raise welfare if it is the 
only way to induce necessary policy change.
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4.4 Hypotheses
Number of veto players:
Depending on the form of the national transposing instrument, the number 
of actors varies, and this affects the timeliness of transposition in general. 
A Dutch Ministerial Order, for example, is faster than statutes or orders in 
Council, because consultation of advisory boards is very rare, and neither the 
Council of State nor the Parliament needs to be consulted (Bekkers, Bonnes, 
De Moor van Vugt, Schoneveld and Voermans, 1995: 412). In France, a Legisla-
tive Act with the format of an omnibus bill that transposes a number of direc-
tives, preferably in one policy area, requires the State Council’s advice and a 
parliamentary approval with a simple majority. A ministerial order, however, 
represents a provision issued by the minister without explicit authorization 
through a law, and requiring nothing more than a signature by the minister. 
National governments that must satisfy many coalition partners, as well as 
other veto players, have through all possibilities in real time requiring a lot 
of time for the actors to shake down from n to one player. Since waiting i.e. 
delaying is costly, the model suggests, in line with Haverland (2000); Giuliani 
(2003); Steunenberg (2006), that policy change is adopted later in countries 
with more political fragmentation.
Veto-player matters – hypothesis: The fewer actors involved in the making of a legal instru-
ment, ceteris paribus, the less likely a delayed transposition process.
Level of discretion:
The more discretion guaranteed in the EU directives reflected by the amount 
of issues, the more difficult it will be to find an agreement across the numer-
ous transposition actors. The higher the directive’s number of issues, guaran-
teeing a certain degree of flexibility, the more complex the transposition proc-
ess, i.e. the more issues to be pondered and negotiated, the more strategic and 
time-consuming bargaining involved, the longer it will take for an agreement 
to be reached. Since waiting is costly (and a considerable number of issues 
given leeway in interpretation entaisl longer rounds of bargaining), there is a 
positive relation between the number of issues, member states’ discretion and 
the timeliness of national transposition processes.
Discretion matters – hypothesis: The higher the amount of discretion, ceteris paribus, the more 
difficult to settle an agreement on time.
Time set for transposition:
Two effects on timeliness with regard to the transposition time set in the di-
rectives are important. First, the length of the transposition time matters. 
Especially highly detailed and complex directives are transposed slowly 
(Ciavarini Azzi, 2000: 56) and need to grant more time for transposition than 
fairly straightforward directives. This is especially true when technical deci-
sions about complex directives are decided in implementation committees 
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after the directive has been accepted. For example, changes to labelling re-
quirements should allow sufficient time to exhaust existing label stocks.  With 
longer transposition timeframes the flow of benefits to actor i for choosing a 
particular waiting time decreases and with it this overall utility. To the con-
trary, a short transposition time set in the EU directive limits the rent seeking 
costs of actor i and increases the benefits. Member states are more likely to 
comply in case of longer deadlines.
Transposition time matters- hypothesis: The more time a member state has to transpose a 
directive, ceteris paribus, the swifter the national transposition process.
Furthermore, a comfortable transposition timeframe increases the probabil-
ity that the adoption of the national transposing measure will occur around 
the deadline. In politics, each actor chooses the time at which he or she in-
tends to concede his or her position. In situations where there is a known final 
period, or even when the number of negotiation rounds is known, a settle-
ment is agreed upon around the time of the deadline. Whereas the average 
benefits of bargaining without a deadline are close to zero (since conceding 
means giving up almost all the surplus), a deadline, and especially an early 
deadline, yields positive average benefits. Whereas the costs of non-transpo-
sition remain constant before the deadline, they shoot up after the expiry of 
the deadline by adding the ‘infringement cost’component. The costs of non-
transposition increase considerably after the deadline because, after that set 
date, citizens and businesses can file costly court cases in hopes of eking out 
their rights. Since delays are so costly, this study predicts that introducing a 
deadline with the directive results in a so-called deadline-effect (Carré, 2000). 
This study argues that there is a positive, unidirectional, probability of a com-
promise at the transposition deadline set by the Council of Ministers.
Transposition deadline effect – hypothesis: Actors come to an agreement around the date of 
expiry.
Coherence of national transposition package:
First directive in the national transposition package: Delaying effect
Normally, a European directive is followed by more directives on the same 
issue at hand, so the costs for the first directive are relatively high compared 
to the costs of maintaining the existing status quo. As long as the responsi-
ble unit is aware of the fact that forthcoming amendments are common to 
recently adopted directives, the costs of the status quo are bearable because 
the possibility of future EU legislation illuminates the actual costs of non-
transposition. Ministries may strategically delay engaging in a cumbersome 
transposition process.  As long as the costs of the existing policy remain lower 
than the costs for policy change – which, however, decreases with every addi-
tional directive in the transposition package – the settlement of transposition 
bargaining for the first instrument in the package will be delayed.
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Last directive in the national transposition  package: Accelerating effect
In most cases the national transposition process is already underway when 
the last European directive (of a transposition package) has been adopted by 
the EU Council of Ministers, so the national package approach will have an 
accelerating effect on the last directive in the perceived transposition pack-
age. While time will have helped to settle allocation quarrels about the costs 
before the adoption of the last European directive, costs of non-transposition 
will have surpassed the costs for policy change.
National transposition package approach – hypothesis: A national package approach increas-
es the probability of a delayed settlement of the first European Directive in the package, 
whereas, in turn, it accelerates a settlement of the last European Directive.
Timing of general elections:
Beginning of transposition process: Retarding effect
Ministers are office seekers. To get (re-)elected, politicians must please and 
spend time with their constituency. Although they are not always Member 
of Parliament, due to their popularity Ministers spend much of their cam-
paigning time with their constituency. Consequently, during general elec-
tions, ministers who are key players in the legal transposition process have 
less time for day-to-day policy-making. Electoral concerns that occur in the 
beginning stages of the transposition process may persuade policy makers 
to stick with the status quo. At the beginning of a transposition process the 
costs are lower than the benefits from possible re-election. When the discount 
factor for future payoffs is comparatively low the overall utility to settle an 
agreement low. If the timing of general elections falls within the starting phase 
of a national transposition process the drafting process of new legislative in-
struments, hence, will be retarded. In addition, a change in domestic political 
circumstances may lead government leaders to see new potential gains from 
alternative policy options, as when a political party with stronger commit-
ments to liberalizing trade come to power or the implementation of a Euro-
pean directive generates new domestic political pressures (Börzel and Risse, 
2003). For administrators a new legislative term means increased workload. 
This workload includes all non-adopted legislation from the former legisla-
tive term that must be re-considered from scratch as well as delving into new 
legislative texts that have not yet seen the light of day.
End of transposition process: Accelerating effect
The end of a legislative term coinciding with a national transposition process 
has the opposite effect. At the end of a legislative term the so-called ‘legisla-
tive deadline’ triggers the need to act fast. Directives that have not been trans-
posed by the end of the parliamentary term expire or have to be tabled new. 
Since, here, the threat of additional infringement costs with the date of expiry 
is potentially high, the discount rate is almost equal to 1, national transposi-
tion processes are very likely to be adopted on time.  If transposition is not 
concluded before the next legislative term, a general election will shelf it, 
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along with all legislative projects that have not been adopted before the next 
legislative term. Hence, all non-adopted legislation in the concluding legis-
lative term would have to be re-introduced in the forthcoming term, which 
would increase the costs unbearably for politicians and administrators alike. 
Administrators profit from a political vacuum; it increases their influence 
in day-to-day policy-making. The certainty of a legislative deadline makes 
transposition before the end of the legislative period possible.
Election matters – hypothesis: Whereas a general elections falling at the beginning of the 
transposition procedure decreases the probability of a problem-free settlement, a general 
election at the end of a transposition process accelerates the adoption of new national 
legislation.
Transport related accidents: Accelerating effect
Considering the findings of the transport chapter, accidents apply to trans-
port sub-sectors in particular. 21 This study has identified a crisis-driven ap-
proach behind the overall European development of transport. EU policies 
for all modes of transport, (maritime, air, inland waterways, road, and rail) 
have been often initiated by accidents and crises, leading to the adoption of 
numerous packages in the transport sub-sectors by the Ministers of Trans-
port. So, accidents in all modes of transport have not only shaped the devel-
opment of EU transport policy in general, but have also kicked off reform 
efforts by increasing the costs of delayed non-transposition of the new EU 
legislation.  The greater the costs of non-cooperation for the group in general, 
the more likely is an agreement, since these costs will erode the expected pay-
offs. External shocks add costs to the utility equation, resulting in an increase 
of general overall costs. Additional costs decrease the utility and increase the 
urgency of a settlement and, eventually, accelerate the settlement of a bar-
gaining conflict. Consequently, the players are forced to settle earlier.
This study argues that a member state in the midst of transposing EU legisla-
tion, and in particular legislation in the transport sub-field, has an increased 
probability of reaching a settlement when an accident occurs.
Accidents matter – hypothesis: An accident increases the probability of a timely settlement.
4.5 Summary of predictions
Table 4.6 summaries three groups of factors that affect the timeliness of natio-
nal transposition processes across member states. It shows, as argued, that the 
EU directive’s level of discretion may have a retarding effect on transposition 
timeliness. On the contrary, the more transposition time set in the directive, 
21 Accidents probably also affect other policy areas, such as: food safety, banking, health and 
safety at work, protection from hazards, and border control.
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the more swift and problem-free the national transposition process. Further-
more, the adoption of new legislative instruments should accumulate around 
the transposition deadline. At the national level, national forms and methods 
of transposition play an important role as well as the timing general elections. 
When more veto players are involved, the transposition process is slower. 
The package approach alters the pace of policy change by affecting the distri-
bution of adjustment costs of a new European policy. General elections may 
have a either a retarding or an accelerating effect on transposition, depending 
on when they occur in the transposition process. Last but not least, external 
shocks increase the cost component in the cost/benefit equation. consider-
ably. Transport related accidents push for fast implementation of the content 
of the new EU directive. 
Table 4.6: Effects on transposition speed.
Effect on transposition speed
Retarding Accelerating
EU directive 
related 
factors
1. Level of discretion 
guaranteed by the 
directive
The more discretion in 
the text, the more diffi-
cult timely transposition.
2. Length of transposi-
tion deadline of the 
directive
The more transposition 
time set in directive, 
the more problem-free 
transposition. The more 
likely Member States are 
to comply.
Form and 
method of 
national 
transposition 
process
3. Number of veto 
players 
The more veto players 
involved, the more 
delayed the transposition 
process.
4. Presence of national 
package 
First European Directive 
in the national transposi-
tion package
Last European Directive 
in the national transposi-
tion package
5. General elections General elections sche-
duled at the beginning of 
transposition process
General elections sche-
duled at the end of the 
transposition process
Internal and 
external 
situational 
change
6. Transport related 
accidents
Accidents during the 
transposition period
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided a theoretical framework to address the re-
search question of why member states wait to adopt new legislation causing 
missed deadlines when transposing Internal Market directives in the field of 
transport. This framework is informed by findings of war of attrition models 
on the effect of costs and benefits on the settlement of bargaining problems. 
Assuming that a newly adopted EU directive affects the transposition actors’ 
utilities, the national transposition process is not a zero-sum game. Instead is 
understood as a bargaining between political and administrative groups of actors, 
who must reach an agreement about the distribution of cost and benefits. Applying 
the logic of war of attrition models to the transposition problem, this study 
generated six hypotheses. In the remainder of the book, all six hypotheses 
will be tested. In the following chapter, which introduces the third part of the 
study, I present and discuss the data and methods used to test the hypotheses 
on the timeliness of national transposition processes.

Part III
Analysis within a 
combined research 
design

Chapter 5: 
EU 1995-2004 transport transposition 
data set:
‘Who is Afraid of Cumulative Research?’ (Title of the article by 
M. Gabel, S. Hix and G. Schneider published in European Union 
Politics 3(4): 481-500.
5.1 Introduction
After reviewing the rich scholarly discussion on implementation and trans-
position in the European Union (EU), I assessed the characteristics of the his-
torical development of the EU transport policy field. Results from this review 
further supported my theoretical framework, which explains why member 
states miss deadlines for transposing EU transport directives. In this chapter, 
to test the six hypotheses quantitatively, I present a new data set  of the second 
round that covers almost two-thirds of the full population of the EU transport 
acquis from 1995 to 2004. Before I operationalize and test the hypotheses in the 
subsequent chapters, here, I deal with methodological issues. First, I address 
my motivation of the selection of the policy field, the member states, and the 
time period of investigation.  I then present the sources of information and 
assess the completeness of the data set, while devoting particular attention to 
missing values and other important choices.
5.2 Policy field selection
While the research focus is to understand the reasons and mechanisms be-
hind member states’ transposition delay of EU Internal Market legislation, 
directives are of particular interest. They are not immediately applicable at 
the national level, but must first be incorporated into national law. Therefore, 
this book’s focus is the transposition of European directives. It is difficult, 
however, to analyze all European policy fields in which directives are issued 
within the context of the proposed study. Whereas the amount of ‘legislation 
in force’ in general has more than doubled from 4,566 legal acts in 1983 to 
9,767 in 1998 (Wessels, Maurer and Mittag, 2003), the occurrences of EU direc-
tives in particular was 2,285 in 1998 and 2,674 (European Commission, 2006) 
on 8 March 2006.
The policy area selected for the study was guided by four considerations: 
Because the study’s focus is on the timeliness of national transposition proc-
esses, I will not consider areas in which the EU primarily issues regulations, 
such as in the field of cohesion policy, international trade and the common 
agricultural policy (Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht, 2005). Second, I will 
focus on a core policy area of the Union established by the Treaty of Rome 
(Franchino, 2005). Furthermore, a classic way of distinguishing between 
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policy types, which I will use, is in terms of regulatory, re-distributive and 
distributive policies (Lowi, 1964). Typically, EU policies have a strong regula-
tory emphasis (Nugent, 2003: 324), and  Majone even argues that the EU can 
be thought of as a regulatory state (1991; 1994; 1996). In order to facilitate 
the generalization of my findings at a later point, the second consideration is 
whether the policy area in question fit well into the dominant EU regulatory 
category. And fourth, to be able to produce empirical regularities for research 
on transposition of EU directives, I present areas with a sufficiently large 
number of cases and sufficient variety between the cases (for concise over-
view of EU legislative output, see: Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht, 2005).
On the basis of these four criteria this current study opted for the transport 
sector. Transport has a strong regulatory component, and furthermore, is 
one of the crucial enabling technologies for civilization. Since transport had 
played a longstanding and key role in people’s everyday lives and was a 
major factor in economic competitiveness and employment, the creation of 
the single market for intra-Community transport was judged as one of the 
necessary conditions for achieving the ‘four freedoms’ enshrined in articles 
74-84 of the Treaty of Rome. Transport contributes to social and territorial 
cohesion and by its very nature is fundamental to the achievement of free-
dom of movement across the EU, satisfying a primary objective of EU policy. 
Furthermore, permitting quantitative research, the transport acquis includes 
a sufficient number of directives (106). 
5.3 EU transport transposition data set 1995-2004
While the selection of the policy area was primarily guided by four analytical 
reasons, in the following sections, this study argues that we must make ad-
ditional choices about which member states to include in the data set, what 
time period to cover, sources of information, what information to garner and 
what to do with missing values.
5.3.1 Selection of member states:
For analytical reasons this study opted for nine member states: France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. 
These states were selected to cover most of the important dimensions of vari-
ation on the national level independent variables: centralized versus decen-
tralized states variation in legal traditions and practices, and variation in the 
number of veto players across and within member states. Here, institutional 
aspects of the member states’ political system play a role, since they are part 
of the explanatory factors. Whereas some governments tend to be more sta-
ble than others, also included are member states with clear preferences for a 
limited number of transport sub-sectors, such as the Netherlands for inland 
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waterwayss. In contrast, Germany considers all five modes of transport 
equally important. In addition, the study highlights a pair of notorious trans-
position laggards – Greece and Italy. Conversely, Spain and Sweden have 
often led the Commission’s scoreboards on the notification of national meas-
ures of implementing directives (European Commission, 2005). Eventually, 
also included are France, Greece, Sweden and Ireland, a group on which little 
implementation research work has been done to date.
5.3.2 Time period: 1995-2004
This study opted to focus on only recent cases (1995-2004) of EU national im-
plementation instruments in the area of transport covering almost ten years 
for three reasons. First, EU history experienced a new level of quality with 
the adoption of the Single Market in the early 1990s. It was the Single Market 
idea that triggered important new policy developments in more general ar-
eas.22 The Transport Chapter illustrates that it was not until the 1990s that all 
sub-sectors were covered by EU legislation. The Internal Market Project en-
tailed the first ever legislative efforts in the railway sector, an area that had not 
previously attracted considerable attention. Second, rounds of enlargement 
widened the group of member states. With Sweden, the study includes a 
country that became member of the EU as late as 1995. Another consideration 
is Schulz and König (2000) finding that data sources on EU legislation and 
national legal instruments such as Celex, are biased toward the period before 
the late 1980s, i.e. the Celex data base is complte only as of late 1980s.  There is 
a considerable delay before the Celex database is fully updated by the Com-
mission, as national data is transferred sporadically. To maintain the effect 
of right censoring controllable (with regard to those directives for which the 
transposition process as not been concluded yet), I ignored directives with 
transposition deadlines set for after 2004.
Overall, the EU transport transposition data set 1995-2004 covers almost ten 
years of crucial EU transport history while representing 63 percent of the 
full transport acquis, which had to be adopted by the member states of the 
last round of enlargement in 2004. The data covers all transport sub-sectors. 
The distribution of policy sub-sectors in the transport acquis is summarized 
in Figure 5.5.
Road and shipping directives account for almost two-thirds of the transport 
acquis, whereas air and rail represent 12% each, general framework directives 
constitute 8% while inland waterways are used for 4%.
22 See also Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2005) for a breakdown of EU legislation by 
policy domain.
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5.3.3 Sources of information:
Information on the EU transport directives is taken from the official legal data-
base of the European Union – Celex (Communitatis Europeae Lex) which covers 
all Community legislation, preparatory acts, case-law of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) and parliamentary questions. Celex also aids the interaction 
between community law and national law by providing publication referenc-
es regarding member states’ national provisions to enact community direc-
tives. Almost 70% of all national implementing measures for Germany, Spain, 
the Netherlands, the UK, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, France and Greece have been 
reported in Celex and other Commission sources. 23 However, the official legal 
databases of the European Union are not the only accessible source to report 
national implementing measures (or an overview, see Hudson, 2005).
To compare and control for the quality of Celex, I contacted each Transport 
Ministry in the nine Member States and received a full list from their national 
transposition databases dating back to the very first directive of the transport 
acquis. 24  Interestingly, 80% of the data that was often referred to as ‘unreli-
able’ (Börzel, 2001; Mbaye, 2001; Mastenbroek, 2003) matched the national 
data. In only 20% of the cases I added further information on the national 
implementing instrument derived from the national databases. There was 
23 See Steunenberg and Rhinard (2005) for an overview of Commission’s efforts to gather 
reliable compliance data.
24 www.boe.es/g/es (Spain); www.gazzette.comune.jesi.an.it (Italy); www.jura.uni-sb.de/
BGB1/suche.html (Germany); www.legifrance.gouv.fr (France); www.online-law.
co.uk/lawsearch/lawsearch/html (UK); www.opmaat.sdu.nl (The Netherlands); 
www.swedengov.se/sb/d/3288 , www.infotorg.sema.se and www.rixlex.riksdagen.se/
ntbin/thw?%24% (Sweden). I would like to thank Panagiota Massouridou to assist me in 
getting access to the secured data base for the Greek legal professions.
Composition of EU transport directives by 
percentage
Air 12%
Inland
waterways 4% Transport 
general 8%
Shipping 31%
Rail 12%
Road 33%
Figure 5.5: Composition of EU transport directives by percentage. 
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no biased lack of information across member states or transport sub-sectors 
worth mentioning. However, I did add information for all modes of transport 
within each member state following the efforts in line with transposition data 
of the second generation.
5.3.4 Missing data:
When considering the detailed information for each transport directive from 
the first national implementing measure, missing values became apparent. 
However, incomplete data on the EU directives or the national implementing 
measures seems unrelated to member states or transport sub-sectors.25 Since 
these missing values are random noise, they are not expected to affect the 
findings in a systematic manner. Consequently, I took the following steps to 
improve the quality of data. First, in cases where a date of publication was not 
recorded, I used their date of adoption. Second, I excluded missing values for 
which I had not found a date of transposition. Third, I deleted two EU direc-
tives portions from the transport acquis which only dealt with transport in 
the broadest sense, namely: summer time provisions. Fourth, I excluded all 
cases in which member states had already complied before the EU directive 
was adopted. Finally, I deleted all transposition cases of consolidating direc-
tives that combined existing directives, repealed directives or corrected direc-
tives. The last information added on pending cases was February 1, 2004.26
5.3.5 Recording the first national transposing instrument:
Member states sometimes translate EU legislation by using more than one na-
tional transposing instrument. When they do this, they necessarily notify the 
Commission of all to-be-used measures. For the purpose of this research, it 
was not feasible to record all the transposing instruments that were notified to 
the Commission. Therefore, in order to calculate transposition delay at a later 
stage of this analysis, a decision had to be made with regard to which national 
implementing measure is recorded. It is an important question, not in the least 
because whatever legal instrument is recorded will be used to calculate the de-
pendent variable, timeliness. Three primary considerations denote the first na-
tional legal instrument as the prudent choice: practical, conceptual and legal.
First, from a practical point of view, recording the first national implementing 
measure makes sense because the Commission considers the first national 
legal instrument notified as sufficient (IP15). It is sufficient with respect to 
25 See Kaeding (2006).
26 Please see Steunenberg and Rhinard (2005) for additional information on the Transposi-
tion Group data set.
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complying with the requirement of timely notification. That is not to say that 
timely notification is an appropriate measure to explain the completeness of 
implementation. Nonetheless, timeliness is the dependent variable of this 
study and, moreover, a necessary first step for full compliance with the EU 
Treaty obligations. Only after the Commission has been notified of the first 
instrument does the ‘clock start ticking’ to measure an instrument’s appropri-
ateness and correctness for transposing a particular EU directive.
From a conceptual point of view, opting for the alternative ‘last’ implement-
ing measure would have been problematic. Since there is always the possibil-
ity that new measures will be added later on, due to the transposition of new 
EU legislation in the area, it is rather difficult to identify the last instrument, 
especially in a large-n study. 27 Conceptually, then, there is not such thing 
such as a last instrument (see Berglund, Gange and van Waarden, 2006 for 
detailed discussion). When is an instrument the last one? When is a national 
implementing process finalised?
From a legalistc point of view, opting to record the first national transposition 
instrument is prudent because the instrument normally represents the key 
legislative measure in the national transposition process. Moreover, it often 
clears the way for additional pieces of legislation, if required, to be imple-
mented. 
In summary, the first recorded measure might not indicate whether the na-
tional transposition process is complete. However, by using this indicator we 
can confidently ascertain whether there has been a delay. Focusing on the 
timeliness of national transposition processes, furthermore, taking for record 
the first instrument also diminishes the possibility of exaggeration of delays.
5.3.5 Data set:
The EU transport transposition data set covers the period of 1995-2004 and 
includes information on the first 367 national implementing measures in nine 
member states covering 67 EU transport directives and representing 63% of 
the total transposition acquis that member states had to transpose before the 
last enlargement round in 2004. To increase the quality of the Celex data (and 
thereby satisfy the recent efforts of the implementation data of the second 
generation), this study controlled for and added national data sources and 
tidied up the data set for analysis purposes.
27 I will return to this argument when presenting the case studies. When presenting them, 
I have the advantage of hindsight to accurately account for all legislative instruments, 
since all four cases had been concluded. 
Chapter 6: 
EU transposition deficit – statistical 
illusion or reality?
‘Failure to apply European legislation on the ground damages the 
effectiveness of Union policy and undermines the trust on which the 
Union depends. The perception that ‘we stick to the rules but others 
don’t’, wherever it occurs, is deeply damaging to a sense of European 
solidarity… Prompt and adequate transposition and vigorous pursuit 
of infringements are critical to the credibility of European legislation 
and the effectiveness of policies.’ (European Commission’s Strategic 
Objectives 2005-2009, COM(2005) 12 final, p.5).
6.1 Introduction
There has long been a vague supposition that the EU has a transposition prob-
lem. The study first demonstrates that, indeed, the EU does have a serious 
transposition problem among member states and different modes of transport. 
Based on information from 367 national implementing measures covering nine 
member states during 1995-2004, indeed it is shown that that the EU transposi-
tion deficit is more than just a statistical illusion. While only 50 percent of na-
tional transposition instruments are completed on time, cross-country variance 
is respectable pinpointing to laggards and leaders among member states.
6.2 The European transposition deficit further specified
Calculating the difference between the transposition deadline set in the EU 
directive and the date of publication of the first national transposing instru-
ment, Figure 6.6 shows that the EU faces a serious transposition deficit in the 
transport sector. Figure 6.6 displays the delays in weeks for the 367 national 
implementing measures in the transport data set. A negative delay, as indi-
cated on the horizontal axis of the figure, indicates that a national implement-
ing instrument was adopted early, i.e. before the official deadline set by the 
Council of Transport Ministers.
During 1995-2004, the nine member states under investigation notified 53 
percent of the national instruments on time. In addition, we find cases that 
were transposed up to 2,4 years earlier than demanded by the directive (see 
index, No. 367 and 366). However, 47 percent were transposed late, varying 
between just a few days tardy to 251 weeks (almost 5 years) overdue, as it is 
the case for Greece’s national transposing measure for the EU directive on the 
harmonization of boatmasters’ cerficates (index No. 11). The mean transposition 
time in the transport sector was 26 weeks (six months) late, whereas the me-
dian was zero weeks, i.e. on time.
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6.2.1 Mean/median discrepancy:
Before additional results are addressed a more detailed discussion of the dis-
covered mean and median values is prudent to address first. The recorded 
discrepancy between median/mean values uncovers the following, which is 
crucial for the remainder of the book. One the one hand, we see that about half 
of the national transposition measures were notified on time, while the re-
maining half were late (median). On the other hand, the standard average (ar-
tithmetic mean) indicates that the average transposition delay was about six 
months. With a discrepancy between the mean and median of 26 weeks (half a 
year), we notice that a considerable number of national legal instruments must 
record a remarkably long delay. The distribution of the mean delay is skewed 
upwards so that the majority of national transposition processes have a delay 
lower than the mean. Indeed a closer look at the figures shows that 70 percent 
of the delayed transpositions have a delay longer than six months (the mean), 
a circumstance that causes the discrepancy between median/mean values.
Looking at these patterns, we can identify three main groups of outcomes. 
The first (50 percent of cases) represents those national instruments notified 
on time. A second group of instruments had a transposition delay of less than 
six months (15 percent of cases), and finally, the third group of national meas-
ures were transposed more than six months late (35 percent of cases). I will 
early late
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Figure 6.6: Transposition of transport directives in Germany, Spain, the Netherlands,
UK, Greece, Ireland, France, Italy, and Sweden: Delay in weeks. 
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return to this data characteristic when discussing the appropriate statistical 
method to test the theoretical framework.
6.2.2 Variation across member states and policy areas:
In line with Conant’s findings (2002), which uncover delays upwards of 10 
years, and also reveals a significant variation between both member states 
and policy areas, Table 6.7 shows that the nine member states can be clustered 
into three groups with Sweden (SE) and the UK performing the best, hav-
ing an average transposition delay of less than two months. Germany (DE), 
France (FR), Spain (ES) and Ireland (IE) performance range below 30 weeks 
delay. The Netherlands (NL), Greece (EL) and Italy (IT) represent a group of 
their own, performing worst among the nine member states with an average 
transposition delay beyond 35 weeks. The independent sample of t-tests for 
the five member states indicate that the groups differ significantly in their 
average level of the dependent variable.
Interestingly, the patterns shift slightly if we consider the median value of 
delay across member states. The transport data set reveals that the mean 
and median delays differ considerably between member states. Whereas the 
champions such as Sweden, Spain and the UK have a median transposition 
delay of zero weeks, the laggards of Dutch and French implementing instru-
ments have a median transposition delay of 22 and 20 weeks respectively. In 
the Netherlands, approximately half of the population has values less than 22 
weeks and the remaining half has values greater than the median.
Despite the problematic records for Italy, the Netherlands and France, trans-
position also varies across the different transport sub-sectors, namely: mari-
time, road, rail, air and inland waterways. Whereas maritime and general 
transport directives perform best with an average delay of 20 weeks or less, 
Table 6.8 illustrates that air directives are delayed an average of one year. 
Road and rail directives range in-between with eight and nine months of 
delay. Inland waterwayss directives take the most time. Here, the average 
transposition delay is 27 months (2,25 years). 28
28 Testing the similarity of means for the differences of transport subsectors in transposition 
delays, similar conclusions can be drawn. Only inland waterways does not differ system-
atically from the average means of the other modes of transport despite its extreme value 
of an average transposition delay of 27 months.
Table 6.7: National differences in transposition delays in weeks.
Delay (in weeks) SE UK DE FR ES IE EL NL IT
Mean 3 7 25 25 28 29 35 37 42
Median 0 0 8 20 0 10 10 22 13
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Again we find slight changes when looking at the median values. Rail and in-
land waterways seem to be the transport sub-sectors with considerable trans-
position delays (32-98 weeks) across all member states.
6.3 Conclusion:
Whereas the nature of the Commission’s scoreboards has raised some ques-
tions about its quality in general and the existence of a serious EU transposi-
tion problem in particular, the analysis of the EU transport transposition data 
set from 1995-2004 uncovers a noticeable transposition deficit. The EU transposi-
tion deficit is more than just a statistical illustion; it is a sad reality.  In line with 
the recent findings of Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber (2005), the study 
uncovered evidence that the EU suffers from a serious transposition deficit. 
Falkner et al. (2005) maintain that in more than two-third of all cases (63 out 
of 91), the adaptation requirements were delayed by two years or more before 
full implementation. The data corroborate their findings. Almost 50 percent 
of the national transposing instruments are reported late.
Furthermore, the figures show that member states failed to meet the Barcelona 
(2002) Zero Tolerance Objective (2002) in case of directives whose transposi-
tion is more than two years overdue. According to the EU 1957-2004 transport 
transposition data set still 8 percent of national transposition processes were 
delayed for more than 2 years amounting to almost 5 years of transposition 
delay. The EU transposition problem appears to be a epidemic problem and not a 
problem of ‘statistical artifact’.
In addition, the difference in mean and median values, which vary signifi-
cantly across member states and policy sub-sectors, uncover three groups, 
namely: national transposition measures transposed on time, delayed by less 
than six months and delayed by more than six months. Especially in the Nether-
lands, France, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Germany, there exists a transposition 
problem with regard to transport directives.
While the Commission data seem to seriously underestimate the transposi-
tion deficit in terms of timeliness across all member states and policy sectors, 
the next chapter tests empirically the theoretical framework addressing the 
central question of why member states miss the deadlines when transposing 
EU transport directives.
Table 6.8: Different transposition delays of modes in weeks.
Mode of 
transport
Transport 
general
Maritime Road Rail Air Inland 
waterwayss
Mean -17 20 31 38 49 109
Median 0 6 12 32 23 98
Chapter 7: 
Determinants of transposition delay
‘Wir brauchen Zeit!’ (Staatssekretär im Bundeswirtschafts-
ministerium, Georg Wilhelm Adamowitsch in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 March 2004).
7.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is to understand the correlational effects of the ex-
planatory variables for timeliness of national transposition processes. In this 
chapter, I first operationalise the complementary variables. The subsequent 
sections present the research methods and the results. Herein, the existing 
arguments in the literature are confirmed, challenged, and extended. Finally, 
I summarise and discuss the findings and conclude with some comments that 
bridge to a second step of analysis.  
7.2 Operationalization Of Theoretical Framework
7.2.1 EU directive specific features:
Transposition deadline set in directive
It is not problematic to test the argument that a comfortable transposition 
timeframe increases the positive probability of the adoption of the national 
implementing measure around the deadline. The lengths of granted transpo-
sition time, i.e. the time set in the EU directive fixing the period for notifica-
tion of the national implementing measure to the Commission, are calculated 
by subtracting the deadline, set in the directive, from the date of publication 
of the EU directive in the Council of Ministers. The more time a member state 
has to transpose a directive, the lower the perceived costs of transposition, and 
therefore, the less likely that transposition delay will occur. Celex provides 
the full texts of the directives where the last but one article always includes 
the reference to the deadline, phrased as follows: ‘Member States shall bring 
into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with this Directive by … ‘. The timeliness for transposition deadlines 
set in the directives varies. In some exceptional cases, like the Council Direc-
tive 97/26/EC on driving licenses, the EU directive enters immediately into 
force (time to transpose equals zero). In other rare cases, transposition dead-
lines are much more generous. For example, the Council Directive 96/35/EC 
on the appointment and vocational qualification of safety adviser for the transport 
of dangerous goods by road, rail and inland waterways provided 3.5 years for the 
complete transposition.
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Amount of discretion
In principle, directives should specify, in the words of Article 249 of the Trea-
ty, ‘the result to be achieved’ but leave ‘to the national authorities the choice 
of form and methods.’ The leeway of interpretation, hence, represents a core 
characteristic of a directive. Over the last decade, however, directives have 
become more and more detailed, to the point where they could be viewed 
as regulations (Bellis, 2003: 3-12). The Maritime Directive 2001/53/EC, for 
example, consists of only 4 articles printed on 1 page, but its Annexes include 
a full 26 pages. The Annexes cover 184 equipments, for which detailed inter-
national testing standards already exist, and leave little room for interpreta-
tion.
To test the ‘discretion-matters’ hypothesis, this study relies on the discretion 
ratio, that is defined as the number of major provisions in a legislative act 
that grant discretionary executive powers to member states, divided by the 
total number of major provisions in the act. In line with Franchino (2004) and 
Thomson et al. (2005), who also identify the number of major provisions of 
each legislative act that grant discretionary executive power, I rely on the in-
formation provided by Celex and Eurlex. Coding every provision according 
to whether member states may be left with some sort of discretion, the rate 
varies in principle on a scale from 0 (no discretion) to 1 (full discretion). The 
rate for all 67 directives including all articles but the first (purpose) and the 
last (addresses) ranges between 0 and 0.7 accordingly. Note that I substracted 
the first and last articles from the denominator. This was because they, by 
definition, serve the formalities of a directive only; furthermore, I wanted to 
minimize the potential inclusion of any discretion given to member states.
7.2.2 National level specific features
Number of veto players
When fewer actors are involved in the making of a legal instrument, the trans-
position process is faster. This is because there is less discussion about the al-
location of the perceived costs and benefits of the adoption of new national 
legislation. Hence, the number of transposition actors is linked to the selected 
national transposing measure. Information on the national legal instruments 
for all member states is drawn from the list of measures notified to the Com-
mission, Celex, and the national legal databases. For example, the Greek legal 
system is composed of a number of legislative instruments: legislative acts 
(Nóµoß), presidential decrees (Pρoedρiκó Aiátagma) and ministerial or-
ders (Koinæ Upouρgiκæ Apófash). In Germany, the EC directives are either 
implemented as legislative acts (Gesetze) or ministerial orders (Rechtsverord-
nungen). Note that until the mid-1990s, circulars (Egkúklioß, Verwaltungs-
vorschrift, Circulaire, Resolución, Instrucción, Circular, Föreskrift) were also 
widely used to transpose EU legislation into national law in a lot of member 
states.
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Compared to a government decree, a ministerial order, and a circular a legis-
lative act involves more transposition actors. Table 7.9 summarizes the hier-
archical ordering of national legal instruments for every member state under 
investigation according to these four categories.
Member states typically transpose EU legislation via non-legislative meas-
ures, in which the parliament is not involved.29 This study goes one step fur-
ther than the normal veto-player indexes (Tsebelis, 2001) by building its own 
29 Spain 80%, the Netherlands 69%, France 60% and Denmark 28% (Steunenberg and Rhi-
nard, 2005; Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005)
Table 7.9: Categorization of national legal instruments in 9 member states. 
Legislative act Government 
decree
Ministerial order Circular
Germany Gesetz - Verordnung Verwaltungs-
vorschrift
UK Act of Parliament Order in Council Ministerial Order -
France Loi, DDAC, 
Ordonnance
Décret Arrêté ministériel Circulaire
Italy Legge, legge 
communitaria, 
decreto legge, 
decreto legislativo
- Decreto ministe-
riale
-
Spain Ley ordinaria, 
real decreto-ley, 
real decreto-
legislativo
Real decreto Orden Resolución, 
Instrucción, 
Circular
The 
Netherlands
Wet Algemene 
Maatregel van 
Bestuur
Ministeriële 
regeling
-
Greece Nóµov (Nomos) Proedrikó 
Diátagµa
(Proädriko 
diatagma)
Kotnä Uπourgikä 
Aπófash
(Kini ipurgiki 
apofasi)
Egkúkliov
(Egiklios)
Ireland Act of Parliament - Order -
Sweden Lag - Förordning Föreskrift
Source: Steunenberg and Voermans (2005) endorsed with additional information on Italy, 
Sweden, Greece, Ireland and Sweden.
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veto-player index varying for each directive and member state respective-
ly (Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2005: 15). It will account for legal instrument 
specific veto player configurations.30 If transposition requires a ministerial 
order, the number of ministries involved is counted, with the assumption that 
they may have different agendas. In the event that we come across an ad-
ditional junior minister (Müller and Strom, 2004) who represents a different 
party group than the minister, we add this junior minister to the number. 31 
If transposition is decided by the national government, a score that is based 
on the autonomy of the prime minister is added to the index (Strom, Müller 
and Bergman; 2003). Finally if transposition is handled by adopting a bill, the 
national legislative veto player index, by Tsebelis, is added.32 The veto player 
index ranges on a scale from 0 to 16. In the end, this index accounts for poten-
tial veto players in non-legislative national transposition processes, such as 
ministerial orders. The veto player index can account for the number of  min-
istries involved and the role played by junior ministers. Furthermore, it better 
differentiates among legislative acts. For example, in one case, France notified 
the Commission of a Legislative Act in 2001 (Tsebelis veto player index = 5) 
with the signature of ‘eight’ different ministries to transpose Directive 99/62/
EC on charging heavy goods vehicles for use of certain infrastructures during a pe-
riod of cohabitation. In addition, in this case, there was a relatively high po-
litical autonomy by the then French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin under the 
French President Jacques Chirac. This more nuanced measurement of poten-
tial veto players in the national transposition context resulted in a veto index 
of 16 instead of 5.
National transposition package approach
To recall through a transposition package a number of EU directives are 
grouped together for transposition purposes because they cover similar pol-
icy issues. In a transposition package, a number of directives, with varying 
deadlines are transposed at once. The so-called first directive in the pack-
age is the one with the earliest deadline, and the so-called last directive in 
the package is the one with the deadline furthest into the future. Due to the 
perceived transposition costs of directives yet to be transposed, the national 
package approach increases the probability of a delayed settlement of the first 
directive to be transposed, but accelerates a settlement for the last directive 
in the national transposition package to be transposed. Member states dif-
30 Tsebelis legislative veto player index would be a very crude measure since only few na-
tional implementing instruments are legislative acts.
31 In Germany, for example, the most important actors at the federal level in transport are 
the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Economic Affairs. The two ministries, how-
ever, hold diverging conceptions regarding sectoral regulations. Whereas the Ministry of 
Transport has often taken a pro-regulatory stand, the head of the transport division in the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs defined its role through ensuring that liberal views about 
transport counterbalanced those of the Ministry of Transport (Teutsch, 2001: 139).
32 For the missing data on Greece, I am grateful to Frank Häge who provided me with the 
necessary figures.
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fer in applying package approach. Whereas Germany (39%), France (31%), 
and Spain (26%) often use this method in the transport sector, Greece hardly 
transposes EU transport directive in form of packages (2%). Furthermore, we 
see also differences in terms of transport sub-sectors. Regarding inland wa-
terways, we hardly find transposition packages across the member states. But 
maritime, rail, and road directives account for 75% of the data set that were 
grouped in packages including 2 to 8 EU directives.
On the European level, on occasion, the Commission decides upon directives 
by also using the package approach, as in the transport sector (air and rail-
way packages, Erika I and II (see Transport Chapter). These events may have 
facilitated member states to transpose those same directives in packages ac-
cordingly covering similar policy issues. Dinstinct from the EU packages of 
directives, however, in most cases, national transposition packages are the re-
sult of member states deciding to transpose a number of single EU directives 
with one national implementing measure. In Germany, for example, the See-
schifffahrtsanpassungsgesetz, on 18 September 1998, transposed eight maritime 
directives that had been adopted in the Council of Ministers between 1996 
and 1998. Italy, on the other hand, used the package approach four times to 
transpose maritime directives between 1995 and 2004; these packages ranged 
in size from two directives to four directives. The information on 82 packages 
of the 367 notified national implementing measures, which represents 23% 
of all cases, was derived from Celex and the national databases. Controlling 
for decelerating and accelerating effects, we introduce dummies for those EU 
directives that represent the first or last directive in national transposition 
package.
Timing of national general elections
General elections may accelerate or delay national transposition records, 
depending on when they occur. If a general election falls within the last six 
months of a set transposition period, it has an accelerating effect. But a gen-
eral election scheduled within the first six months of the official transposition 
period invariably slows the national transposition process. The argument is 
that a policy that is not adopted before the end of the legislative terms must 
be reintroduced, and by this reintroduction, raises the costs to the extent 
that transposition becomes more opportune. An overview of all national 
parliamentary elections can be accessed through the website on parties and 
elections in Europe by Wolfram Nordsieck.33 I coded the variables with the 
number 1 for the occurrence of a general election, otherwise 0. Fifty-one per-
cent (189) of the 367 national transposition processes were affected by general 
elections during the national transposition process.  Only a few transposition 
processes experienced general elections both at the beginning as well as at the 
end of the transposition process (2%).
33 http://www.parties-and-elections.de/
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7.2.3 Transport related accidents:
The previous Transport Chapter in this book highlighted the accident-driven 
approach behind EU transport policy. Driven by European transport acci-
dents the Commission, member states and the Parliament have adopted new 
European transport legislation in the different sub-sectors by addressing the 
reasons for often devastating ecological disasters. The ‘accident-matters-hypoth-
esis’ in the context of EU implementation argues two points. First, transport 
related accidents that occur during the national transposition period increase 
the perceived costs of non-transposition of the new EU legislation. Second, 
accidents facilitate problem-free and timely settlements in the transposition 
bargaining. A summary of transport related accidents in Europe from 1995-
2004 can be found in the Transport Chapter of this book. In the end, I assigned 
a ‘1’ for the occurrence of an accident and 0 for no accident in the years during 
of the national transposition process. In 25% (94 out of 367) of the cases, mode-
specific accidents are recorded.
7.2.4 Summary of descriptives:
Data limitations- notably missing data on key variables- reduce the effective 
sample to 361. Table 7.10 presents descriptive statistics of all the variables, 
and provides means, standard deviations, and min/max values for all the 
independent variables in the sample. (See appendix for correlation tables).
7.3 Method
As mentioned previsouly, almost 70% of the data set was transposed using 
only one national implementing measure. This fact, taken with other earlier 
considerations, induced me to use the first implementing measure to calculate 
Table 7.10: Descriptive statistics: Min/max, means and standard deviations (n=361).
Variable Minimum/
Maximum
Mean Standard 
deviation
Discretion rate    0/.7 0.07 0.13
Transposition time set in the directive 
(in weeks)
   6/184 46.57 36.71
Number of veto players    0/16 2.59 2.98
First directive in national transposition package    0/1 0.08 0.27
Last directive in national transposition package    0/1 0.11 0.32
Start of transposition in election year    0/1 0.28 0.45
End of transposition in election year    0/1 0.31 0.46
Transport related accidents    0/1 0.35 0.48
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delay. 34 Bearing in mind that only a few time-varying variables are present in 
the transposition data set, I checked for the likely amount of directives that 
would be eliminated by a potential binary dependent variable. This research 
would lose only 5% of its complete information. In the analysis of the missing 
values I could not find any significant pattern.
Ordered multinomial logistic model
This study runs an ordered multinomial logistic model. Two considerations 
were in mind when running it. First, the model was run in order not to lose 
a lot of information by collapsing the dependent variable to a dichotomous 
measure that merely indicates if the transposition was timely or not – a very 
legalistic concept of delay. Second, the earlier recorded discrepancy between 
mean/median in the previous chapter hints at the necessity to account for 
different groups of transposition outcomes. Whereas the mean transposition 
delay in the transport sector was 26 weeks (six months), the median was zero 
weeks, i.e. on time. In addition, interview partners and scholars (Falkner et 
al., 2005: 267)) dealing with transposition on a day-to-day basis agree that a 
‘psychological’ threshold lies at six months. Delays within six-month margin 
occur regularly. The Commission does not normally take any formal infringe-
ment procedure with regard to delays in this time period, due in part to its 
lack of resources to allow an examination of all national implementing meas-
ures for timeliness and correctness (IP15). Consequently, the study identifies 
three ordered outcomes: non-delayed transposition, transposition delay less than 6 
months, transposition delay more than six months.  Whereas 50 per cent fall under 
category 1 (on time), 15 per cent fall under category 2 (less than 6 months 
delay) and 35 per cent fall under the last category (more than 6 months delay). 
An ordered multinomial logistic model can account best for the three groups 
of outcome. Long (1997), Long & Freese (2003) and Borooah (2002) provide 
the reference points of nominal data with multiple outcomes and the inter-
pretation of multinomial coefficients.
34 Normally, this study would be predestinated to apply a hazard rate model to test the hy-
potheses about delay in the transposition process of EU directives. Alas, this is not the 
case. One of the advantages of event history over standard ordinary last squares (OLS) 
regresion is its ability to handle what is referred to as censoring (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Bradford, 1997; 2004; Golub, 1999: 747; Schulz and König, 2000; Schimmelpfennig, 2000; 
Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn, 2003; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004; Fearon, 
2004). A duration model, for example, allowed Mastenbroek (2003) to treat the not yet 
transposed directives as right-censored avoiding selection bias by eliminating directives 
on which the member states have taken no final action yet (see also Borghetto et al., 2006). 
Specifying the baseline hazard rate, however, is very time-consuming and cumbersome 
because it involves speculation about the effect of the passage of time on the probability 
that an event will occur. Especially with time-varying covariates, the calculation of the 
survival functions is quite complicated because one needs to specify a path or trajectory 
for each variable.
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7.4 Results
Before calculating a statistical model for transposition delay, I conducted 
three tests to assess collinearity. I visually inspected the matrix of correlations 
amongst the independent variables (see Annex). I checked the tolerance and 
the variance inflation factors, the second of which relates to the amount that 
the standard error of the variable has been increased because of collinearity, 
but found no evidence of major concern.
Ordered multinomial logistic regression
Based on earlier findings of this study, I assume that the conditions that lead 
to long delays are likely to be different from those that lead to relatively short 
delays. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 7.11. In the first col-
umn, the coefficients for timely transposition, which also represent the base-
line model, are displayed. Furthermore, table 7.11 distinguishes between two 
different kinds of transposition delay: short and long delay. In the second 
column, I look at the factors that predict delay of less than 6 months. In the third 
column, the study focuses on the more serious delays: those that take longer 
than 6 months. The multinomial coefficients must be interpreted in the context 
of the base category (timely transposition), and in the context of the other 
coefficients for that variable, as well.
The model fit of the ordered multinomial logit regression, with a R2 of 0.35 is 
relative satisfactory. All factors in either column indicate in the predicted di-
rection. The results in table 7.11 hint that there are some potentially important 
differences between the three types of transposition delays.
Transposition delays of more than six months were apparently more of a prob-
lem in national transposition settings with numerous veto players. On the 
other hand, there are certain indicators that matter more for shorter delays, 
such as the discretion ratio and the transposition time guaranteed in the di-
rective. The strongest predictors of transposition performance are, again, the 
timing of general elections and the external shock related indicator. Whereas 
transport-related accidents are the most highly significant in explaining long-
er delays, it is the timing of general elections that can either slow or accelerate 
national transposition processes significantly.  Depending on whether na-
tional general elections fall at the beginning or the end of a national transposi-
tion process, the procedure is slowed or accelerated respectively.
7.5 Discussion and summary
In summary, most findings of both analyses are in accordance with our expec-
tations, and support the theoretical framework. All indicators are related in 
ways that were expected, and most of the explanatory variables are signifi-
cant. Furthermore, the findings of the ordered multinomial logit regression 
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show that there are specific sets of variables that explain shorter delays better 
than longer delays, and vice versa. Interestingly, it is the EU directive specific 
characteristics that explain short delays, and national level explanatory variables 
best account for delays of more than 6 months. Very long transposition delays 
may be ascribed to two factors: the selection of the transposing legal instru-
ment, and the decision of whether to use the national transposition package 
approach or not.
Table 7.11: Determinants of transposition delay: Ordered multinominal logit 
1995-2004.
 Outcomes
Variable On time < 6 months 
delay
> 6 months 
delay
EU LEVEL VARIABLES
Discretion ratio
Transposition time 
-1.83 *
(1.39)
0.02 *
(0.00)
3.58 **
(1.21)
-0.02 **
(0.00)
2.11 
(1.37)
-0.02
(0.00)
NATIONAL LEVEL VARIABLES
Number of veto players
Package approach
First directive in transposition package
    
Last directive in transposition package
-0.27 ***
(0.06)
-1.50 *
(0.72)
2.24 **
(0.80)
-0.05 
(0.07)
1.79 *
(0.71)
-2.56 *
(1.03)
0.27 ***
(0.06)
1.53 *
(0.72)
-2.15 **
(0.79)
General elections
At the beginning of transposition process
At the end of the transposition process
Transport related accidents
-4.67 ***
(0.83)
2.88 ***
(0.41)
1.46 ***
(0.41)
1.39 ***
(0.39)
-0.85 *
(0.40)
-0.11
(0.33)
4.07 ***
(0.84)
-2.92 ***
(0.41)
-1.41 ***
(0.40)
N
Prob>chi2 
Pseudo R2
361
0.0000
0.35
Multinomial logistic regression. Firgures and coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01, ****p< .001. Timely transposition is the comparison group. Source : 
EU transport transposition data set 1957-2004.
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EU directive characteristics that determine delays of less than six months
The findings uncover that member states face more problems when transpositing 
EU directives with a limited transposition time set in the directive, in general – it 
accounts significantly for short delays. Consequently, sufficient transposition 
time is important, especially as the number of directives increase. Despite 
the growing number of directives to be transposed over the years (+84%), 
however, the mean transposition time agreed upon in the Council has de-
creased by 24%. Whereas the average guaranteed transposition time in the 
1970s was 11 months, it increased to 17 months in the early 1980s. Then, it 
steadily decreased over the late 1980s and late 1990s (from 15 to 13 months). 
Only recently, this trend has been reversed. A directive adopted after 2000 
guaranteed, on average, 18 months for full transposition. In periods of high 
legislative output, thus, short-term transposition delays seem inevitable.
Furthermore, the amount of discretion provided by the EU directive is a signifi-
cant determinant of short transposition delays. The more discretion the more 
likely delay.
It is only a small conceptual step from the amount of discretion to to the level 
of detail in the directive. Normally, the higher the level of detail, the smaller 
the amount of discretion. The amount of discretion provided decreases with 
the complexity of a directive. Bellis (2003) argues that because the definitions, 
specified conditions, and specified services were extremely detailed, they 
were obviously intended to be applicable in their own terms in all member 
states. In this respect Kaeding (2006) tested the EU directive’s level of detail, 
as embodied by the number of recitals. He finds that the number of recitals has 
a considerable negative effect on transposition delay. The higher the amount 
of recitals, the more likely transposition delay. In line with Bellis (2003), it 
seems that the several recitals used by the member states or the Commission 
to add a number of points, that were not agreed upon during the negotia-
tions, interferes with a swift transposition. They further increase the detail of 
the directive, which is strongly linked to the level of discretion allowed in a 
directive’s interpretation. The more detail a provision has, the less discretion-
ary power the member states have in transposing the directive.
National level factors that determine delay of more than six months
At the national level are explanatory factors of long transposition delays. The 
veto player coefficient indicates that the fewer actors involved in the making 
of the legal measure, the faster the transposition process, which is in line with 
research by Haverland (2001), Giuliani (2003) and Franchino (2004). To a large 
extent, the number of actors involved in the transposition process depends 
on which type of transposition instrument is selected by the member states. 
Types of national legal instrument differ in the amount of relevant actors 
involved. In the Netherlands, for example, Mastenbroek (2003) argues that 
directives often fall between the jurisdictions of more than one ministry, 
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resulting in communication and coordination problems, conflicts of interests, 
and competence issues that may cause problems. Dimitrakopoulos (2001: 616) 
also links differences in tradition, structures, and culture in the transposition 
process within the ministries to member states’ transposition performance.
Furthermore, the selection of a national package approach may also have a con-
siderable delaying effect on the first EU directive in the transposition package 
to be transposed. Different institutions decide which national legal instru-
ment to use and whether the use of a transposition package is called for; it is 
worth noting that both these decisions affect the timeliness of national trans-
position processes. Note that such problems arising from these two explana-
tory factors are homemade, and therefore can only be solved at the national 
level.
Timing of general elections
Indeed the timing of general elections in a member state play strong. At the 
end of a legislative term, the costs of continued inefficient policies increase 
dramatically. Future payoffs shadow on the bargaining and the benefits from 
new policy are comparatively higher than the costs of delay. The opposite 
effect happens when general elections occur in the beginning of a transposi-
tion process. Here, the coefficient highlights the retarding effect of a general 
election. In this case, future payoffs are valued less. In addition, a change in 
domestic political setting lead government leaders to see new potential gains 
from alternative policy options. This could happen when, for example, a po-
litical party with stronger commitments to liberalizing railway undertakings 
come to power or the implementation of the new drivers’ licenses generates 
new domestic political pressures.
Transport-related accidents
Situational changes in the internal and external environment require respon-
sive decisions by the incumbent decision-makers. They are also strong deter-
minants of transposition delay, in general, and longer delays, in particular. 
While transport policy itself is a crisis-driven EU policy area, transport-related 
accidents accelerate national transposition processes significantly. Conse-
quently, crises and emergencies affect the decision making situation, leading 
to a different equilibrium. When continuous bargaining conflicts imply that 
a member state has settled in a pareto-inferior equilibrium, radical changes are 
often needed to break the stalemate and put the existing national policy on a 
welfare-superior path. The extreme welfare losses (by devastating ecological 
disaster and numerous fatalities in car, train, and aircraft accidents) dwarfs 
the costs associated with a major policy change.
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7.6 Limitations and conclusion
What are the concluding implications of these findings? While the previous 
chapter clearly hinted at a serious transposition problem across EU member 
states, the first set of analysis shows, that, first, delay is a multifaceted event. The 
results of the model provide strong support for the assertion that distinguish-
ing between the outcomes of transposition process (on time, short, and long 
delay) is a useful method of investigation. Second, the study identified European 
level and national level factors that have different affects on the length of delay, but 
which overshadow each other. If governments perceive that transposition 
is complex and may require the introduction of a legislative act, for exam-
ple, they must take this into account while negotiating with the Council of 
Minister. Furthermore, the timing of general elections in a member state and 
transport-related accidents influence the timeliness of national transposition 
processes.
All in all, we identified ‘effecs of a cause’, i.e. factors that determine delays 
when transposing EU internal market directives. However, even with the 
most complex techniques ‘correlation is not causation’ (though causation is 
only possible with correlation). The statistical analysis has uncovered rela-
tionships between variables: to explain a dependent variable from a range of 
possible independent variables.
To identify ‘causes of the effect’ there is a strong argument in favour of case 
study analysis. Following a clear comparative logic it allows for the develop-
ment of a more detailed analyses and possible theoretical innovation (if fo-
cusing on well-predicted and deviant cases derived from the statistical analy-
sis) (Yin, 1993; George and Bennett, 2005). Here, especially comparative case 
studies are useful. Compared to a single case study, a comparative approach 
can overcome some of the single case study problems, such as inference and 
representativeness.
But, the comparative logic is contested. In fact, there is disagreement as to 
which type of comparisons are the most relevant. There are, two main types 
of comparison in the field of comparative politics: the most similar and the 
most different case design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Based on the or-
dered multinomial logistic regression, the following chapter will be entirely 
devoted to the case selection in order to, then, analyse well-predicted and 
outlying cases accounting for robustness and possible slight refinements 
of the theoretical model on the timeliness of national transposition process 
across member states.
Chapter 8: 
Cae selection of on- and off- liners35
‘The use of mixed strategy helps to overcome potential sources of bias 
and to sort out spurious findings that might be produced in either 
small-n or large-n analysis when carried out in isolation’ (Lieberman, 
2005: 450).
8.1 Introduction
In the following pages, I demonstrate that the statistical findings must include 
case studies for two main reasons: First, they help further test the robustness 
of the statistical results that address the second sub-question of the study, 
specifically: What are the empirical effects of the factors? How do the deter-
minants and the occurrence of these factors influence the timeliness of the 
national transposition processes? A ‘causal-process’ observation will provide 
information about mechanisms and context (Collier, Brady and Seawright, 
2004: 253). Case study research allows a close examination of the hypothe-
sized role of causal mechanisms in the context of the individual case. The 
in-depth analysis will make cases more easily comparable and causal mecha-
nisms more clearly elucidated through, for instance, process-tracing and pat-
tern-matching (Franchino, 2005: 250). The second main reason for choosing 
case studies is to further improve the model fit. Standard assessments about 
the strength of parameter estimates show that the goodness-of-fit between 
the specified model and the empirical data is improvable (R2=.35). Since a 
case study is ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of under-
standing a larger class of similar units’ (Gerring, 2004: 342), in the end, it will 
achieve higher conceptual validity of timeliness and the independent vari-
ables in the transposition context.
In line with Lieberman (2005), this study will show that there are specific ben-
efits of systematically combining both, quantitative and qualitative, in one 
design. Quantitative and qualitative research methods can share a symbiotic 
relationship.  The large-n and small-n research designs provide different and 
complementary bases for causal inference (George and Bennett, 2005: 208). 
To provide an absolute criterion for answering the question about robustness 
and improvement one important tool is central: the actual scores of the cases 
should be plotted graphically relative to the predicted scores from the sta-
tis-tical estimate (so-called identification of outliers) (Lieberman, 2005: 439). 
Especially deviant cases are frequently encountered in large-n studies and 
usually noted as such without an effort to explain why they are deviant. Cases 
with large positive or negative residuals will be examined in the study to deter-
mine why these points fit so poorly. Next to pattern matching, process-tracing
35 I am grateful to Ingo Rohlfing who suggested the term ‘on- and off-liner’ (see also Rohlfing, 
2005).
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is particularly useful for obtaining an explanation for deviant cases- those 
whose outcomes are not predicted or explained adequately by the existing 
statistical model (Achen and Snidal, 1989: 167-168).
To succeed case selection is of utmost importance. In line with combined re-
search designs the  large-n studies will guide case selection for in-depth case 
studies. The case selection chapter is structured as follows. First, in line with 
Lieberman (2005), two criteria for case selection are presented. These crite-
ria depend on whether the fit of the statistical model is relatively satisfying 
or, in contrast, is considered not sufficient based on the calculated deviant 
residuals. While this study opts for carrying out a model-testing and improv-
ing approach, so it then plots the deviance residuals for the statistical model 
against the transposition delay. Next, a most-similar/most-different design 
guides the selection of four national implementing measures. In the subse-
quent chapter the case studies are thencarried out.
8.2 Case selection criteria:
As a point of departure, the entire design of the case study, as well as its po-
tential theoretical significance, is ‘heavily influenced by the way the unit of 
analysis is defined’ (Yin, 1993: 10). To answer the question what the empiri-
cal effects of the determinants of transposition delay are and how these fac-
tors influence the timeliness of the national transposition process, the unit of 
analysis is the national legal instrument. Furthermore, the primary criterion 
for case selection should be the relevance to the research objective of the study 
(Haverland, 2006), regardless of whether the case includes theory testing or 
theory improving.  The problem of systematic error of case selection, how-
ever, is the recurrent trade-off in case studies. Since the research will require 
a comparison of several cases, they should be selected to provide the kind of 
control and variation by the research problem.
In order to assess model fit and to identify aberrant observations, plots of 
residuals are useful. Residuals are the difference between a model’s predict-
ed and observed outcomes for each observation in the sample. Cases that fit 
poorly have large residuals, known as outliers.  Regardless of which method 
is used, further analysis of the deviant cases may reveal either incorrectly 
coded data or some inadequacy in the specification of the model. Deviant 
cases are frequently encountered in large-n studies, and they are met too. 
8.2.1 Model-testing and improving: 
Scholars differentiate between theory testing and theory improving depend-
ing on the fit of the statistical model (George and Bennet, 2005: 109-124). If 
the researcher is satisfied with the model’s specifications fit, then, the main 
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goal of the in-depth component of the mixed-method design is to further 
test robustness of those findings (model testing). If, however, the researcher 
believes that the model fit could be further improved (for example because 
quantifiable indicators or statistical estimators are weak, or because not all 
causal mechanisms and causal paths are satisfactory) then case studies can 
investigate why deviant cases are deviant, perhaps leading to the identifica-
tion of omitted variables (model improving) (Lieberman, 2005).
From the study’s research objective point of view, we intend to test and fur-
ther improve theory: For researchers with an eye toward theoretical parsimo-
ny and clarity a model-testing approach compels the gathering of evidence 
that allows them to analyze the statistically significant results. For example, 
researchers ‘gather evidence that allows us to write a detailed narrative from 
the vantage point of the preferred model’ (Lieberman, 2005: 442). For theory-
building purposes, another powerful advantage of case studies is in the fur-
ther improving of concepts such as timeliness by focusing on deviant cases. 
The case study can focus on accounting for estimated differences between 
cases. The outcome in a deviant case may prove to have been caused by vari-
ables that had been previously overlooked, but whose effects are well known 
in other areas of research (George and Bennett, 2005: 111). In contrast to the 
model-testing case selection, which is based on the widest degree of varia-
tion of the independent variables that are central to the model, the model–
improving approach involves selection of cases based on initial scores on the 
dependent variable (Liebermann, 2005: 11). Here, plotting graphically the 
actual scores of the cases relative to the predicted scores from the statistical 
estimates is helpful.
The literature identifies two relevant variants for model building (Rohlfing, 
2005): first, a selection for most likely and least likely designs; and second, 
a comparison of onliers and offliers. In the first version, cases are assigned 
to the categories on the basis of whether they are expected to be most-likely 
or least-likely. In a least-likely design, a case warrants closer attention if it is 
found where it is not expected—in a category where the case is least likely 
expected to occur. Therefore, case 1 should be chosen for closer inspection 
and compared with case 2 exhibiting the expected result. In the second vari-
ant, cases are selected on basis of their extremeness on the dependent vari-
able. Cases that belong to a different type should be matched with respect 
to their scores on the dependent variable so that process-tracing takes place 
on basis of most-similar and most-different designs (Przeworski and Teune, 
1970) with typical and deviant-on-X cases (Rohlfing, 2005) and variation on 
the independent variables. 36 For the study’s purpose, the second variant for 
model-improving design will further guide this study.
36 Most similar cases are ideally cases that are comparable in all respects except for the inde-
pendent variable, whose variance may account of the cases having different outcomes on 
the dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005: 81).
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8.3 Assessing the model’s fit
With a logit model design, the normal procedure in examining model accu-
racy and identifying outliers is to examine the martingale residuals (Stata, 
2001: 292-298 and 369-375). But because martingale residuals are sometimes 
difficult to interpret (because the residuals are skewed, taking values in (– ~, 1),
deviance residuals are preferred here for examining model accuracy and 
outlier identification. They are a rescaling of the martingale residuals so that 
they are symmetric around the value of zero, and thus more like residuals 
obtained from linear regression. Deviance residuals can be interpreted as 
the difference between the observed logistic values minus that predicted by 
the model. If the model fits, one expects to see the cases to cluster smoothly 
around zero. 
Plotting the deviance residuals for the statistical model against the transposi-
tion delay for all 361 national implementing cases, we can see that they differ 
according to the two categories of the dependent variable: namely non-delay 
and delay.
Figure 8.7 shows that the deviance residuals are smaller for national imple-
menting measures that were notified to the Commission on time, and then 
increase the closer they approach the deadline (0). For the second category 
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Figure 8.7: Deviance residuals for timely transposition of EU directives between  
1995-2004. 
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(delayed), we find the reverse trend. Whereas the deviance residuals for cases 
closer to the deadline score high, the longer the delay lasts, the smaller the 
deviance residuals.
These patterns suggest three phenomena. First, the logistic model fits particu-
larly poorly for cases around the deadline. Whereas almost all residuals for 
very early and very late transposition processes score below ‘1’, cases around 
the transposition deadline approach the ‘magic’ threshold of ‘2’. Second, 
the logistic model underestimates the probability of delay for instruments 
transposed in time and overestimates the probability of delay for national 
implementing measures with long delays. Third, in the plot, several residuals 
stand out as being large relative to the others. In such cases, it is important to 
identify the specific observations with large residuals for further inspection 
(Long and Freese, 2003: 126). Actually, there is no rule for what counts as a 
‘large’ residual. Despite Hosmer and Lemeshow’s (1999: 176) caution that it is 
impossible to provide any absolute standard, a deviation of more than ‘+/– 2’ 
is considered to be ‘large’ (Long and Freese, 2003: 127).
8.4 Selection of  two on- and off-liners for timely transposition 
of EU directives
Following the idea of most-similar and most-different designs with typical 
and deviant on-X-cases, this study selects four cases on basis of their extreme-
ness on the dependent variable. From a practical point of view, I decided 
to disregard national implementing measures that had been notified to the 
Commission before 1998. I chose two on-the-line cases, namely: 91 and 156. 
Two off-the-line cases were also selected, namely: 211 and 328. The four cases 
were chosen for the following methodological reasons:  
In order to find on-the-X line cases, this study applies a most-different systems 
design. I consulted the deviance residuals and found that only 22 cases lay 
exactly on the 0-line. For comparison purposes, I chose two on-the-line cases 
with deviation residuals of 0, but that differed in the amount of transposi-
tion delay. Whereas case No. 156 was only three weeks delayed, case No. 91 
was more than 8 months (32 weeks) late. But both were well predicted by the 
model since they had the same residual (zero). In addition, guided by a most-
different design, I selected cases varying on the independent variables. While 
both cases represent different transport-subfields (maritime and rail), and the 
national legal instruments originate from different Member States (France and 
Spain), they vary considerable in the transposition times set in the directives, 
the discretion ratio, the number of veto players and in the application of a na-
tional transposition package and the occurrence of national general elections. 
Since cases fit the predictions of the theoretical framework, then examining 
them in detail will give an additional in-depth testing of the microfoundations 
of the framework when it is working correctly (Lieberman, 2005).
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Table 8.12: Case selection of four on-and off-liners.
Most different design Most similar design
Index 156 91 328 211
Case number 31-98-0055-9-
311298
34-01-0014-4-
150303
31-02-0059-2-
050204
31-01-0053-9-
170202
Member State France Spain Germany France
Transport 
sub-sector
Maritime Rail Maritime Maritime
Name of the 
directive
Amending 
minimum require-
ments for vessels 
bound for or
leaving Com 
ports
Allocation of rail-
way infrastructure 
capacity and the 
levying of char-
ges for the use 
of railway infra-
structure and safety 
certification
Establishing a 
Community 
vessel traffic 
monitoring and 
information 
system
Amending marine 
equipment 96/98
Deviation 
residual
0.04 -0.05 -1.23 1.21
Delay in 
weeks
3 32 1 2
Transposition 
time set in 
the directive 
(months)
6 24 18 6
Discretion 
ratio
0 0.6 0 0
Number of 
veto players
4 11 1 2
Package 
approach
yes no yes no
General 
elections
no yes yes yes
Transport 
related 
accidents
no no yes no
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For the two off-liner cases, I deliberately selected cases No. 211 and 328. 
Whereas the model fit for the selected on-the-line cases was good, the follow-
ing cases are both poorly explained by the logistic model. Case No. 211 has a 
positive deviance residual of 1.2 (underestimated), while case No. 328 a nega-
tive deviance residual of (–1.2) (overestimated). Following a most-similar 
research design, both cases have similar values on the dependent variable; 
they are non-problematic cases in terms of delay. Similarly, the two national 
implementing measures used represent one mode of transport (maritime), 
but originate from different member states, namely: France and Germany. 
Compared to the earlier to on-the-line cases, here, the independent variables 
are more similar. While neither directive provides any level of discretion, the 
national implementing measures required only a low number of transposi-
tion actors. Since the two off-the-line cases passed the deadline by only few 
weeks, they will be helpful in improving the existing logistic model by com-
paring them to the on-liners. Comparing them to case No. 156, which is also 
almost transposed in time, but is, to the contrary, well-predicted by the theo-
retical model, will be especially helpful.
Table 8.12 summarizes the characteristics of the cases selected for further in 
depth investigation.
8.5 Summary
Informed by the research question, the unit of analysis, and the goodness-of-
fit between the specified model and the empirical data, this study deliberate-
ly chose the four aforementioned cases. This study opted for a model-testing 
and improving case selection approach following a most-similar and most-
different design with typical and deviant-on-X-cases. The two on-the-line 
cases (1,2) will help further assess the causal impact of six variables, namely: 
amount of discretion, transposition time set in directive, number of veto play-
ers, package approach, general election, and transport-related accidents. The 
two off-the-line cases (3,4) may help refine the existing model and guide this 
current study in particular and scholars of EU implementation in new direc-
tions more generally.  In the following, I carry out the case studies.

Chapter 9: 
Tracing the process of four national 
transposition cases
‘Les obligations de transposition pesant sur l’Etat découlent tant 
de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 que des traités européens. Un 
manquement à ces obligations n’affecte pas seulement notre crédit 
au sein de l’Union. Il expose la France à des sanctions contentieuses, 
y compris pécuniaires. Il entrave le bon fonctionnement du marché 
intérieur, affectant aussi bien la concurrence entre entreprises que 
la protection des consommateurs.’ (Circulaire du Premier ministre, 
Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Paris, 27 septembre 2004).
9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, detailed explanations of the selection process in 
adopting four national legal instruments to transpose EU transport directives 
were provided. Namely, the sample of 1998/55/EC, 2001/14/EC, 2001/53/
EC, and the 2002/59/EC was discussed. Two important sub-sectors in the 
transport field – maritime and rail which represent 43% of the overall EU 
transport acquis – are the focus of this chapter, as they have been crucial de-
partments for the EU’s economic and regional development.
With coastlines running virtually uninterrupted from the Aegean Sea across 
the Mediterranean, and along the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea to the 
Baltic, the maritime sector is very important. Roughly 40% of the contem-
porary world fleet is European, and around 4% of the EU’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) comes from maritime industries and services. Around 90% of 
global cargo is transported by sea, with 3.5 million tonnes of goods cruising 
through EU waters every year. More than 40% of the EU’s internal trade goes 
by sea. Each year, nearly two billion tonnes of freight is loaded and unloaded 
at EU ports. Another indicator, if an unfortunate one, of the importance of 
EU waters is the fact that out of the world’s 23 major oils spill incidents in 
the past 40 years, 11 occurred in European waters (WMU, 2006).  Based on its 
economic importance, as well as the risks to the environment EU maritime 
legislation has attracted a lot of attention, and represents about 31% of the full 
EU transport acquis.
Railways in the EU, on the contrary, have been declining in economic impor-
tance over the last almost four decades. Though it currently represents about 
12 % of the full EU transport acquis, its decline in market share is considerable, 
and probably irreversible. This is despite the railway’s achievements of both 
a steady passenger flow, and a freight transport growth. Between 1970 and 
2001, the rail’s market share collapsed, falling from 21% to 7.8% (Di Pietranto-
nio and Pelkmans, 2004: 2). In the case of freight transport, railways lost mar-
ket share, not only in relative terms, but even in absolute terms. It is estimated 
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that between 1990 and 2001, the market share of general freight transport rose 
by 25%, whereas the respective shares of road transport (-35%) and rail freight 
transport (-6%) actually decreased. The current challenge of the European rail 
industry is to develop maximum passenger/customer value. Trains have to 
be safe, clean, reliable, and prompt, both for passengers and stock. Improved 
services may give rail transport a enormous competitive edge, making it the 
best way to combine low travel time with easy accessibility to both leisure 
and professional hubs.
Methodology
So far, the determinants of transposition delay have been identified. This 
chapter addresses the second sub-question how the identified determinants 
influence the timliness of the national transposition processes. The causal 
mechanisms underlying the correlations between the timeliness of national 
transposition processes and the individual components of the theoretical 
framework will be further elucidated through process-tracing. Qualitative 
research focusing on four case studies will further explain the ambivalent 
statistical results produced by the data and displayed, in the previous chap-
ter, by the deviant residuals. George and Bennett (2005: 206-207), explain the 
process-tracing method as follows:
‘The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the 
causal chain and the causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable. […] Process-tracing forces the investigator to 
take equifinality into account, that is, to consider the alternative paths through which the 
outcome could have occurred, and it offers the possibility of mapping out one or more po-
tential causal paths that are consistent with the outcome and the process-tracing evidence 
in a single case.’
I will trace the operation of the causal mechanisms at work in the transposi-
tion process, and infer the essence of the cognitive processes that accompany 
these mechanisms.37 Consequently, this method calls for a theoretically in-
formed, and very specific trace of the four national transposition processes. 
I will carefully map this process, ‘exploring the extent to which it coincides 
with prior, theoretically derived expectations about the workings of the 
mechanisms’ (Checkel, 2005: 6).
Data
The causal mechanisms that explain why member states miss transposition 
deadlines will be clearly elucidated through process-tracing. The required 
data for process tracing is qualitative in nature and includes official docu-
ments, EU legal databases, press accounts, and interviews. Information about 
the negotiation phase can be found in Prelex38, which follows all Commis-
37 Process tracing is synonymous with a mechanism-based approach to theory development 
(Checkel, 2005: 17).
38 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex
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sion proposals and communications from their transmission to the Council 
or the European Parliament. Links allow users to access directly the electronic 
texts available (COM documents, Official Journal, Bulletin of the EU, docu-
ments of the EP, press releases). The largest documentary databases on EU 
law (Eurlex and Celex) and national legal databases provide information on 
the national implementing measures. Information on the timing of national 
elections and the change of transport ministers were found in the annual po-
litical data provided by the European Journal of Political Research. Information 
on national-level transport related accidents were stidoed by content analy-
sis (Krippendorf, 2004) of newspapers. For cross-checking purposes and the 
procurement of additional data for these theoretical informed case studies, I 
conducted 15 interviews in Brussels and in different member states between 
January 2005 and January 2006 (see Appendix for overview).
Structure of the four case studies
The structure of the four case studies is as follows. The analysis is grouped 
into two on-the-line and two off-the-line cases. On-the-line incidents represent 
those that are well explained by the theoretical model for apt transposition 
with residual deviants of around ‘0’, and off-the-line incidents describe those 
that are poorly explained by the statistical model and the fuzzy set. To begin, 
a short introduction about the directive’s relation with the full transport ac-
quis is given. Then, analysis addresses the European level factors that account 
for transposition delay, namely: the European negotiation process in general, 
and the content of the European directive in particular. Following this is a 
closer look at the national transposition practices, and the transposition ac-
tors involved at the national level. Last but not least, the effects of past crises 
in the national transposition process are examined. These four cases are later 
used to generalize subsequent conclusions of this chapter.
9.2 On-The-Line Case Studies
9.2.1 Case 1 – 1998/55: French transposition of the Council Directive 98/55/EC
of 17 July 1998 amending Council Directive 93/75/EEC concerning mini-
mum requirements for vessels bound for or leaving Community port and 
carrying dangerous or polluting goods.
In order to sketch the overall scope of Directive 98/55/EC, the purpose of 
the amended Directive 93/75/EEC is crucial to understand. After the 1978 
Amoco Cadiz accident yielded environmentally devastating consequences, 
and especially after the 1987 Herald of Free Enterprise accident claimed the 
lives of 193 people, the EU legislative bodies adopted Directive 93/75/EEC con-
cerning minimum requirements for ships bound for or leaving Community ports and 
carrying dangerous or polluting goods. The idea was to oblige vessels bound 
for Community ports to notify the national authorities of the nature of the 
dangerous and polluting goods they were carrying, and to make available 
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to those authorities a plan indicating the location of such goods on board. In 
addition, vessels were to immediately inform authorities in the case of acci-
dents. In accordance with International Maritime Organisation (IMO) regu-
lations, authorities were then to forward information about the accident to 
other shipping vessels in the area, and also to other affected member states.
9.2.1.1. European level characteristics:
Six months transposition deadline
The Commission proposal for the Council directive amending Directive 
93/75/EEC was introduced on 23 September 1996, and was finally adopted 
in the second reading during the first days of the Austrian Presidency on 17 
July 1998.  Hence, it took almost two years to adopt the new EU legislation in 
the field of maritime safety. In light of developments in international legisla-
tion on maritime safety, the purpose of the Commission’s proposal was to 
update the annexes to the 93/75 Directive and to facilitate their subsequent 
amendments. In the first reading, the European Parliament (EP), headed by 
the EP’s rapporteur, Alfonso Novo Belenguer (Radicals, ES), was quite com-
plementary  to the Commission’s text. The EP urged the Council to extend 
the scope of Directive 98/55/EC to include the carriage by sea of irradiated 
nuclear fuel, plutonium, and high-level radioactive waste in flasks. In total, 
the European directive has six recitals, it was just two pages long, containing 
two annexes, each of which were one page long. In the end, the transposition 
deadline was set at six months (31 December 1998), which is the normal time-
frame for the implementation of an amendment that will replace, foremost, 
the annexes of already existing EU legislation. In the meantime, Directive 
98/55/EC has been repealed by Directive 2002/59/EC.
No discretion for interpretation
Amending Directive 93/75/EEC, Directive 1998/55/EC had two main objec-
tives. First, it specified that the Directive 93/75/EEC covered nuclear trans-
port, i.e. irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium, and high-level radioactive waste. 
These radioactive materials (RAM), of natural or artificial origin, are of wide-
spread use in developed societies all over the world. They are used in medi-
cine, research, industrial manufacturing, agriculture, electric power genera-
tion, and in other applications that assist our daily lives. The handling, use, 
and management of RAM, including their transport gives rise to potential 
Table 9.13: Policy cycle timetable of 98/55/EC.
98/55/EC Initiated Adopted Deadline French 
Notification to 
Commission
Date 23 September 96 17 July 98 7 November 99 19 February 99;
17 March 99
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radiological hazards. Directive 1998/55/EC was designed to include RAM. 
Second, Directive 1998/55/EC emphasised the search for harmonization of 
EU member states’ legal instruments on the basis of already existing interna-
tional standards, conventions, and agreements. Hence, the two objectives of 
Directive 1998/55/EC were to maintain the scope of Directive 93/75/EEC, 
and to facilitate the adaptation of those annexes to developments in inter-
national law through the committee procedure. It added relevant INF codes 
(International code for the Safe Carriage of packaged irradiated nuclear fuel, 
plutonium and high-level radioactive wastes on board ships) to the content 
of the accident information that was to be reported to the authorities of the 
Community port’s member state. Therefore, the duty of notifying authori-
ties of accidents was extended to include all ships, regardless of their date of 
construction or size. Directive 1998/55/EC specified how RAM should be 
carried on each kind of ship.
After all these adjustments, member states were left with little discretion as 
to how to interpret the provisions on RAM, a fact confirmed by all interview 
partners. Although one article was adopted to amend Directive 93/75/EEC’s 
annexes I and II, they include a clear and straightforward checklist for ves-
sels, and permit no discretion.
9.2.1.2. The national transposition process: France
With the exception of the UK, member states transposed Directive 1998/55/
EC before the deadline, or else notified the Commission of a short delay of 
between one and five months. Table 9.14 illustrates that most member states 
did not encounter considerable transposition delays. This is despite the fact 
that no member state was able to refer to already existing national legislation, 
but instead had to actively adopt new legal instrument(s) to transpose the 
Directive (IP2).
France belongs to the group of member states that did not encounter serious 
transposition delay while transposing Directive 1998/55/EC. With a notifica-
tion to the Commission of the first national instrument on 19 February 1999, 
France had a short delay of three months.
Table 9.14: Transposition delays in months of Directive 1998/55/EC.
Member State EU15 BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AU PT FI SE UK
Transposition delay in 
months for 1998/55/EC
1 0 -3 0 4 3 5 -3 n.r. 4 n.r. n.r. 3 0 21
Source: Eurlex and national databases; n.r. = no reference (16.9.04), Legend: BE (Belgium), 
DK (Denmark), DE (Germany), EL (Greece), ES (Spain), FR (France), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), 
LU (Luxembourg), NL (the Netherlands), AU (Austria), PT (Portugal), FI (Finland), SE 
(Sweden), UK (United Kingdom).
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Relatively large numbers of transposition actors
In the end, France notified the Commission of two measures belonging to the 
‘lowest’ level instrument in the French hierarchy of legal measures39, namely, 
the ministerial order (arrêté ministeriel). The first order40 was adopted almost 
three months after the transposition deadline set in the Directive, and the sec-
ond one was 14 weeks after this deadline (17 March 1999)41.  Both ministerial 
orders were signed by the director for maritime transport, M. Gressier, and 
three ministries were directly involved in the transposition process, namely: 
the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry 
of Transport. An interview partner of Transport ministry stressed the three 
dimensionality of the Directive – it covered boat, harbour, and circulation – 
which required the extraordinary involvement of more than just the Ministry 
of Transport. Despite the fact that lowest national instrument was chosen, the 
number of veto players (4) was consequently relatively high.
Transposition package with 98/55/EC and 98/74/EC
Whereas Directive 98/55/EC was one among four directives to be transposed 
in the maritime units, it was the first Directive in a transposition package with 
Directive 98/74/EC. It was the State Council (Conseil d’Etat) that was respon-
sible for determining whether the text would require legislative action, or else 
could be dealt with by government regulation. Furthermore, in accordance 
with the State Council and the SGG (Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement), the 
SGCI (Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel pour les questions economiques 
européennes) decided on the application of the package approach.
Adopted on 1 October 1998, the last Directive in the package, however, had a 
transposition deadline set for 2 November 1999—almost one year later than 
that of Directive 98/55/EC. Considering the time difference, one can see that 
the package approach matters. While the latest transposition measure in the 
package was adopted almost eight months in advance, this packaging meth-
od had a delaying effect for the transposition of Directive 98/55/EC. Adopted 
three months later in the Council of Transport Ministers, but having double 
the transposition time guaranteed by the EU Transport Ministers, the trans-
position of Directive 98/74/EC was combined with the Directive 98/55/EC 
(that covered minimum requirements for vessels bound for or leaving Com-
munity port and carrying dangerous goods) which had a delaying effect on 
the transposition process of Directive 98/55/EC.
39 Consult chapter 8 for an overview of all types of national implementing measures in the 
nine member states covered by this study.
40 Arreté du 19 février 1999 portant modification du règlement annexé à l árreté du 23 novembre 1987 
modifié relatif à la sécurité des navires.
41 Arreté du 17 mars 1999 pris en application de l’article 3 du décret du 14 décembre 1929 modifié 
relatif au reglement général du pilotage. JORF du 20/03/1999, p. 5256.
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Third French cohabitation (1997-2002)
During the transposition period, 17 July 1998 to 17 March 1999, the political 
climate in France was not tense, and no general election took place. Instead, 
between 4 June 1997 and 7 May 2002, France experienced its third cohabita-
tion. Whereas Jacques Chirac of the liberal-conservative Union for a Popular 
Movement (UMP) was the president of the French Republic, Lionel Jospin, 
from the Socialist Party (PS), was Prime Minister. ‘It was a relatively stable 
five-year term of government’ (IP1). During these five years, Jean-Claude 
Gayssot, of the French Communist Party (PCF), was the only transport minis-
ter under Lionel Jospin, a fact that guaranteed the prospect of continuity and 
‘business as usual.’ (IP1).
9.2.1.3. Crises:
No maritime accident
During the eight months of the transposition period, no maritime accident 
occurred. An accident would have had an effect on the implementation process 
in France. The next ecological disaster, however, was not far off. On 12 Decem-
ber 1999, the oil tanker Erika sank 40 miles off the coast of Brittany, releasing 
more than 10,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil. The ecological disaster was devastat-
ing, polluting 400 kilometres of the French coast line. Only a few months later, 
the next European maritime directives were adopted under the highest politi-
cal priority during the Portuguese Presidency (January-June 2000).
9.2.1.4. Preliminary findings:
The knowledge gleaned by following the French transposing of EU maritime 
Directive 1998/55/EC, from the Commission’s initiative to the final adoption 
of the last ministerial order corroborates the study’s theoretical framework (see 
table 9.15). Whereas the six-month deadline set in the Directive, which is very 
formal in character and leaves no room for interpretation, would have been 
sufficient time for transposition. However, the extraordinary number of trans-
position actors and the national transposition packaging caused some delay in 
the end.
Three French ministries had to agree on a national instrument that would be 
used in  transposing 1998/55/EC, a directive that covered three issues: boat, 
harbour, and circulation. This lead to some coordination efforts between the 
SGCI and the head of the Ministry of Transport, efforts that would ultimately 
risk a problem-free procedure. Furthermore, the SGCI had agreed to set up a 
transposition package for two maritime Directives adopted by the EU min-
isters of transport in 1998, whose transposition deadlines, however, differed 
by almost one year. Consequently, this approach caused a three-month delay 
for the first Directive in the package (98/55/EC), but accelerated the trans-
position process of the second Directive (98/74/EC) by almost eight months. 
Next, I address the second on-the-line case whose implementation record is 
less convincing.
124 Chapter 19
9.2.2 Case 2 – 2001/14: Spanish transposition of Directive 2001/14/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation 
of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of 
railway infrastructure and safety certification
The EU has had the goal of revitalizing its railways on the agenda since 
the early nineties. Three railway packages have, meanwhile, been adopted 
amounting to a series of directives. This all started in 1991, with the adoption 
of single directives, like Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of European 
railways. The intention of this Directive was to improve the legal framework 
for railways, and to halt the ongoing decline in their market share. Direc-
tive 91/440/EEC was complemented by a follow-up in 1995, Council Directive 
95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and one on allocation of railway 
infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges (95/19/EC). A second step of 
reforms at EU level, which were adopted on 26 February 2001, goes under 
the name ‘first railway package.’ Referring to rail freight only, it represented an 
attempt at liberalizing the sector through the introduction of open access and 
forms of head-on competition—at least on the Trans-European Rail Freight 
Network (TERFN). The TERFN is responsible for 50% of EU railway net-
works and 80% of traffic. Open access and head-on competition will extend 
to the whole network by 2006, according to the 2004 adopted ‘second railway 
package’. On 3 March 2004, the Commission adopted its third railway pack-
age. This package contained four legislative measures, which are still being 
negotiated in the Council’s working groups. Directive 2001/14/EC, which is 
part of first railway package, will be the focus of the second case study of this 
chapter.
Table 9.15: Results of case study no. 1.
Transposition of 1998/55/EC 
in France
European directive related 
factors
Transposition time set in the 
directive 
6 months
Amount of discretion granted 
by the directive
No discretion for interpre-
tation
Form and method of 
national transposition 
process
Number of veto players Relatively large numbers of 
transposition actors
Package approach Transposition package with 
98/55/EC and 98/74/EC
Situational change of 
internal and external 
environment
General elections No election; Third French 
cohabitation
Transport related accidents No maritime accident
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9.2.2.1. European level characteristics:
Two years transposition deadline
The EU negotiations for the first railway package, containing Directives 
2001/12, 2001/13, and 2001/14, were concluded in February, 2001. The Com-
mission proposal was introduced during the Austrian Council Presidency on 
22 July 1998.  On 25 August 2000, the Council declared that it could not ac-
cept all the EP’s amendments that were drafted by EP’s rapporteur, Johannes 
Swoboda (PSE, Austria). Subsequently, the Council convened the Concilia-
tion Committee, which met for the first time on 11 October 2000. Meanwhile, 
several meetings of EP’s delegation and in trialogues (Farell and Hértier, 
2003; Häge and Kaeding, 2007) took place before and after that date. On 22 
November 2000, the Conciliation Committee reached its final agreement on 
the entire railway package. Ultimately, the first railway package was signed 
by the EP after its third reading and by the Council after two and a half years 
of bargaining. The date of the signing was 26 February 2001.
Regarding infrastructure access, Directive 2001/14/EC superseded and re-
pealed Directive 95/19/EC. Strongly inspired by the 1998 White paper on in-
frastructure access pricing, Articles 7 and 8 of Directive 2001/14/EC inject new, 
essential, and detailed principles of charging. The deadline for transposition 
was set at two years (15 March 2003)42. Compared to the average 18 month 
transposition time of other transport directives in 2000 to 2005, the 24 month 
deadline was considerably above average (IP5).
While Directive 2001/14/EC was in transposition, Article 30 of Directive 
2004/49/EC (in the second railway package) amended the title of Directive 
2001/14/EC, as well as the contents of Articles 30.2., 32, and 34 to remove 
provisions on safety.
42 There are derogations in respect of the implementation of certain provisions of the Capac-
ity Directive for Ireland, the UK and Greece, and those provisions do not have to be imple-
mented until 15 March 2008.
Table 9.16: Policy cycle timetable of 2001/14/EC.
2001/14/EC Initiated Adopted deadline Spanish Notification 
to Commission
Date 22 February 98 26 February 01 15 March 03 17 November 2003;
30 December 04;
7 April 2005
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Relatively high level of discretion
Directive 2001/14/EC is a 17 page document with 40 articles and 3 short an-
nexes. It deals with potentially applicable principles and procedures for the 
setting of railway infrastructure charges, both international and domestic, 
and the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity43, i.e. each Member State 
has to designate the allocation body which should be informed of all train 
paths available, and has to ensure that the railway infrastructure capacity 
is allocated on a fair and non-discriminatory basis. The existing directives 
had not prevented major disparities in the structure of railway infrastructure 
charges, nor the levels of such charges, nor the form or length of capacity-al-
location procedures. Thereupon, Directive 2001/14/EC provides much detail 
necessary to describe the general character of the infrastructure manager’s44 
monopoly regulation. It addresses the following questions explicity: Who is 
entitled to access the network? Who allocates access? What is the allocation 
process? How long is an allocated access period? How is access priced? What 
are the other terms of access? What if the network is congested? The direc-
tive is considered a ‘rather complicated document’ (IP5), with 5045 recitals 
that state the scope of the legislation. Although they are not legally binding, 
they clearly indicate the Directive’s complexity. In the end, however, Direc-
tive 2001/14/EC does allow for a certain degree of flexibility (IP5). It entails 
a considerable amount of discretion in the interpretation and application of 
its requirements. All interview partners confirmed that it provides infrastruc-
ture managers and train operators with appropriate incentives and flexibility 
in capacity allocation, and in performing allocation procedures fairly (Article 
7.2.; 8.1.; 10.1.; 14.1.; 16; 19; 29).
9.2.2.2. National transposition process:
Member states had different points of departure after the adoption of the first 
liberalizing directives in the early 1990s. Whereas most member states had 
not foreseen any separation in the railway sector administration, Sweden was 
the first European country that provided the legal framework for non-dis-
criminatory competition on the rail network, remarkably, even before its of-
ficial membership to the EU. Sweden’s railway reform of 1988 separated the 
infrastructure and the operator completely. The separation in administration 
had also already been accomplished in the UK. The British railway system 
had been divided into a number of different entities, including infrastruc-
ture, passenger and freight operators, rolling stock companies, and regulator. 
In Spain, too, the railway system also had been divided into different admin-
43 ‘Allocation’means the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity by an allocation body 
(2002/14/EC Article 2 e)
44  ‘Infrastructure manager’ means any public body or undertaking responsible in particular 
for establishing and maintaining railway infrastructure, as well as for operating the con-
trol and safety systems (Directive 2001/14/EC Article 2c)
45 Directive 2001/14/EC is the transport directive with the most recitals in history.
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istrative entities, in the 1990s, following the British model, but all entities still 
fell under the umbrella organization RENFE (Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles 
Espanoles, empresa pública operadora).
Table 9.17 illstrates that, all in all, member states had difficulties in transpos-
ing the directive by the deadline. Whereas initially Sweden, the UK, Denmark, 
Finland, and Italy notified the national measures to the Commission on time, 
in the end, only Denmark and Finland complied with EU legislation to the 
Commission’s satisfaction. Infringement proceedings were started against 
the UK and Sweden because their existing legislation was not sufficient in 
scope (IP5). On the other hand, most member states experienced more con-
siderable transposition delays, including Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium. After months of intensive legislative activity, Belgium, for ex-
ample, needed 24 national implementing measures. At first, Spain notified 
the Commission that its first instruments would be only moderately late, 
estimating implementation on 17 November 2003. The adopted legislative 
act, however, was to come into force six month later, on 18 May 2004, which 
is referred to as the so-called vacatio legis46. Even then, it was not enforced before 
31 December 2004, accumulating almost two years of delay. 
Large number of transposition actors:
After the adoption of the first railway package in 2001, Spain initially waited 
before taking any action. Since Directive 2001/14/EC gave considerable lee-
way to the member states, Spain watched and consulted with other member 
states ‘to see which interpretation was pursued’ by them (IP6). Apparently, 
RENFE (Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles) had steady contact with 
46 The period between the publication of a statute in the Official Journal of Laws and the 
beginning of the tax year. The official Spanish text in the legislative act reads as follows 
(Ley39/2003, BOE 276/40561): ‘La presente ley entrará en vigor a los seis meses desde su publi-
cación en el boletín oficiál del estado.’
Table 9.17: Transposition time in months of Directive 2001/14/EC.
Member states EU 15 BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK
Transposition delay in 
months for 2001/14/EC
19 -3 25 n.r. 8 23 n.r. 4 n.r. 21 9 8 0
A
lready existing legislation
A
lready existing legislation
Source: Eurlex and national databases (16.9.04); n.r.= no reference, Legend: BE (Belgium), 
DK (Denmark), DE (Germany), EL (Greece), ES (Spain), FR (France), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), 
LU (Luxembourg), NL (the Netherlands), AT (Austria), PT (Portugal), FI (Finland), 
SE (Sweden), UK (United Kingdom).
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its French and German counterparts for these reasons, and also because it 
became clear that not all Spanish political forces would agree with their gov-
ernment’s approach in the transposition process. Therefore, Spain hoped 
to watch and learn from other states so as to develop a measure that would 
please the most people.
On 17 November 2003, the Spanish parliament adopted a legislative act47 
opting for the ‘radical division’ between the new public administration, 
ADIF (Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias) and the RENFE-Op-
erator. Although this legislative act was ‘again a good example for Spain’s 
radical transposition style’ (IP7), there was still a pending issue to be solved. 
Before the legislative act could come into force, the questions about the um-
brella organization (RENFE)’s debt had to be solved, leading to a provisional 
vacatio legis of six months (IP4). Two ministries were involved in the Spanish 
transposition process. The Ministry of Transport (Fomento) lead the process of 
transpostion, while the Ministry of Economics (Ministerio de Economía y Haci-
enda) tackled the debt of 7,200 million Euros (El País, 2004: 60; Goméz, 2005)
A legislative act (ley ordinaria), which is the highest legal instrument in the 
hierarchy of Spanish legal measures, involves a considerable number of veto 
players in the policy-making process. Legislative acts represent only about 
12% of the total legal instruments used for the transposition of EU directives 
in Spain (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005: 132), yet the adoption of a ley 
ordinaria requires parliamentary approval as well as the advice of the State 
Council. The additional role played by the Ministry of Economics made a six 
months vacatio legis indispensable.
Furthermore, the ‘gladiator style’ (IP4) separation48 incited extensive discus-
sions between the conservative Aznar government and left opposition parties 
in the parliament and, consequently, delayed the drafting of complementary 
regulations, which were considered necessary. Although the administrative 
separation of units (infrastructure and circulation) had been already taken 
place in the early 1990s, the discussion now was more about the physical sep-
aration of persons and the threat of licensing third contractors to the national 
infrastructure due to rationalizing means (IP7).  
Transposition package without relevance
The first railway package was being transposed concomitantly with eight 
other ongoing transposition processes in the railway sectors units of the 
Ministry of Transport. Despite the massive workload, Spain transposed all 
47 Ley 39/2003, de 17 de noviembre, del Sector Ferroviario BOE no 276 de 18/11/2003 
p. 40532.
48 Whereas Germany and France opted for a middle way, Spain decided to separate infra-
structure manager and railway understaking from each other, not only legally, but also 
in terms of buildings and human resources.
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three directives of the first railway package through one legislative act (ley) 
39/2003 on 17 November 2003, amending the already existing legislation 
of 30 July 1987. Although Spanish authorities applied a transposition pack-
age for the entire first railway package, the timeliness of the transposition 
process was not improved. This was because all three EU directives were not 
only adopted by the EU Ministers of Transport on the same day (26 February 
2001), but they also had the same transposition time guaranteed—a final date 
fixed for two years later (15 March 2003). Consequently, it is not possible to 
differentiate between the first or the last Directive in this particular Spanish 
transposition package, nor would the theoretical model foresee any effect on 
the timeliness of transposition.
Spanish general election of 14 March 2004
The aforementioned conflicting discussions between the conservative Aznar 
government and the left opposition in parliament were further augmented 
by the campaigning for the general elections of 14 March 2004. With these 
discussions now came an interruption in the transposition process. Over 
time, the clear division between ADIF and RENFE-Operador became an elec-
tion campaign issue (IP4). Although less ideological than the French counter-
parts, the Spanish unions UJT (Transistors Uniunión) and SEMAF (Sindicado de 
Maquinistas y Ayudantes Ferroviarios) demonstrated against the legislative act. 
The autonomous regions in Spain, CCAA (Comunidas Autónomas), especially 
those governed by the opposition party groups – Aragón, Asturias, Castilla-
La Mancha and Cataluña – initiated a constitutional proceeding concerning 
their regional transport competence (Articles 79d and 31).  Their goal was 
to carry out their full regional competences in the railway sector in general 
and the infrastructure in particular, since they would be responsible for the 
practical application of the legislative act, as well as its three related regula-
tions. Although their constitutional proceeding was eventually dropped, all 
interview partners confirmed that it served to irritate the national situation 
for some time.
Despite the overall displeasure about the conservative government’s radical 
approach, a few weeks before the general election, the conservative govern-
ment seemed very likely to keep their positions after the election. But then 
something unforeseen happened, traumatising Spain and the Spanish vot-
ers. After the fatal Atocha Central Station bombings on 11 March 2004, the 
centre-left party, PSOE, lead by Zapatero won the elections. Those who had 
criticized the legislative act in parliament were now (surprisingly) in power. 
They assigned a new transport minister, Magdalena Álvarez. Her first action 
as transport minister was to postpone the coming into force of the transpos-
ing legal instrument. She added another year to the vacatio legis in order to 
facilitate discussions between the trade unions (UJT and SEMAF) and the 
autonomous regions (CCAA), which had supported the new government 
fiercely in opposition during the election campaigns.
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This self-imposed year of reflection (14 March 2004 to 30 December 2004) con-
cluded with three additional implementing measures (real decreto) adopted 
on 30 December 2004 49 – one year after the publication of the legislative act 
39/2003. Based on Article 86 of the Spanish Constitution, the government 
may issue this special type of decree in regards to the status of the law in case 
of extraordinary and urgent need (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005: 131). 
The provisions of the real decreto-ley are directly applicable, but they must 
be immediately submitted to parliament. Although the Spanish government 
considered the speediest Spanish legal instrument urgently necessary (IP4), 
the Commission, considered it to be insufficient. The Commission started an 
infringement procedure for non-compliance, leading to two additional min-
isterial orders (orden) adopted on 7 April 200550, which are provisions issued 
by the minister without explicit authorization through law. Thereupon, the 
Commission closed the infringement proceedings against Spain.
Ultimately, Spain adopted six national instruments covering almost all dif-
ferent types of instruments, whereas most of the other member states – with 
the exception of Belgium – remained in the margin of between one and four. 
The Spanish Ministry of Transport, Magdalena Álvarez, stands still in contact 
with the Commission to further improve the transposition of the first railway 
package in Spain (IP4).
9.2.2.3 Crises:
No major railway accidents on Spanish territory
Whereas the UK is ‘sadly famous’ for its fatal railway accidents, Spain has 
not experienced any major train crashes, in general; nor did any occur during 
the transposition period. The Atocha bombings during the election campaign 
had a delaying effect on the proceedings of Spanish policy-making. However, 
since they were not directly related to transport or railway liberalization, no 
accelerating effect could be expected.
9.2.2.4 Preliminary findings:
In the end, the Spanish authorities notified the European Commission of six 
legal instruments that would be used to transpose the first railway package, 
including Directive 2001/14/EC. The preconditions for a swift transposition 
process were already null because of the high degree of discretion given to 
the member states. This flexibility resulted in a time-consuming ‘wait and 
49 Real decreto 2395/2004, de 30 de diciembre, por el que se aprueba el Estatuto de la entidad 
pública empresarial Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias. Real decreto 2396/2004, 
de 30 de diciembre, por el que se aprueba el Estatuto de la entidad pública empresarial RENFE-
Operadora. Real decreto 2387/2004, de 30 de diciembre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento del 
Sector Ferroviario.
50 Orden 5754 FOM 12324/2005 and orden 5755 FOM 12331/2005.
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see’ situation right after the EU Ministers of Transport had adopted Direc-
tive 2001/14/EC. After the Spanish authorities had deliberated on the differ-
ent approaches envisioned by Germany and France, they decided to go for 
the ‘gladiator style’ of separation between ADIF and RENFE-Operador. The 
potestad reglementaria opted for the highest Spanish instrument, the ley ordi-
naria, involving large numbers of transposition actors (State Council, parlia-
ment, autonomous regions etc.). However, before transposition could begin, 
the  ADIF’s debt of 7,200 million Euros had to be tackled by the Ministry of 
Transport and the Ministry of Economics. This situation resulted in one ad-
ditional agency’s involvement, the Ministry of Economics, and required the 
introduction of the so-called vacatio legis. Furthermore, the radical Spanish 
approach caused considerable agitation within the country. Unions protested 
in the streets of Madrid, autonomous regions began legal proceedings, and 
the opposition antagonized the draft legislation in parliament.
The hostile response by unions, autonomous regions, and the opposition was 
further harassed by the general elections, which were scheduled in the last 
month before the Directive’s transposition deadline (15 March 2004 – 17.11.03 
plus 6 months). The fatal Atocha Central Station bombings of 11 March 2004 
were likely responsible not only for preventing the Aznar’s from winning the 
elections, but also for further delaying the transposition process of 2001/14/
EC. The Directive was set to the side, as other issues, such as terrorism and 
security, earned priority status. After the bombings and the unexpected elec-
toral victory of the centre-left, however, Spain needed a general period of 
reflection. A new centre-left government assigned a new transport minister, 
whose first action was to proclaim this year of reflection. Furthermore, by 
postponing the final adoption of Direct 2001/14/EC by one year, the Spanish 
government also honoured the trade unions’ and the autonomous regions for 
their strong support during the election campaigns.
Table 9.18: Results of the second case study.
Transposition of 2001/14/EC 
in Spain
European directive related 
factors
Amount of discretion granted 
by the directive
Relatively high amount of 
discretion
Transposition time set in the 
directive
2 years transposition dead-
line
Form and method of 
national transposition 
process
Number of veto players Relatively large numbers of 
transposition actors
Package approach Transposition package 
without relevance
Situational change of 
internal and external 
environment
General elections Spanish general election of 
14 March 2004
Transport related accidents No railway accident
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9.3 Off-the-line case studies
While the first two cases corroborate to great extent the theoretical framework 
on apt transposition, the following off-the-line studies will help to further im-
prove our understanding of timely transposition.
9.3.1 Case 3 – 2002/59: German transposition of Directive 2002/59/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 establishing a 
Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system, and repealing 
Council Directive 93/75/EEC
9.3.1.1 European level characteristics:
The sinking of the oil tanker Erika off the French coast in December, 1999 spurred 
new developments in Europe’s maritime safety policies. The ‘Erika I’ package 
included two Directives that would update existing Directives on classifica-
tion societies, Port State Control, also update a Regulation on  the phasing out 
of single-hull tankers. ‘Erika II’ aimed to bring about lasting improvements 
in the protection of European waters, and spoke to accidents and marine pol-
lution. This second set of measures was presented on 6 December 2000 by the 
Commission. It contained two proposals for Regulations and one proposal 
for a Directive. This final proposal will be the focus of this case study.
18 months of transposition time
As is the case for 95% of all transport directives,]Directive 2002/59/EC was a 
European Parliament and Council directive. Repealing Directive 93/75/EEC, 
the only one in the Erika II package, Directive 2002/59/EC was adopted by 
the EU Ministers of Transport and the EP relatively quickly. Initiated on 6 De-
cember 2000, Directive 2002/59/EC  was mainly the EP’s issuing of  stricter 
provisions. In the first reading, on 13 June 2001, the EP’s transport committee, 
and especially the rapporteur, Dirk Sterckx (ELDR, Belgium),urged the Com-
mission and the member states to broaden the scope of their objectives. The 
hope was that new objectives would include all types of ships as well as the 
development of a working relationship with the international maritime com-
munity to promote a culture of safety in all transport sectors. Furthermore, 
the Committee accussed the Commission’s proposal of ignoring the ‘human 
element and over-emphasizing technological solutions’ (IP14). In the second 
reading, the EP asked for additional measures. It suggested the introduction 
of an adequate compensation scheme51 for EU ports accommodating a ship 
in distress, and also suggested the possibility of requiring that ships to come 
to a Community port to be adequately insured. On 12 June 2002, the Commis-
sion modified its proposal to include almost all the amendments proposed by 
51 Addressing of who has to pay for the salvage costs of a ships on national waters?
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Parliament. Just two weeks later, on 27 June 2002, the Council finally adopted 
Directive 2002/59/EC repealing 93/75/EEC. In the end, the EU negotiations 
took only 18 months. The process is probably best explained by the high po-
litical priority assigned to the maritime safety dossier by the member states 
after the Erika accident in 1999 (IP14).
Member states, the Commission, and the EP agreed on a 18 months transpo-
sition deadline (5 February 2004), which was the average transposition time 
guaranteed to all EU transport directives in that period (2000-2004). However, 
compared to the average 13 month transposition time for maritime directives 
in the acquis, 18 months is quite long. Interview partners confirmed the ex-
traordinary timeframe set for this Directive, which they ascribed to ‘the Com-
mission’s colloquial approach towards member states.’ In the pre-negotiation 
phase, member states were already allowed to raise their concerns and influ-
ence the content of the Directive as well as the transposition deadline, which 
they considered to be crucial (IP12 and IP13).
Almost no leeway for national interpretation
As mentioned before, this Directive is to be viewed in the context of the 
second package on maritime safety (Erika II), and as a direct response to 
the sinking of the Erika in 1999. In general, it applied to ships of 300 gross 
tonnages, and was to improve maritime safety and reduce the possible en-
vironmental consequences of accidents at sea. The Directive, in particular, 
foresaw the improvement of accident prevention measures. It also called for 
the monitoring of ships sailing in European waters, an action that would also 
cover ships not calling at European ports. The Directive expressly provided 
for the installation of a notification system that would include vessels not 
calling at Community ports. Before entering member States territories, ships 
must be equipped with EDI (electronic data interchanges), the automatic 
vessel identification system (AIS system), and a voyage data recorder (VDR) 
system (‘black box’) to facilitate investigations following accidents (IP4). The 
Directive also called for increased cooperation among member states and a 
closer monitoring of vessels that present specific risks to maritime safety and 
the environment. 
Ultimately, Directive 2002/59/EC strengthens the power of coastal member 
states to take action in the event of accident or pollution risks off their coasts, 
and even outside their territorial waters. The directive enables them to order 
Table 9.19: Policy cycle timetable of 2002/59/EC.
2002/59/EC Initiated Adopted Deadline German 
Notification to 
Commission
Date 6 December 2000 27 June 02 5 February 04 27 February 04 
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a potentially threatening ship to change route; member states also have the 
options of sending aboard a risk evaluation team, as well as piloting or tow-
ing the ship. Finally, the directive requires each member state to designate 
ports of refuge where vessels in distress can seek shelter.
In total, Directive 2002/59/EC is 16 pages long, including 4 annexes of about 
1 page each. Additionally, the Directive lists 22 recitals compared to the me-
dian number of recitals in transport directives (8), which may indicate its 
complexity and may also explain the atypical amount of time for transposi-
tion set in the Directive in the first place.
Furthermore, the 32 articles guarantee little leeway for interpretation. The 
exceptions to this are Articles 15 and 16. Whereas Article 15 introduces an 
exemption for services performed between ports on one member state’s ter-
ritory, the remaining ones do not include any amount of discretion in this re-
gard. Concerning Article 16, interview partners spoke of the highly technical 
nature of the Directive 2002/59/EC, and this article in particular. Repeatedly 
they underscored the German efforts to keep Länder competences out of the 
directive, a feat that could only be accomplished by a restrictive interpreta-
tion of Article 16 II. It reads as follows:
‘Costal stations holding relevant information on the ships referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
communicate it to the coastal stations concerned in the other Member states located along 
the planned route of the ship.’ (Article 16 of Directive 2002/59/EC)
In order to guarantee a centralised coordination along the German coastlines, 
the federal ministry insisted that this task was to be taken over by a federal 
body and would not fall under the responsibility of the bordering Länder.
9.3.1.2 National transposition process:
Directive 2002/59/EC encountered timeliness problems across the member 
states. Whereas only Denmark and Spain notified the Commission of their 
instruments on time, all the other member states experienced  delays in noti-
fication, ranging from 1 month in Germany   to 10 months in the Netherlands, 
and 19 months in Belgium.
In comparison to the other member states, Germany performed rather well. 
Notifying its ministerial order 52 (Verordnung) on the 27 February 2004, it sur-
passed the deadline by only three weeks.
52 Elfte Verordnung zur Änderung seeverkehrsrechtlicher Vorschriften vom 18/02/2004 BGBI. Teil I 
no 8 vom 27/02/2004 p. 300.
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Small number of national transposition actors
The goodness of fit between the pre-existing German legislation and Direc-
tive 2002/59/EC seems evident. Despite the considerable workload for the 
drafters of new maritime legislationcaused by the subsequent accidents on 
European sea53, German legislation had to include relatively small number 
(12) of newly introduced articles  by the ministerial order.  All interview part-
ners confirmed the Directive’s harmony with pre-existing German legisla-
tion. Out of seven issues covered in the EU directives, four had been already 
discussed in Germany, namely: Article 5 (monitoring of ships entering the 
area of mandatory ship reporting systems), Article 9 (infrastructure for ships’ 
reporting systems, ships’ routing systems, and vessel traffic services), Article 
12 (obligation on the shipper), and Article 20 (places of refuge). Moreover, the 
transposition team explicitly chose not to introduce new legislation. Instead, 
the German ministerial order changed already existing annexes to legislative 
acts, and altered the content of ministerial orders, without introducing new 
instruments 54
The German interpretation of Article 16 of the Directive was a practical one 
(IP12). Germany adopted a ministerial order (Verordnung) in maritime trans-
port. Normally, Länder competencies are involved in maritime transport leg-
islation, being that six Länder have access to the sea, namely: Mecklemburg-
Western Pomerania, Schleswig- Holstein, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower 
Saxony, Bremen and Hamburg. However, Länder involvement in Article 16 
would have made the transposition procedure much more complicated by 
53 Between 2000 and 2003, sixteen EU maritime legislations had been adopted. The maritime 
unit in the German Ministry of Transport had a considerable number of ongoing transpo-
sition processes (7) right after the start of the national transposition processes. 
54 Änderung der Anlage zum Schiffssicherheitsgesetz; Änderung der Schiffssicherheitsverordnung; 
Änderung der Anlaufsbedingungsverordnung; Verordnung über die Sicherung der Seefahrt und 
die Änderung der Sportbootführerscheinverordnung-See.
Table 9.20: Transposition delay in months for Directive 2002/59/EC.
Member State EU15 BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK
Transposition delay in 
months for 2002/59/EC
19 -4 1 n.r. 0 5 n.r. n.r. 7 10 n.r. 5 n.r.
A
lready existing legislation
5
Source: Eurlex and national databases (16.9.04); n.r.= no reference, Legend: BE (Belgium), 
DK (Denmark), DE (Germany), EL (Greece), ES (Spain), FR (France), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), 
LU (Luxembourg), NL (the Netherlands), AT (Austria), PT (Portugal), FI (Finland), 
SE (Sweden), UK (United Kingdom).
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requiring all six governments to adopt implementing measures. Instead of 
involving Länder, Germany used an adopted ministerial order on the federal, 
not local, level. This kind of order is the fastest German transposition instru-
ment. It ranks lowest in the set of implementation measures in Germany, re-
quiring only a very small number of compulsory actors (Steunenberg and 
Voermans, 2005: 174-188). The ministerial order was signed only by the Min-
ister of Transport, a fact that underscores the relatively small number of ac-
tors involved. After all, the provisions are issued by one minister with explicit 
authorization through law (Ermächtigungsgrundlage), and do not require the 
signatures of other actors.
Package approach with 2000/59/EC, 2001/106/EC and 2003/75/EC
The German Ministry of Transport decided to apply a transposition package 
including four EU directives, namely: 2000/59/EC, 2001/106/EC, 2002/59/EC,
and 2003/75/EC. The deadlines of the four directives differed by 14 months. 
Whereas the first directive’s 2000/59/EC deadline was set for 28 December 
2002, the last directive’s deadline (2002/59) was 5 February 2004. In the end, 
the German ministerial order transposed all four EU directives at once, caus-
ing a considerable overdue for the first measures in the package. The first di-
rective, 2000/59/EC, was transposed with a delay of almost 15 months. Con-
sequently, the hypothesis in this book about the delaying effect of the package 
approach for the first directive is corroborated. The package approach’s af-
fect on the last directive in the package, however, is less straightforward. The 
last two directives in the package, with similar transposition deadlines, were 
transposed three weeks late. This can be considered a very short delay; how-
ever, a clear accelerating effect is certainly not confirmed in this case. 
German general elections of 22 October 2002
During the adoption period of the German ministerial order transposing EU 
directive 2000/59/EC, between 25 September 2002 and 18 February 2004, 
there was indeed one general election, scheduled for 22 October 2002. Falling 
only one month after the adoption of the EU transport directive, it might have 
had a delaying effect on the German policy-making process. The interview 
partners confirmed that the fiercely fought election campaign created a near 
standstill in national politics. ‘Ministers had to campaign [and] mobilize their 
electorate, which did not leave sufficient time for day-to-day politics.’(IP13).
However, as it happened, the electoral outcome did not cause a change of 
government; the ruling Schröder red-green coalition achieved a marginal 
win. Yet, even if the constellation of the government did not change, with 
the Social Democrats and the Green Party still in power, the portfolios were 
indeed reshuffled, and the Ministry of Transport was taken over by Man-
fred Stolpe55. This reshuffle paralyzed German policy-making the following 
55 Formerly held by Kurt Bodewig. 
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months. Since a new minister and with him personal assistants, and so forth, 
had to become acquainted to their new positions, it took some time before 
‘the Berlin republic could move on with politics as usual’ (IP12).
9.3.1.3 Crises:
Accidents in the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic
From the early EU negotiations onwards, Germany had been one of the 
member states pushing for stricter legislation in the field of maritime safety. 
Although not directly affected by the Erika accident in 1999, it was already 
sensitized by three earlier accidents in its own waters, both of which had 
caught a lot of media attention. The Clement sank in the Bermuda Triangle in 
the Baltic Sea on 6 March 2000, and the Baltic Carrier caused an ecological dis-
aster in the Baltic Sea on 29 March 2001. Foremost in influence, however, was 
the Pallas accident in late 1998, which was by all accounts, been very present 
in people’s minds. ‘Pallas should be not possible in the future anymore,’ 
a common statement went (IP12). What had happened?
It was on 25 October 1998 that the wood cargo ship Pallas caught fire near the 
Danish coastline. During four days the cargo ship floated in the North Sea, 
while attempts of extinguishing the fire and sending out tugboats had failed. 
Finally, the Pallas floated to and grounded on the German island Amrum, in 
the North Sea. When it landed, it caused the deaths of one crew member56 
(von Wecheln, 1999) and more than 16,000 birds, and devastated the wading 
sea by dumping into it  60,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil.57 Later investigations 
revealed that the responsible classification society, and several others, had not 
noticed the chain cable’s exceeding amount of rust. The chain cable’s deplor-
able state was left at 80% of its original weight, which precluded any attempts 
of anchoring. Furthermore, the lifeboat on the ship was not serviceable, which 
dissented with the regulations (von Wecheln, 1999). Last but not least, the co-
operation between the Danish and the German bodies was not good. Given 
the fact that a burning, disassembled ship was floating towards Germany’s 
coast, Denmark should have alarmed the German coast guard immediately.
The lessons learned from the Pallas accidents in the North Sea and the Erika 
accident shortly thereafter before the French coast were taken very seriously 
by Germany and the European Commission. Next to the salvage operation 
of the Pallas in the North Sea, which cost about 14 million DM (7,16 million 
EUR) it was an ecological disaster for the North Sea in general and the small 
island, Amrum, in particular due to reasons which are addressed by the pro-
visions of the directive.
56 The others had been rescued under severe weather conditions by helicopter. 
57 See other case study on Directive 98/55/EC where Germany, probably due to this accident 
in own waters, transposed the Directive very fast.
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The transposition process in Germany was overshadowed by another eco-
logical disaster, albeit one far from the German coastline. On the 13 Novem-
ber 2002, five months after the adoption of the Directive 2002/59/EC, the oil 
tanker Prestige broke in two off Galicia in Spain. It released a considerable 
amount of the 70,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil onboard. This maritime catas-
trophe caught a lot of media attention, in Germany too (IP12). It illustrated, 
once again, the importance of improved enforcement of existing EU legisla-
tion in the field of maritime safety.
9.3.1.4 Preliminary findings:
Circumstances seemed ideal for Germany to notify the Commission of its 
transposition measures in a timely fashion. Directive 2002/59/EC came 
with an ample deadline. It also contained rather strict provisions. Leaving 
almost no leeway for interpretation, Germany decided to apply its lowest 
level instrument to transpose the Directive, an instrument that allowed few 
veto players. Moreover, Directive 2002/59/EC was the last in transposition 
package. In addition, despite the situational changes in the external environ-
ment caused by three maritime accidents that directly affected Germany’s 
coastline and the Prestige accident which too place in the first months after 
the adoption of the directive, Germany passed the deadline by a mere three 
weeks. Note that in comparison to other member states, Germany performed 
quite well.
Table 9.21: Results of case study number three.
Transposition of 2002/59/EC 
in Germany
European directive related 
factors
Amount of discretion granted 
by the directive
Almost no leeway for natio-
nal interpretation
Transposition time set in the 
directive
18 months of transposition 
time
Form and method of 
national transposition 
process
Number of veto players Small number of transposi-
tion actors
Package approach Package approach with 
2000/59/EC, 2001/106/EC 
and 2003/75/EC
Situational change of 
internal and external 
environment
General elections German general election 
from 22 October 2002
Transport related accidents Earlier and actual accidents 
in the North Sea (Prestige, 
1998), the Baltic Sea and the 
Atlantic (Erika, 1999)
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Two issues may reasonably be pointed to as causes for the short delay. They 
both indicate that the level of political priority assigned to the transposition 
process may play an important role.  While the German parliamentary elec-
tions in 2002 did not result in a change of government, they did require a lot of 
resources. As it happened, then, resources became unavailable for day-to-day 
policy-making. Until election day, polls forecasted a close run between the two 
alternative party group blocs, a situation that called for the full engagement 
in the electoral campaign by every member of the cabinet. The German gov-
ernment remained in place after the election. This was, largely because of the 
strong performance of the smaller coalition party, headed by Joschka Fischer. 
Another strong influence of the victory was that of the Eastern German elec-
torate. The electorate gave strong support to the ruling government that had 
just promised emergency funds for recovery after the devastating hundred 
year flood in Eastern Germany which had occurred in late summer 2002. De-
spite the maintenance of power, however, the minister posts were reshuffled. 
The minister of transport was replaced and endorsed with a new portfolio. 
Manfred Stolpe was not only Minister of Transport, but was, from then on-
wards, special appointee for the new federal Länder whre the general election, 
in the end, had been won. During the first months after the election, it was this 
new portfolio that attracted most of the minister’s attention, thereby grant-
ing a rather unassertive start for the transposition of Directive 2002/59/EC
(IP12). Political priority attached to the transposition process was low.
With regard to the maritime accidents in German waters, the Erika I package 
demonstrates that people forget quickly. Despite the fact that the ecological 
disaster caused by the Erika tanker was by far the worst in EU history, the first 
Erika package was not at all rapidly transposed into national law. In fact, by 23 
September 2003 (the transposition deadline), only five EU countries had trans-
posed both of the Directives relating to the Erika I package. The Commission 
even initiated legal proceedings against Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden for failing to 
implement one or both of the Erika I Directives (IP14). This example indicates 
that the priority assigned to transposition by the transposition actors is crucial, 
and it must be reinforced on a regular basis. Accidents have a brief impact. They 
only affect the perceived costs and benefits of new EU legislation when they 
occur within the national transposition process itself on national territory.
9.3.2 Case 4 – 2001/53: French transposition of Commission Directive 2001/53/EC 
of 10 July 2001 amending Council Directive 96/98/EC on marine equipment
9.3.2.1 European level characteristics:
International conventions, such as the 1974 International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), require that marine equipment onboard 
ships conform to certain safety regulations. The Marine Equipment Directive 
(MED) seeks to enhance safety at sea and prevent marine pollution through 
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the uniform application of relevant international instruments. These instru-
ments establish common rules about equipment and eliminate differences 
in the implementation of international standards in the member states. The 
MED 1996/98/EC, as amended by Directives 98/85/EC, 2001/53/EC, and 
2002/75/EC, began a two-year transition period on 1 January 1999, and be-
came mandatory on 1 January 2001. In general, Directive 1996/98/EC applies 
to marine equipment on both new and existing vessels that are registered in 
the EU/European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) area. In particular, the Direc-
tive covers life-saving appliances, marine pollution prevention, fire protec-
tion. It also refers to fire-fighting equipment, navigational equipment, and 
radio-communication equipment.
Six months transposition time
The Commission Directive 2001/53/EC, amending Directive 1996/98/EC, 
was adopted by regulatory comitology procedure involving the Committee 
on Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (COSS), which was 
set up by Council Directive 93/75/EC of 13 September 1993. Falling under 
regulatory procedure (Steunenberg, Koboldt and Schmidtchen, 1996), the 
Commission was obliged to consult the COSS, whose opinions were binding 
on the Commission. Chaired by the Commission, the COSS meetings always 
counted among its attendees representatives of old member states which 
were very active. Whereas France, Germany, and the Netherlands were very 
involved in the meetings, the Spanish representative, for example, hardly 
participated in the negotiations. After several months of weekly discussions, 
the Commission directive was adopted by a qualified majority during the 
first days of the Belgium Council Presidency, on 10 July 2001.
The typical transposition deadline for amending directives that fall under the 
comitology procedure was six months. The deadline for Directive 2001/53/EC
was also set for six months, to be completed by 31 January 2002. The length of 
time afforded here was, however, considerably less than the average transpo-
sition time for transport directives (18 months) in general.
Little discretion allowed in interpretation
The MED 2001/53/EC is very technical. It covers certain statutory equipment 
carried and used on ships registered under the flags of the EU member states 
which are required to meet the international conventions (SOLAS, MARPOL58 
58 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
Table 9.22: Policy cycle timetable of 2001/53/EC.
2001/53/EC Initiated Adopted Deadline French Notification 
to the Commission
Date 10 July 01 31 January 02 29 January 02
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etc.). The aim of the MED is to ensure that equipment meets common stand-
ards of safety and performance acceptable to each member state through the 
harmonization of states’ approval requirements. The equipment categories 
covered are listed in Annex A of the Directive. 59 Annex A is divided into two 
sections, A.1. and A.2., and equipment can fall under either or both sections. 
Only equipment listed under A.1 is required to be certified in accordance with 
the MED. Those items listed in A.2. must comply with national requirements 
(IP10). Each member state, or the organizations acting on their behalf (notified 
bodies), must ensure, when issuing or renewing the relevant safety certificates, 
that the equipment onboard complies with the requirements of the Directive.
The MED’s high level of technicality did not leave any room to manoeuvre in 
interpreting it. On the one hand, its sterness is reflected in the high number 
of appendix pages. Whereas the directive includes only 4 articles on 2 pages, 
the annexes consist of 26 pages. On these 26 pages are tables on equipment for 
which detailed testing standards either exist or do not yet exist on the inter-
national stage. On the other hand, the number of recitals is relatively small, 
which reflects a low degree of complexity (Kaeding, 2006). Furthermore, the 
comitology procedure set a six month transposition time that underscores the 
rather technical issue of the MED. Technical amendments normally grant a 
transposition deadline of not more than six months. Last but not least, inter-
view partners confirm that there seemed to be only limited possibilities of in-
terpretation for member states while transposing the Directive into national 
law. ‘It was rather a ‘copy-and-paste’ job’ (IP11).
9.3.2.2 National transposition process:
Table 23 illustrates the timelines in which member states transposed the MED 
into national legislation. Whereas some member states – Italy, Denmark, Lux-
embourg, Portugal – had considerable problems and delays of more than one 
year, other member states – Sweden, Spain, the UK, Ireland, and the Nether-
lands – did not encounter delay- causing problems in the transposition proc-
ess (IP8 and IP9).
59 Life-saving appliances, marine pollution prevention fire protection, navigation equip-
ment, radio communication equipment, COLREG 72 and bulk carrier safety equipment.
Table 9.23: Transposition delay in months for Directive 2001/53/EC.
Member State EU15 BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK
Transposition delay in 
months for 2001/53/EC
7 13 8 3 -1 0 1 21 13 1 5 12 9 -1 0
Source: Eurlex and national databases (16.3.04); n.r.= no reference, Legend: BE (Belgium), 
DK (Denmark), DE (Germany), EL (Greece), ES (Spain), FR (France), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), 
LU (Luxembourg), NL (the Netherlands), AT (Austria), PT (Portugal), FI (Finland), 
SE (Sweden), UK (United Kingdom).
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France, too, did not encounter any problems in notifying its national instru-
ment 60 to the Commission on time. Whereas the transposition deadline was 
set for 31 January 2002, the French transposing instrument was adopted 29 
January 2002 and published on 8 February 2002.
Comparatively ‘high’ number of French transposition actors
France transposed the MED with the lowest ranking instrument in the hier-
archy of French national implementing measures, namely: ministerial order 
(arrêté ministériel). It required and obtained only the signature of the Ministry 
of Transport, at a time when five other transposition processes in the field 
of maritime transport were also underway. In total, the French ministerial 
order includes six articles on two pages, and refers to two already existing 
legislative texts from the mid-1980s. 61 According to the interview partner, the 
goodness-of-fit was extraordinarily high. ‘On n’a rien créé’ (‘We did not create 
anything’) (IP11).
Despite the fact that the national implementing measure required only one 
minister’s signature, another institution was actively involved in drafting the 
French national legal instrument. As mentioned before, the key players in 
carrying out the transposition of a directive are the national notified bodies. 
They are in charge of assessing member states’ conformity to the applicable 
directive. Member states are responsible for their notification to the Com-
mission. They select the institutions they will notify from the bodies falling 
under their jurisdiction which comply with the requirements of the directive 
and the principles laid down in Decision 93/465/EEC. But not every mem-
ber state has a notified body for the MED. Whereas Italy has three, Germany 
does not have any, but uses the one in Luxembourg. 62 In France, there is one 
notified body, namely: Bureau Veritas (BV). Normally, the manufacturers have 
to contact the notified bodies and arrange for the equipment to be type ex-
amined. Once a production-control phase module is deemed appropriate the 
equipment is affixed with the mark of conformity, indicating that it complies 
with the Directive. From the date of its entry into force, only equipment com-
plying with 2001/53/EC is allowed to be placed onboard sea-going vessels. 
This means that the Directive is a very powerful economic weapon for the 
industry deciding on provision of certifications.  Herein lies the interest and 
the necessity of involvement of the notified body in the policy-making proc-
ess since they have to carry out the licensing task. With the involvement of 
these notified bodies, the national implementing measure, in practice, calls 
for two actors: the minister, and the respective notified body.
60 Arrêté du 29 janvier 2002 modifiant l’arrêté du 23 novembre 1987 relatif à la sécurité des navires 
JORF no 33 du 08/02/2002 p. 2595.
61 Décret no 84-810 du 30 aout 1984 modifié relatif à la sauvegarde de la vie humaine en mer, à l’ha-
bitabilité à bord des navires et à la prévention de la pollution ; arrêté du 23 novembre 1987 modifié 
relatif à la sécurité des navires.
62 For further details please consult: http://www.mared.org/
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No package approach
Whereas the French administration uses transposition packages in the field 
of transport, and especially in maritime policy, the MED was not part of one. 
In fact, only Denmark set up a transposition package for Directives 2001/53/
EC and 2002/75/EC.
French general elections shortly after the transposition deadline
During the French transposition process, between 10 July 2001 and 29 Janu-
ary 2002, no general elections were scheduled. Neither did the Minister of 
Transport change. However, 2002 was a super-election year in France with 
presidential elections on 21 April and 4 May, with elections for the French 
National Assembly on 9 June and 16 June 2002. The final date of elections 
was almost one year away in the quite distant future, from a transposition 
actor’s point of view. However, the first half of 2002, which included the last 
months of transposition process, was considered characterized by a paraly-
sis of France decision-making. Due to the numerous elections and predicted 
change of government, French policy-making was slowing down (IP11). With 
regard to Directive 2001/53/EC, the adoption of the French legal instrument 
occurred within the last months of the electoral campaigning, which could 
have fostered a timely transpose. The general election was set for spring 2002, 
and all draft legislation from the old parliamentary term had to be adopted 
by then. The principle of discontinuity states that all non-adopted legislative 
proposals have to be re-introduced at the beginning of the new legislative 
term. Therefore, according to this principle, the drafts had to be passed within 
the last months before the new, post-election government formation. In the 
end, President Chirac was elected, and the opposition centre-right coalition 
held majority in the parliament. The former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin left 
and with his resignation, the government reshuffled. On 7 May 2002, Gilles 
de Robien became new Transport Minister of France.
9.3.2.3 Crises:
No transport related accidents:
Between the six month period of the French transposition process of Directive 
2001/53/EC (10 July 2001 to 29 January 2002), there was no maritime trans-
port related accident taking place on French territory.
9.3.2.4 Preliminary findings:
Whereas the theoretical model would have predicted a longer delay for this 
case, the findings are ambiguous. The transposition time was only 6 months, 
which is short compared to the average 18 month deadlines set in transport 
directives, but on the other hand, normal for technical amendments agreed 
in comitology. The number of transposition actors was even higher than re-
ported in the statistical data, including next to the ministry of transport the 
French notified body (BV). Hence, the number of actors was comparatively 
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high, including the Ministry of Transport and the Bureau Veritas (French noti-
fied body). Moreover, the Directive left meagre room for member states to 
exercise discretion in interpreting its provisions.
Again in this case, the political priority attached to the Directive may help ex-
plain the timeliness of transposition across the member states. The political pri-
ority assigned to Directive 2002/59/EC was high. Two clear indications of its 
deemed importance are the role played by the French notified body (BV), and 
the specialization of the department in charge of implementing the Directive.
Although it is considered a second actor in the French transposition process, 
the Bureau Vertias (BV) has always had a considerable interest in extending its 
market share, and consequently its influence, on French policy-making in the 
field of maritime transport (IP10). Since the mid-1980s, BV had been prepar-
ing a text for a possible European directive, which, however, was not adopted 
until 1996. However, BV considered the certification of marine equipment ‘une 
arme terrible pour l’industrie’ (‘a terrible weapon for the industry’) (IP10) be-
cause the assessment of the body seeking notification determines if it is techni-
cally competent and capable of carrying out the conformity assessment proce-
dures in question. Furthermore, the notified body must also demonstrate the 
necessary level of independence, impartiality, and integrity. The notified body 
earns a lot of money with assigning certificates. It controls the certification of 
marine equipment for France. This is why BV has always had a strong interest 
in global maritime industry. Moreover, according to the interview partners, 
BV has always been very commercially aware, and has had strong relations 
with the government in order to guarantee its profits in the big maritime mar-
ket. In former times, it was the BV that controlled the policy making process. 
Table 9.24: Results of case study number four.
Transposition of 2002/59/EC 
in France
European directive related 
factors
Amount of discretion granted 
by the directive
No discretion of interpreta-
tion
Transposition time set in the 
directive
6 months transposition time
Form and method of 
national transposition 
process
Number of veto players Relatively high number of 
transposition actors
Package approach No package approach
Situational change of 
internal and external 
environment
General elections General election three 
months  after deadline 
(21.4.-16.6.2002)
Transport related accidents No maritime accident
145IntroductionTracing the process of four national transposition cases
Mr. Pinog, who had been the director for marine merchant in the Ministry of 
Transport, took over the head BV position in the mid- 1990s. His promotion 
to this seat granted informed communications between the government and 
the industry. Over the last few years, however, BV’s influence has diminished 
from being actively involved in all decisions in the area of marine equipment 
to equally shared competences among the ministry and BV. Currently, in ma-
rine equipment, a division of labour between the ministry and the BV is prac-
ticed. Whereas the safety matters are handled by the Ministry of Transport, 
BV deals with the commercial aspects of the directive. All interview partners 
confirm that this coordination among the two institutions work very well by 
guaranteeing short communication tracks and immediate coordination in a 
policy area which is both strategically powerful and profitable.
Another indicator of the high priority France assigned to maritime equip-
ment is the special civil servant assigned for the dossier. Whereas in the UK, 
for example, different departments are involved in the transposition of the 
MED (IP10) – which involves more time-consuming coordination among the 
actors – in France, there is only one person responsible for all aspects of the 
MED. Here, one finds ‘une addresse email spécialisée’ (‘a special email address’) 
set up for maritime equipment issues only (IP10). This specialization is also 
a rather unique phenomenon in French administration. All in all, it was the 
high priority attached to the marine merchant in French policy-making ex-
emplified by the special civil servant post and the considerable involvement 
of BV in French marine merchant policy-making that facilitated the MED’s 
problem-free and timely transposition.
9.4 Conclusion
The study has shown that the process tracing method is a helpful research 
tool. It uncovers the correlational findings and elucidates the causal mecha-
nisms explaining why member states miss their deadlines when transposing 
EU Internal Market directives. Moreover, it helps to clarify and correct for 
measurement errors and concept overstretch committed in large-n statistical 
analysis. It, for example, allowed controlling for first and last national imple-
menting measures since all four cases had been concluded by the end of this 
study. Representing two major transport sub-fields which account for over 
43% of the EU transport acquis, liberalizing and harmonizing types of direc-
tives alike, the four maritime and railway cases in this chapter advance our 
understanding of national transposition processes across member states in 
the EU. Based on official documents, EU legal data bases, press accounts, and 
interviews with stakeholders in the European and national policy-making 
procedures, the process tracing method directed this study to trace the four 
national transposition processes in three different member states in a very 
specific and, most importantly, theoretically informed way.
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Tracing back the processes of the French (98/55/EC) and Spanish (2001/1/
EC) on-the-line cases corroborates earlier findings and illustrates that the statistical 
model has some explanatory power. While both cases have been explained well 
by the statistical model, the case studies in this chapter clarify how the differ-
ent factors in rather complex national transposition processes work can cause 
delays of varying lengths.
On the other hand, process tracing further elucidates those cases that are off-
the-line, i.e. show higher values of deviance residuals. Focusing on the Ger-
man (2002/59/EC) and the French (2001/53/EC) cases, we obtained an addi-
tional explanation for those deviant cases. The case studies uncover an additional 
important factor in explaining transposition delay. We found that the political 
priority assigned to the transposition process seems to matter and might be a 
missing component causing the outliers.
In particular, for the German case, we found that despite a handful of crises 
– three maritime related accidents in German waters some years before the 
start of the transposition process, and one ecologically devastating accident 
on the Atlantic during the 20 months of the German transposition process –
Germany’s notification to the Commission was still one month delayed. In-
terview partners confirm that a maritime accident beyond German waters 
would not attract Germany’s attention or, thereby, accelerate the transposi-
tion procedures. Those three examples of loss at sea with a direct effect on 
Germany, however, had occurred too long ago to influence the German trans-
position process of 2002/59/EC. However, the Pallas accident in 1998 did 
influence the process. Interview partners confirm that, due to this accident in 
Germany’s own waters, another related Directive (1998/55/EC) was trans-
posed three months before the expiry of the deadline. However, in terms of 
time, the Pallas disaster was too distant in the public memory to have a direct 
impact on the German transposition process of Directive 2002/59/EC.
Furthermore, the general election of 22 October 2002 affected the priorities 
of the transport ministers’ political agendas. The election did not put a new 
ruling party in change the government. However, the minister for transport 
was replaced, and the position was enriched with an additional portfolio that 
attracted the new minister’s full attention and delayed the start of the trans-
position process at the beginning of his term. The elections had been won 
in the ‘east’ of Germany, after the hundred year flood and the government 
actions it aroused. The electorate in the east had given strong support to the 
ruling government. This same government had just promised emergency 
funds for recovery after the devastating flood that lead to the evacuation of 
37 towns and resulted in the largest natural-disaster mission in history of the 
German Armed Forces and the Technical Relief (Technisches Hilfswerk). There-
fore, during his first months in office, the new minister of transport, and special 
appointee for the new Länder, rather unassertively start the German transport 
policy, in general, and the implementation of EU directives, in particular.
147IntroductionTracing the process of four national transposition cases
The second outlying case further elucidates the importance of political prior-
ity for a swift and problem-free transposition process across member states. 
The high priority France priority assigned to merchant marine affairs can be 
viewed in two ways. On the one hand, we see the ministry of transport and 
the industry working together in a very productive way. While the assign-
ing of certificates is seen as ‘une arme terrible’ (‘a powerful weapon’) for the 
merchant industry, the notified body has been assisting in drafting French 
positions in EU negotiations and national policy-making. Helpful here was 
the exchange of high-level personnel between the two institutions. Also indi-
cating the high priority of this directive was the uncommon setup of contact 
points for marine equipment within the notified body as well as the minis-
try’s facilitating the exchange of information.
If political priority is indeed important for the timely transposition of EU directives 
and constitutes the missing component in explaining the unexplained vari-
ance in the two deviant cases, then we might have another look at the two 
well-explained cases to see how this factor plays out there. Whereas it is not 
so evident in the first French case, the Spanish case shows that political prior-
ity indeed mattered. Whereas the transposition process of Directive 2001/14/
EC caused media-wide discussions (IP4) about the separation of the Spanish 
railway operator and railway infrastructure manager, the Atocha attack on 
11 March 2004, left Spain in total paralysis for the subsequent months and 
condemned the transposition process to insignificance. Until the last week 
before the general elections, on 14 March 2004, the national implementing 
measure attracted considerable public attention, with unions demonstrating 
in the streets of Madrid, and autonomous regions filing a law case against the 
government. It is fair to argue that without the Atocha attacks, the govern-
ment would have remained in power and would have adopted subsequent 
legislation faster. The fatal incident, however, resulted in additional Spanish 
measures on safety and security that further delayed the process. Therefore, 
Directive 2001/14/EC was adopted more than two years after the set trans-
position deadline.
However, the current study requires more than a simple cross-check with the 
two well-explained cases in order to generalize the importance of political 
priority for the timeliness of national transposition processes across member 
states. This will be the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 10: 
Assessing the relative importance of 
necessity and sufficiency for timely 
transposition
‘When a member state fails to implement laws on time, everyone 
looses out. The playing field remains from level. And real opportunity 
for growth and jobs are lost.’ (Charlie McCreevy, European 
Commissoner for the Internal Market, 2006).
10.1 Introduction
Departing from the large-n statistical and supplementary small-n case study 
analyses this study argues that we still have to take one last step in order to 
round up the study on timeliness of EU transport directives. Furthermore, 
I argue that we need to address few remaining shortcomings of the four case 
studies. Two issues are of primary focus. First, the generalizabilty of the four 
case studies findings. Second, we do not yet know the relative importance of 
explanatory factors and combinations of variables in terms of necessity and 
sufficiency.
Having completed intensive study of the four case studies, the case study 
analyses identified political priority as an important missing variable. The 
finding’s Achilles’ heel is, however, that, for the moment, these four case studies 
are unable to support broad and well-bounded propositions. We must test 
whether the adjusted model is generalizable. Consequently, the final step re-
quires an additional concluding quantitative analysis in order to generalize 
the findings to similar cases that focus on the same unit of analysis. However, 
political priority is a very difficult variable to measure, although it has been 
tossed around by many EU scholars. It would surpass the study’s resources to 
generate the variable for 365 cases. Moreover, doing so may not even be necessary. 
Alternatively, a technique may help to deploy a reasonable test of the slightly 
adjusted model by using a smaller sample of cases; the technique should still 
apply binomial probability formula and calculating levels of significance. In 
short, the fuzzy set technique may be a prudent way to generalize findings. 
Existing regression and case study analysis in the field of transposition is con-
cerned only with either the effects of a cause or the causal mechanisms underly-
ing compliance with EU law driven by either quantitative or qualitative research 
design. But fuzzy set takes an intermediate step. It addresses the question of 
importance of the effects of the variables by asking under which assumptions 
a given casual factor and/or combinations of factors might be necessary or suf-
ficient for an outcome, in general, and transposition delay, in particular (third 
sub-question). Fuzzy set enables researchers to evaluate set-theoretic relation-
ships such as intersection and inclusion and, thereby, necessity and sufficiency 
(Ragin and Pennings, 2005: 425). It permits the identification of necessary and 
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sufficient conditions by means of the subset principle (Ragin, 2000; Goertz and 
Starr, 2002; Braumoeller and Goertz, 2000; Rihoux, 2006) which represent a 
‘core part of social science theory’ (Goertz, 2002: 65) such as the EU literature63. 
Finding factors to be necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome, the hypoth-
esis under consideration assumes that it (or a combination of factors) will exert 
its effect independent of all other factors and are present in all instances of 
an outcome.  Or to put it in regression terms, whether: Y= f(X1, X2, X3) or Y= 
f(X1*X2*X3) (or any combination of these three factors).
Hence, sitting directly between large-n and small-n studies, the fuzzy set 
technique provides a set of new tools for generalizing the case study findings. It 
also helps the analysis of the relative importance of the identified explanatory 
factors and configurations of conditions for timeliness of national transposi-
tion processes across member states. It is critically important to go this one 
step further, and undertake the two main challenges here.
In the following pages, this chapter represents the third main part of this study 
testing the adjusted theoretical framework on timeliness of national transpo-
sition models. After reviewing the fuzzy set literature in social sciences and a 
brief discussion about how the fuzzy set technique works, I present the data 
set and outline the ‘calibration’ of the outcome and the causal factors indi-
vidually. The results suggest that the case study findings can be generalized 
on a broader sample of cases. Next to three other variables political priority is 
indeed a usually necessary condition for timeliness. In addition, the study finds a 
sufficient combination of conditions whose significance will be discussed in 
the chapter’s concluding section. 
10.2 The Fuzzy set technique
Although the fuzzy set technique originates in the mid-1960s 64, scholarly 
work in the field of social sciences has been scarce and not existent in EU 
studies at all. Instead methodological discussions about the advantages and 
pitfalls of correlational causation have dominated the field of research (for an 
overview see Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006).
63 Deutsch, Burrell and Kann (1957: 58) found necessary conditions for an amalgamated se-
curity community. Sandholtz identifies two necessary conditions for international collec-
tive action to emerge in telecoms liberalization in Europe. Schimmelfenning argues that 
‘sharing a community of values and norms with outside states is both necessary and suf-
ficient for their admission to the organization.’ Another dominating argument is that veto 
players are a necessary condition for policy change (Tsebelis, 2002). See Goertz (2002) for 
an overview of 150 examples in the social science literature.
64 There are three other related techniques namely QCA (Qualtiative Comparative Analysis), 
multi-value QCA (MVQCA) and MSDO/MDSO which are presented in brief in Rihoux 
(2006). For a critique see: Lieberson (1992); King, Keohane and Verba (1994); Mahoney 
(2000).
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Only recent volumes and special issues in political science illustrate that the 
advantage of the fuzzy set technique is ‘no longer a claim made by a par-
ticular small group of comparativists, but it has materialized into firm and 
unique empirical findings, which warrant further investigation and applica-
tion’ (Ragin and Pennings, 2005; Rihoux and Grimm, 2006). Ragin’s (1987) 
discussion and his take on the causes of IMF riots (2000), in particular, have 
made a fundamental contribution to comparative social sciences. Cress and 
Snow (2000) stress the importance of organizational viability and framing 
activities for obtaining targeted outcomes by homeless social movement or-
ganizations while applying fuzzy set. When these conditions are present and 
occur in conjunction with political mediation, the particulars of which affect 
the types of tactics associated with successful outcome attainment, they find 
that the homeless SMOs are likely to have their greatest impact. Mahoney 
(2003; Katz, vom Hau, Mahoney, 2005) evaluates the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of fuzzy set analysis and regression analysis in explaining the 
‘great reversal’ in Spanish America.65 Whereas the fuzzy set analysis reaches 
substantively important conclusions about probabilistically necessary condi-
tions for economic development, ‘the regression analysis generates findings 
that are not meaningful’ (Katz, vom Hau and Mahoney, 2005: 567). The coef-
ficient estimates are unstable, and coefficient variances are high for several 
variables in almost every multivariate model specification. The explanation 
is in the advantage that fuzzy set techniques do not suffer from a small-n or 
degrees of feedom problem. Since each combination is reduced to a single 
value, each combination is, in effect, treated as a single case (Katz, vom Hau 
and Mahoney, 2005: 568).
Next to these sporadic empirical contributions applying fuzzy set technique, 
primarily two groups of scholars apply fuzzy set technique. Their particu-
lar focus within the field of social sciences is on either warfare or welfare. 
Whereas Goertz and Starr (2002), Levy (2002), and Schroeder (2002) focus on 
the outbreak of World War I, Goertz and Levy (forthcoming) edited a book in-
cluding causal explanations and case studies on the end of the Cold War. The 
welfare literature is grouped around Kvist (1999; 2004; 2006) and Pennings 
(2002), who apply fuzzy set technique on comparative welfare state research. 
Surprisingly, no fuzzy set approach has yet been applied to EU studies in 
general or EU implementation studies in particular.
65 From 1750 to 1900, the most marginal colonial territories often became the region’s wealth-
iest countries, whereas the most central colonial territories often became the region’s poor-
est countries. To explain this reversal, their fuzzy set analysis finds that strong liberal fac-
tions are probabilistically necessary for economic development ad that dense indigenous 
populations are probabilistically necesary for social underdevelopment (Katz, vom Hau 
and Mahoney, 2005: 539). More studies applying the fuzzy set technique can be found at 
www.compass.org/WPshort.htm.
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10.2.1 Advantages of the fuzzy set technique:
There are three additional benefits of using the fuzzy set. It reduces uncertain-
ty, identifies causality; and, finally, reveals necessary and sufficient conditions 
and specific combinations, that might otherwise be hidden by the traditional 
correlational techniques (i.e. regression).
Verkuilen (2005) argues that the fuzzy set approach can help reduce the un-
certainty in social science. Ambiguity sprouts from the multiple meanings of 
background concepts and from lack of firm concept boundaries. Furthermore, 
‘the fuzzy set logic presents a promising new tool for comparativists that can 
be used to reveal causalities’ (Pennings, 2003: 541). Häge (2005) shows that 
Niemann’s study (2004) on the conditions for communicative action can be 
improved by incuding precision and the validity of conclusions drawn from 
the empirical analysis. Finally, ‘the fuzzy set logic presents a promising new 
tool for comparativists that can be used to reveal causalities’ (Pennings, 2003: 
541). Pennings (2003) assesses the main variations in the constitutional con-
trol of the executive in 45 parliamentary democracies and how these differ-
ences can be accounted for. He identifies necessary and sufficient conditions. 
But, only fuzzy set analysis shows that the degree of constitutional control 
can be explained solely by a specific combination of institutional conditions 
stemming from the four dichotomies and not by one single dimension. 
These scholars further argue that fuzzy sets are useful for both qualitatively 
and quantitatively oriented researchers and that the qualities of fuzzy set 
theory warrant a more frequent use and application in social sciences. The 
fuzzy set technique constitutes a step away from large-n studies, and a step 
toward a more case study oriented research design. It shares one key charac-
teristic of qualitative analysis: the ability to fully account for the richness and 
complexity of individual cases, as well as the diversity across cases (Ragin, 
1987, 2000). The advocates of the fuzzy set technique argue that it maximizes 
the use of the scholar’s analytical and case knowledge and helps to translate 
this knowledge into numerical values that, at least, approximate meaningful 
degrees of membership (so-called calibration). It facilitates the identification 
of necessary and sufficient conditions and specific combinations of condi-
tions. Given the relatively small number of cases in existing studies (10-35), 
the advantage of the fuzzy set technique is that research using it can often 
achieve standard levels of statistical confidence (Lieberson, 1992; Pahre, 2005: 
131; Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006).  Hence, for the purpose of this study it 
will help to measure political priority in a ‘bigger than four’ sample of cases 
to generate concluding generalizable findings that explain the timeliness of 
national transposition processes.
But before I consider the fuzzy set technique’s application to the transposi-
tion discussion, this study will devote a few lines to outline how this tech-
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nique works. Discussed in the next section are the key issues that must be 
reported so as to guarantee validity and reliability in this diversity oriented 
technique.
10.2.2 The fuzzy set technique- How does it work?
In order to enable a multicausal explanation, the scores of the conditions (in-
dependent variables) and the outputs (dependent variables) have to be trans-
formed into so-called ‘fuzzy sets.’ They are ‘sets with elements whose mem-
bership grades can have any real value between 0 and 1’ (Pennings, 2003: 542) 
– no member and full member. The following value sets in table 10.25, with 
six levels of membership, will be used in the analysis:
In this sense, a fuzzy set can be regarded as a ‘continuous variable that has 
been purposefully calibrated to indicate degree of membership in a defined 
set’ (Ragin and Pennings, 2005: 424). For example, Berlusconi’s Italy might 
receive a membership score of 1 (full membership) in the set of rich countries, 
but a score of only .8 or .6 in the set of democratic countries. Determining 
whether it is .8 or .6 demands a very high degree of correspondence between 
the theory and the fuzzy set membership scores, in other words, precise 
boundaries between sets of memberships. 
The direct and active involvement of the researcher in the act of calibration 
leaves him or her open to criticism for choosing the wrong aspects, empirical 
indicators, empirical evidence, or qualitative breakpoints. These are called 
problem of wrong qualifications of elements (Kvist, 1999). Consequently, 
this membership assignment exercise is one of the sensitive points of much 
of fuzzy set literature. There are two criteria that are crucial in empirical re-
search, in general, and in calibration, more particularly. They are validity 
(measures must actually measure the concept), and reliability (measure must 
be reasonably reproducible). Fuzzy set studies have to devote time on a de-
tailed justification of the ‘calibration’. Fuzzy set technique outcomes can offer 
improvements to the reliability and validity of the correlational conclusions, 
even when there are no substantial changes made to the original quantitative 
results.
Table 10.25: Six levels of fuzzy set membership.
‘1’  = fully in
‘0.8’ = mostly but not fully in
‘0.6’ = more or less in
‘0.4’ = neither in nor out
‘0.2’ = more or less out
‘0.0’ = fully out
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10.3 Constructing degrees of membership of causal factors 
for transposition delay
10.3.1 Data set:
To generate generalizable findings and to test for necessity and sufficiency the 
sample selection and the construction of degrees of membership are crucial. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions are special kinds of hypotheses that oper-
ate relative to a threshold. They are especially common in studies that relate 
dichotomous variables to one another (Pahre, 2005: 132). As outlined previ-
ously, all fuzzy sets must identify full membership, non-membership, and a 
mid-value or breakpoint. Since calibration of cross-national data is time-con-
suming and resource intensive, it was necessary in this study to determine 
which EU directives and member states to include in the current study, and 
which to defer for future research.
Case selection
The selection of cases is dependent on the substantive and theoretical inter-
ests of the researcher (Ragin, 2000: 122). So in terms of testing the generaliz-
ability of the earlier case study findings we should randomly select national 
transposition processes from the EU transport transposition data set (1995-
2004) excluding the already four investigated cases. In terms of necessity and 
sufficiency, recent works argue that we should test necessary conditions by 
selecting cases by the dependent variable, but that the testing of sufficient 
conditions should be done by choosing cases based on the characteristics of 
the independent variables (Pahre, 2005: 131).
…of EU directives
This study opted for seven EU directives66. Covering all transport sub-sec-
tors, the chosen directives were all relatively recent in helping to generate a 
measurement for political priority. The further away in time, the more dif-
ficult it will be to trace back information from media and interview partners. 
66 The seven EU directives in include: 2000/30 Directive on the technical roadside inspec-
tion of the roadworthiness of commercial vehicles circulating in the Community; 1999/95 
Directive concerning the enforcement of provisions in respect of seafarers’ hours of work 
on board ships calling at Community ports; 1999/35 Council directive on a system of 
mandatory surveys for the safe operation of regular ro-ro ferry and high-speed passenger 
craft services; 1998/41 Directive on the registration of persons sailing on board passenger 
ships operating to or from ports of the Member States of the Community; 1996/67 Council 
Directive on access to the ground handling market at Community airports; 1996/50 Direc-
tive on the harmonization of the conditions for obtaining national boatmasters’ certificates 
for the carriage of goods and passengers by inland waterways in the Community; and 
1996/48 Council Directive on the interoperability of the trans-European high-speed rail 
system.
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The four directives were adopted in 1996, two in 1999, one in 1998, and one in 
2000. None of the chosen directives amend earlier EU directives. Instead, they 
represent a full set of new EU directives in the field of transport that control 
for the distorting effects of amending directives. New legislation represents 
an equal point of departure for all member states involved. While the cases 
vary on the outcome variables including political priority, the selected cases 
vary considerably on the outcome variable. They range from 67 weeks early 
transposition to 110 weeks delayed transposition, and reflect the overall per-
centage of statistical data set.
…of  member states
While varying both in the outcomes as well as the causal factors, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, and the UK were selected because they represent the five 
biggest and most important economies and industrial bases in the EU. They 
prioritize different transport sub-sectors due to their geographical character-
istics (see Transport Chapter). However, whereas Greece and the Netherlands 
would have a bias towards one particular mode of transport—maritime and 
inland waterwayss, respectively—it is in the large European economies that 
all five modes of transport have relatively similar shares, which makes the 
modes of transport more comparable in the seven selected cases.  Four of 
these nations have housed leaders (Spain and UK) as well as notorious lag-
gards (Italy and France) in the transposition of EU legislation before the last 
round of enlargement in 2005. Germany takes a middle position in terms of 
leadership.
In total, the data set represents a sample of the total population with 35 cases, 
which is a relatively big number compared to abovementioned fuzzy set ap-
plications in social sciences. Table 10.26 illustrates the crisp scores for the 35 
cases, as they can be found in the mother data base, on which the pervious 
multinomial logistic regression results are based. In order to translate the 
crisp scores of the dependent and independent variables into fuzzy set partial 
membership scores, information was derived mainly from Celex, Eurlex, na-
tional transposition data bases, official government websites of the selected 
five Member States, I went back to the case study material based on the annual 
review of national politics by the European Journal of Political Research, and the 
five major national newspaper archives, namely: The Guardian (UK); Le Monde 
(France); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany); Corriere della Sera (Italy) 
and El País (Spain). In addition, I placed phone calls with transport attachés 
from the Permanent Representatives of the five Member States in Brussles to 
finetune the membership scores and, in the special case of political priority, 
to gather additional information on the member states’ salience devoted to 
particular EU transport dossiers.
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10.3.2 Calibration:
... of the outcome
Starting with the outcome, we see that transposition delay is not just a meas-
ure with respect to the extent of transposition delay. Relying significantly on 
the interval data derived from the data set of the previous correlational tests 
presented in table 14, the fine-tuning of the membership scale for the depend-
ent variable makes the diversity of the outcome visible. Assigning six mem-
bership scores to the total of 35 outcomes in the crisp set, I argued that a delay 
of less than two weeks can still be considered ‘on time’, whereas a member-
ship score of 1 accounts for cases with delay of more than four years, which 
occurs in only 3.5 % of the total outcomes of the overall data set (13 out of 
367). The crucial threshold lies in the period between six and twelve months, 
which occurs in 12.3 % of the total number of cases (45 out of 367). Although 
interview partners confirmed some of the membership thresholds, the distri-
bution of cases plays some role. According to an outcome’s distribution the 
overall assignment of membership scores for the outcome is as follows: 0 to 
delays of less than 2 weeks, 0.2 for delays of less than 2 months, 0.4 of delays 
less than 6 months, 0.6 for delays of less than 1 year, 0.8 for less than 3 years 
and, 1 for all values above one year. Table 27 illustrates the fuzzy set partial 
membership scores and highlights the considerable variation of the outcome 
values. Scores of 0 occur 5 times. Sscores of 0.2 and 0.4 occur 10 times each. 
There are 3 scores of 0.6, and 7 scores of 0.8. But there is no score of 1.
... of the causal factors
Discretion/transposition time/veto players
Fuzzy set membership scores had to be assigned to all causal factors. First, I 
determine the amount of discretion allowed in the transposition of a directive, 
the transposition time set in the directive, and the number of veto players in 
the 35 cases. To accomplish this, I started again from the crisp set data used 
for the ordered multinomial logistic regression. I crosschecked the number 
of ministries involved and the type of the national legislative instruments 
used in transposition in order to determine a number of veto players. The 
interval data that accounts for the amount of discretion was further enriched 
by controlling for specific terminology in the EU directive that granted room 
for interpretation, such as ‘appropriate, sufficient, may, at last, if necessary 
…’. All 367 national implementation measures vary between 0 and 0.7. The 35 
measures that constitute the focus of this study were assigned to 1 of 6 fuzzy 
units. One is at 0, 1 is at 0.2, 10 are at 0.4, and 5 are at 0.6.  As an example of 
how discretion influenced the fuzzy set values, consider Directive 1996/67/
EC on access to the ground handling market at Community airports. This directive, 
which was valued at 0.6 in terms of discretion, leaves considerable amounts 
of discretion in 10 of its 25 provisions. Of the provisions, one makes the ap-
proval of ground handling activity at an airport, a job fulfilled by supplies of 
ground handling services, conditional. Approval in this matter is to be ob-
tained from a public authority figure that is independent of the managing 
body of the airport (Article 14). 
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Furthermore,
‘A Member State may, where appropriate on a proposal from the managing body of the airport, 
prohibit a supplier of ground handling services or an airport user from supplying ground handling 
services or self-handling if that supplier or user fails to comply with the rules imposed upon him to 
ensure the proper functioning of the airport. […]’ (Article 15 of 1996/67/EC)
Both articles provide examples for the generous amount of discretion guaran-
teed to the member states in Directive 1996/67/EC).
In terms of transposition deadlines, I assigned 0.2 to directives with a set 
transposition time between two days and six months. A membership score 
of 0.4 was assigned to transposition deadlines between six months and one 
year. A score of 0.6 was assigned to deadlines between one and two years. The 
value 0.8 is attributed to, for example, Council Directive 1996/48 on the inter-
operability of the trans-European high-speed rail system, which provides the rare 
occasion of a transposition time of almost 3 years. In only a few cases, direc-
tives are in force immediately after the adoption by the Council of Ministers 
and are assigned, in this study, a score 067.
Packaging/elections/accidents/political priority
The full beauty of the diversity oriented calibration technique, however, can 
be best appreciated by the use of the remaining causal factors, namely: pack-
age approach, timing of general elections, the occurrence of transport related 
accidents and political priority assigned to the specific dossiers. Depending 
on a transposition package’s size and the diversity across transposition deadlines 
set in the EU directives, the transposition method can have different effects on 
the process’ timeliness. The fuzzy set technique can account for this diver-
sity. Going back to the more limited number of cases enables me to compare 
the number of EU directives in a package and their respective transposition 
deadlines. Deadlines can vary between zero and two years making the fuzzy 
set technique a more refined measurement tool than statistical analysis.
As an example of the effects of the national package approach on directives, con-
sider the German legislative act 68 transposing Directive 1998/41/EC. The 
crisp set for both categories is ‘0’. There was no effect in terms of delay for 
either categories; the first directive in the transposition package or the last 
one. A closer look at the transposition package reveals that the German legis-
lative act transposed eight EU directives69 at once. In addition, the transposi-
tion deadlines across the directives differ by 29 months (2.4 years). Whereas 
67 Directive 99/48/EC: adapting to technical progress in approximation of law of transport 
of dangerous goods by rail.
68 Gesetz zur Anpassung der technischen und steuerlichen Bedingungen der Seeschiffahrt an den 
internationalen Standards (Seeschiffahrtsanpassungsgesetz) vom 09/09/1998, Bundes-
gesetzblatt Teil 1.
69 1996/40/EC, 1997/34/EC, 1997/58/EC, 1998/18/EC, 1998/35/EC, 1998/41/EC, 
1998/42/EC and 1998/55/EC.
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Directive 1996/40/EC had a deadline of 1 February 1997, Directive 1998/35/
EC did not have to be transposed before 1 July 1999. Since the transposition 
deadline for Directive 1998/41/EC is next to last, but still with a considerable 
difference of six months after the deadline of the first? directive (1 January 
1999), I assign a fuzzy set membership score of 0.6 in the category last directive 
in transposition package compared to a crisp set score of 0.
A look at the general election dates of the five member states assisted in the 
construction of fuzzy values that account for elections. Elections, in this study, 
are valued with consideration not only of the six months preceding or follow-
ing a general election, but throughout the whole national transposition periods 
as well; the change of transport ministers is also figured into the membership 
score. A general election that results in an almost unchanged coalition govern-
ment guarantees stability and continuity. But government change, and even 
a simple reallocation of portfolios within a legislative term, hampers stability 
and continuity. The lists of transport ministers for every member state helped 
identify those crucial mometns of minister change. For example, during the 
19 months Spanish transposition process (29 April1999 to 25 November 2000) 
of Directive 1999/35/EC on a system of mandatory surveys for the safe opera-
tion of regular ro-ro ferry and high-speed passenger craft services, Spain had one 
general election in the last six months of the transposition process. In Spring 
2000, the conservative ruling party (Partido Popular) won, as expected, with 
a 10% lead over the second ranked socialist party, PSOE (Partido Sociolista 
Obrero Español). Since the Aznar government stayed in power, I would have 
assigned a 0.8 instead of 1 to account for continuity and the high likelihood of 
Aznar´s second term. However, despite the stabilizing effects of the electoral 
outcome, the ruling government reshuffled the government portfolios. The 
transport ministry was assigned to the former Vice-Prime Minister and head 
of the Prime Minister’s office (Ministerio de Presidencia), Álvarez-Cascos. 
This reshuffling lead me to assign the value ‘1’. Note, however, that in 1999, 
only a few weeks after the adoption of the EU directive in Brussels, an earlier 
reassignment of the Spanish government’s portfolios had taken place, leav-
ing the transport ministry with a new minister, Arias-Salgado. The reshuf-
fle took place without a general election. Since there was no general election 
in the early months of Spanish transposition the crisp set value was set ‘0’. 
Accounting for the reassignment of the transport ministry during the early 
period of the legislative term, I assigned a membership score of 0.4, consider-
ing that a change in portfolio constituted a major break of continuity of Span-
ish transport policy-making, in general, and the starting of the transposition 
process for Directive 1999/35/EC, in particular.
In addition, the diversity oriented fuzzy set technique gives precision to the 
crisp set scores for the transport related accident variable. The large-n study 
allowed me to refer only to major accidents that were referred to in Com-
mission communications, and lead to various sets of packages of directives 
in the different transport sub-sectors (see transport chapter). The fuzzy set 
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technique, due to a smaller number (N=35) of cases, enables me to go back to 
the five major national newspapers and scan them in terms of major national 
accidents in the EU directives’ related sub-fields that may have attracted only 
national attention, but had an impact on the national policy-making process-
es. One example is the Ievoli Sun disaster before the British coastline in 2000, 
in which the ship lost 4,000 tonnes of styrene and bunker oil off Alderney, in 
the English Channel. Although this ecological disaster did not make it to the 
front page of the Financial Times, it attracted considerable media coverage in 
British newspapers (Guardian, 2000 a, b). Considering its devastating conse-
quences for the UK, in pariticular, this study assigned a fuzzy set member-
ship score for that particular transport related accident of 0.4. Twenty-four 
other crisp set values were determined accordingly.
Last but not least, the fuzzy set technique makes the assignment of member-
ship scores for political priority feasible. With a N=35, the number of cases is big 
enough to generalize its findings to the broader set of EU transport transposi-
tion process across member states. And at the same time, it is small enough to 
investigate for the salience attributed to EU directives in the national transpo-
sition contexts. Since this is the only conditions, which does not lean back on 
crisp set scores, I had to go start from scratch. Drawing on the findings of the 
Transport Chapter, feedback from the five national transport attachés guided 
the appreciation of membership assignments. While earlier findings of this 
study clearly shows that transport policy is characterized by national needs, 
shaped by the facts of economic geography, additional data provided by the 
European Commission will help to clarify and back up my decisions.
In case of the national implementing measures for Directive 2000/30/
EC on the technical roadside inspection of the road worthiness of commercial vehi-
cles circulating in the Community, for example, all five Member States scored 
relatively high. Whereas Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK score 0.8, only 
France’s value of .4 is comparatively low. While this general pattern is con-
firmed by the transport attachés, the Commission’s data complements this 
finding. Over the last ten years, international road haulage on national terri-
tory has increased considerably in almost all Member States, but France.
Table 10.28 displays that international road haulage on French territory has 
only increased at a meager 5% (European Commission, 2006). To the contrary, 
the figures for the other four countries show a much stronger increase – scor-
ing all above the EU average of (+11%). International road haulage has virtu-
ally boomed in Italy (75%), Spain (+56%), Germany (+36%) and to a lesser 
extent the UK (+11%).
Table 10.28: International road haulage on member states’ territories (1995-2005).
Member State France UK Germany Spain Italy EU average
Increase in % + 5% + 12% + 36% + 56% + 75% + 11%
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Since the Directive’s aim is to improve the safety and equipment of heavy 
commercial vehicles circulating in the Union by supplementing the annual 
roadworthiness inspections of a representative proportion of the heavy com-
mercial vehicles on Member States’ roads, it is evident that those countries ex-
periencing a considerable increase in international road haulage give higher 
priority to this dossier. Vehicles that prove not to be roadworthy as a result of 
a random inspection, wherever they are registered, may be exempt from free 
circulation. The idea is that these random inspections would rapidly improve 
the maintenance of the Union’s commercial vehicles and commercial vehicles 
from third countries that transit the Union.
But not only the considerable increase of international road haulage on Mem-
ber States’ territories, but also the relative number of accidents involving 
personal injury per year per 1000 population connects to the overall picture. 
Table 10.29 shows differences across the five Member States which confirm 
earlier findings on the different levels of political priority attributed to the 
roadworthiness of commercial vehicles.
Similarly, it is specific Member States’ interests in the field of safety opera-
tions of ro-ro ferry and high-speed passenger craft services that account for 
the varying scores for the five member states (Directive 1999/35/EC). Fol-
lowing two ship disasters of roll-on-roll-off passenger ships70 (Estonia, 1994 
and Express Samina, 2000) in the 1990s eight north European states immedi-
ately agreed to set up a higher standard for ship stability in what has become 
know s as the Stockholm Agreement. Specifically this agreement took into 
account the crucial effect of water accumulating on lower decks in the event of 
an accident which had caused a considerable number of fatalities in the Baltic 
and Aegean Sea. The eight states were, next to the Scandinavian countries, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, which score higher than the remaining 
three. Table 10.27 summarizes the fuzzy set partial membership scores for the 
outcomes and all causal factors.
70 Ro-ro describes a significant feature of a ship designed to carry wheeled cargo such as 
automobiles, trailers or railway carriages. This is in contrast to lo-lo (lift-on-lift-off) vessels 
which use a crane to load and unload cargo, i.e. cargo must be winched abroad.
Table 10.29: Number of accidents involving personal injury per year per 1000 
population.
Member State Germany UK Italy Spain France Average EU 15
Nb. of accidents 
per 1000
population
4.7 4.1 3.7 3.6 2.0 3.4
Source: European Commission (2001: 197).
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10.4 Four necessary and one sufficient combination of conditions
The first step in testing necessary and sufficient conditions for timely trans-
position is to discriminate whether the dependent and independent condi-
tions are present or absent in each of the cases (subset principle). Generally 
speaking, a condition is necessary if its membership scores are consistently 
lower than the degree of membership in outcome. X is a necessary condition 
for Y if Y is a subset of X. A condition is sufficient if its membership scores are 
consistently greater than the degree of membership in the outcome. Because 
necessity is not sufficient, the condition is not always present when the out-
come has the same value.
10.4.1 Necessary conditions:
Normally it is important in any analysis to first test for necessary conditions 
before examining sufficiency, especially when there is ‘limited diversity’ (log-
ically possible combinations of causal conditions lacking empirical instances) 
(Ragin, 2000: 131). There are two options: First, to visualize the scatter plots 
showing the distribution of the 35 cases along the output and all conditions 
individually and in combination; second, to run an analysis which calculates 
levels of significance for all nine conditions. Although, in our case, with a 
N=35 it makes sense to run a significance test, I would like to briefly lay out 
with an example how to visualize necessity.
Figure 10.8, for example, illustrates the distribution of cases in a two-dimen-
sional plot with the outcome (length of transposition delay) on the y-axis and 
the necessary condition ‘transposition time’ on the x-axis. In a perfect plot for 
necessary conditions we would expect all cases to be on or below the diago-
nal. Cases in the lower right-hand corner of the plot are directives which have 
considerable time to transpose but, nevertheless, do not delay considerably. 
From the evidence in the figure, it is reasonable to conclude that membership 
in ‘transposition time set in the directive’ is not fully necessary and sufficient 
for membership in ‘transposition delay’. Ten cases lie above the diagonal. 
The key is to understand that when fuzzy membership scores in the outcome 
are less than or equal to fuzzy membership in the cause, then it is possible 
to argue that instances of the outcome are a subset of instances of the cause 
(Ragin, 2000: 217).
While we are interested in finding necessary and sufficient conditions for 
transposition delay, the above-mentioned example indicates that the follow-
ing confinement has to be acknowledged. Since ‘fully necessary’ or ‘fully suf-
ficient’ causation is rather rare, i.e. all the cases together either lie above or 
below the diagonal, it is helpful to adopt a benchmark at which a given factor 
can be considered usually necessary or usually sufficient.  In this study, I test
causal factors and their combinations as ‘almost always necessary’ and ‘almost
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always sufficient’ conditions. This test requires a causal factor or combina-
tion of factors to be necessary or sufficient at a score above a 0.65 benchmark. 
Hence, this study seeks to specify factors that are necessary or sufficient for 
outcomes more than 65% of the time. Another procedure to address random-
ness is statistical significance. Given a relative large number of cases (35), the 
significance level is set at .05 for 29 and more cases, and .01 for 31 and more 
cases (Ragin, 2000: 114). As in the above-mentioned example, now, the length 
of the transposition time set in the EU directive appears to be usually neces-
sary – with only four cases lying outside the diagonal range. In addition, I use
a binomial probability formula to calculate levels of significance. To compute 
the abovementioned findings, this study relies on the FS/QCA software pack-
age (Ragin and Drass, 2002). 71 Table 10.30 shows the presence and absence of 
causal conditions and outputs for the 35 cases.
71 Due to the fact that I will use two procedures to account for randomness, I will not ad-
dress the problem of imprecise measurement by adding an adjustment factor – even if this 
adjustment shifts the line separating consistent and inconsistent cases in a more lenient 
direction.
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Figure 10.8: Scatter plot showing the distribution of the 35 cases along the condition 
‘transposition time’ and the outcome ‘length of transposition delay’: Necessity. 
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In total, table 10.30 identifies four significant ‘usually necessary’ conditions, 
but no single sufficient conditions:
The transposition time set in the directive adopted by the Council of Ministers 
is a ‘usually necessary’ condition but not a sufficient condition for member-
ship in delayed transposition. Moreover, it is significant on the .01 signifi-
cance level. This underlines, again, that a directive-specific feature helps to 
explain transposition delay. The transposition time set in a directive, which 
is agreed upon in Brussels, has an undeniable influence on the future trans-
position process. For example, whereas the 1996/48 Council directive on the 
interoperability of the trans-European high-speed rail system guaranteed about 2.5 
years for the transposition, 1998/41 Directive on the registration of persons sail-
ing on board passenger ships operating to or from ports of the Member States of the 
Community allowed only 6 months for implementation. Given that the aver-
age transposition time set in EU transport directives decreased until early 
2000 (Kaeding, 2006), and afterwards increased continuously, it is possible 
to explain the better performance of member states in recent years– a trend 
which is referred to in the latest Commission scoreboards (2005)—in terms of 
increased deadlines.
General election at end of a transposition period is also a ‘usually necessary’ 
condition, but is significant only at the .05 level. Accounting for general elec-
tions, in general, and also for the change of transport ministers’ portfolios, 
in particular, this study shows that in 83 % of the membership scores for this 
condition are consistently lower than the degree of membership in outcome.
Table 10.30: Results of fuzzy set test: Necessary conditions.
Proportion of cases
Causal Factors Case >= Length of 
transposition delay
Case <= Length of 
transposition delay
Granted transposition time 0.86 (**) 0.46
Amount of discretion 0.49 0.57
Veto player 0.46 0.54
First directive in package 0.34 0.74
Last directive in package 0.74 0.64
General election at the beginning 0.57 0.43
General election at the end 0.83 (*) 0.57
Transport related accident 0.83 (*) 0.51
Political priority 0.82 (*) 0.49
Note: The level of significance for all proportions > .65 is listed in parentheses. ** significant 
at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level.
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Transport related accidents across member states are a ‘usually necessary’ con-
dition for timely transposition. For example, during the transposition of the 
railway Directive 1996/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-European high-
speed rail system, Germany experienced a tragic ICE accident on 3 June 1998. 
A vessel caused the deaths of about 100 passengers in Enschede, an accident 
that was caused by lack of adequate controls and an overstressed wheel.72 
Although the Directive does not foresee any harmonization of security check 
standards, it does argue the necessity to ensure interoperability in the fields 
of infrastructure, energy, control-and-command, and signaling and rolling-
stock (recital 12). Germany notified its ministerial order73 on 20 May 1999, 
six weeks (fuzzy set membership score: 0.2) after the deadline set in the Euro-
pean directive (8 April 1999).
Last but not least, the level of political priority attributed to the legal dossier is 
an ‘usually’ necessary condition for timeliness of national transposition proc-
ess across member states.
10.4.2 Sufficient combination of causal conditions:
Making an interim balance, the study identifies four usually necessary con-
ditions, but no single sufficient ones. But when no single causal condition 
is sufficient, researchers anticipate the finding that different combinations 
of causal conditions are sufficient for the outcome (Ragin, 2000: 130). Suffi-
ciency of a combination of causes reads that the cause in question always pro-
duces the outcome in question. To assess sufficiency of causal combination, 
the researcher examines the cases conforming to the combinations and evalu-
ates whether they agree in displaying the outcome in question (Ragin, 2000: 
132). Exploring any logically possible combination of causal factors this study 
discloses one usually sufficient combination of conditions: ‘general election at 
the end’, ‘transport related accident’ and ‘political priority’.  The evidence shows
that membership scores in the combination of these causal conditions, not 
general election at the end, not transport related accident and not political 
priority, are less than or equal to membership scores in the outcome. The scat-
ter plot showing the relationship between fuzzy membership in the causal 
combination and fuzzy membership in the outcome is presented in figure 
10.9.
72 The steel tire of the wheel in question had been fragmented by stress. Before that hap-
pened, a fissure of the wheel from the center outward had occurred. This fissure could 
have been detected, had there been a control procedure, but such a procedure was not 
used by the Railway company (www.railfaneuope.net/ice/eschede.html).
73 Verordnung über die Interoperabilität des transeuropäischen Hochgeschwindigkeitsbahnsystems 
(EIV), BGBl I 1072.
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The upper-triangular plot shown in Figure 10.9 is a direct reflection of the fact 
that membership scores in the fuzzy set‘ are less than or equal to member-
ship scores in the fuzzy set ‘timely transposition’. When membership scores 
for the combinations of conditions are high, membership scores for ‘timely 
transposition’ must also be high because the causal combination is sufficient 
for the outcome. To summarize, Figure 10.9 supports the argument that the 
combination of general election at the end/transport related accident/politi-
cal priority is a usually sufficient for timely transposition.
10.5 Summary and discussion – To what extent does the fuzzy set 
technique improve the earlier findings?
To address the generalizability of empirical findings derived from the case 
study analysis in chapter nine the fuzzy set technique has proven very help-
ful. Next to the testing of the empirical model (including the political priority 
variable,  with a broader sample (N=35) of cases), it allows the researcher to 
provide a clearer picture of national transposition processes. The fuzzy set 
technique also enables researchers to address questions of necessity and suf-
ficiency for single variables and for combinations of conditions that are too 
often ignored in traditional analysis.
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Figure 10.9: Scatter plot of ‘timely transposition’ against ‘general election at the end/
transport related accident/political priority’: Suffi ciency.
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Clearly, the fuzzy set technique enriches the conclusions reached by prior re-
gression and case study analyses. It is not only that the fuzzy set technique 
allows one to learn more out of the data; it sheds more light on the black box 
of the transposition processes in member states. Indeed, there is no single 
cause by itself capable of producing the outcome. It is neither election cam-
paigns nor a change of government per se that even affects the possibility of 
a swift transposition. But, general elections that are scheduled towards the end of 
a transposition process, or the simple reshuffling of the ministers’ portfolios 
on short notice do seem to delay transpositions. More nuanced measure-
ments for transport-related accidents across member states further stressed 
that accidents require responsive decisions from the states’ incumbent deci-
sion-makers. In addition, the political priority assigned to EU dossiers needs 
careful consideration. No priority hampers timely transposition, i.e. an issue 
given no priority will invariably be transposed late. 
Furthermore, the fuzzy set approach clarifies transpositions by translating 
language into numbers. Timeliness which represents a source of vagueness 
has been very difficult to pin down to one concrete indicator. In addition to 
being vague, this term has important qualitative boundaries. We can recog-
nize cases or definite problems of timeliness, between which there is continu-
ous variation. So, eventually, the conception of variables in terms of fuzzy set 
membership provides a way to operationalize and typologize phenomena 
that sticks closer to theoretical discourse (Goertz and Mahoney, 2005; Rhioux, 
2006: 691). This concluding analysis demonstrates how fuzzy sets can per-
form a more precise operationalization of theoretical concepts. The fuzzy 
set technique, for example, is well-equipped to manage the vagueness of the 
concept of timeliness (‘on time’) for a larger-n analysis. The statistical analysis 
has uncovered that delay seems not to be simply delay and that separating 
out the outcome between short and long delay seems to be a useful strategy. 
In turn, fuzzy set has permitted a ‘more nuanced representation of categori-
cal concepts by permitting degrees of membership in sets rather than binary 
in-or-out membership’ (Ragin and Pennings, 2005: 425). Like terms such as 
democracy, support for political violence, poverty, national transposition 
processes can be timely to some degree, as could a nation be developed or un-
equal (Verkuilen, 2005: 463). One can generally recognise cases of definitive 
delay, between which there is continuous variation. If one’s goal is to explain 
differing levels of development in a specific group of cases, ‘fuzzy set analysis 
usually works best’ (Katz, vom Hau, Mahoney, 2005: 569).
Lastly, the results of the fuzzy set analysis of the theoretical framework point 
to further empirical refinements. Following Verkuilen (2005) I agree that 
fuzzy set theory provides a useful and tractable way to address relationships 
that are too often ignored in traditional analysis: the relevance of single con-
ditions and combinations of causes. While there is no significant single suf-
ficient condition (which is not surprising since it is probably impossible to 
identify conditions sufficient for any social outcome), this study identifies 
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four ‘usually necessary’ conditions: the transposition time set in the direc-
tive, the political priority assigned to the dossier, the occurrence of general 
elections at the end of the transposition process, and transport related acci-
dents. According to the definition of necessity, these four factors exert their 
effects independent of all other factors, and are present in all instances of an 
outcome. Whereas transposition actors can influence the first two conditions 
on the European and national level, the scheduling of general elections and 
the occurrence of transport related accidents lie beyond their policy-making 
space. If political leaders can manipulate these first two conditions, then they 
may be able to minimize transposition problems. Furthermore, the combina-
tion of general elections at the end of a national transposition process with a 
transport-related accident on its territory, and high political priority attribut-
ed to the EU legislation by itself produces timely transposition. It represents a 
sufficient set of conditions for timeliness.
All in all, this concluding analysis has round up and underlined the advan-
tages of a combined approach. Quantitative studies are needed in order to gen-
eralize, formulate hypotheses and identify outliers. Case studies help further 
to assess the plausibility and strength of observed statistical relationships be-
tween variables and unveil missing values. But it is the fuzzy set technique, 
in a third step of analysis, that can be best viewed as ‘an additional item in 
the old kit bag we already own’ (Verkuilen, 2005: 492). For the purpose of this 
study, the fuzzy set technique was valuable in generalizing the case study 
findings. Futhermore, it allowed us to ask under which assumption a given 
causal factor or a combination of conditions might be necessary or sufficient 
for the timeliness of national transposition processes across member states.
Last but not least, the final part of this study will begin with a summary and 
discussion of the findings of the different sets of analysis. It will address the 
question as to what extent this study addresses the shortcoming of the exist-
ing EU implementation literature. In a later step, the empirical and methodo-
logical implications for future studies in the field are assessed. 

Part IV
Summary of fi ndings, 
conclusions and outlook

Chapter 11: 
Summary of findings, conclusion 
and outlook
‘The European Council underlines the importance it attaches to 
Better Regulation at national and European level as a core element 
in achieving the goals of the Partnership for jobs and growth and 
urges all institutions and the Member States to implement their 
respective commitments.[…] The European Council recalls that 
better regulation is also a matter for Member States to implement in 
their domestic law-making and in the transposition of Community 
law and reaffirms its commitment to making progress in all of these 
areas.’ (Presidency Conclusions 23/24 March 2006, p.22 indent 61 
and 62).
The purpose of this book was to find out why delays are so common in nation-
al transposition processes, where member states are supposed to configure 
ways to implement policies handed down by the European Commission. To-
ward this goal, it was necessary to comprehensively review current literature 
on EU implementation studies. A close look was given to the development 
of EU transport policy from 1957 to the 2006 mid-term review of the White 
Paper on European transport policy for 2010. Next, an actor-centered theoretical 
bargaining framework on the timeliness of national transposition processes 
of EU law was expounded upon. Then, aggregate data were presented and 
studied and endorsed by four, highly scrutinized, case studies. The fuzzy set 
technique closed the loop and completed the analysis, conceding equal space 
to large-n, small-n and fuzzy set methodologies.
My ambitious goal in this area was to contribute a meaningful and informa-
tive piece of work to the existing field of implementation literature. This final 
chapter draws together the most important elements of the study’s academic 
relevance which are mainly twofold: empirical, and methodological. First, it 
summarizes the main empirical findings. Following this is a discussion of the 
generalisability of the data on national transposition processes of EU trans-
port directives. And second, this chapter presents the methodological contri-
bution of the book, focusing on the potential added value of mixed-method 
research designs in social science, more generally, and EU implementation 
studies, in particular. Moreover, it is argued that there is a strong necessity for 
cumulative data in EU studies, a relatively young field of research with con-
siderable potential in terms of data triangulation. In completion, I summa-
rize the findings below in the course of discussing their relevance for think-
ing about transposition processes and compliance issues specifically and its 
societal consequences more broadly. Implications for more thoroughly un-
derstanding the causal dynamics underlying the transposition outcome in 
light of broader national and European  discourses are discussed.
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11.1  Empirical contribution
11.1.1 The European Union has a serious transposition problem
Above all, the study illustrates that the EU has a serious transposition prob-
lem. The empirical findings suggest that problem in transposition processes 
occur in almost 66% of all national implementing measures. Furthermore, 
seven driving factors invariably influence the timeliness of national trans-
position processes of European legislation. They can be arranged into three 
groups: European-level, national-level, and crisis-related variables. Tardiness 
can result from particular circumstances in any of these groups.
• Transposition delay is common:
The EU 1995-2004 transport transposition data offers new evidence that the 
EU has a transposition problem. 47 percent of national implementing mea-
sures have been notified late to the Commission, of which 70 percent recorded 
delays of more than six months, with a maximum delay of 4.8 years. The time 
length of missed deadlines varies significantly between member states and 
between transport sub-sectors. Furthermore, the mean and median transpo-
sition delays across member states indicate that ‘delay’ is not a simple, but 
instead a complex entity.  Whereas the median of the 367 national implement-
ing measures lies with zero months, the mean is 6 months. This denotes that a 
number of national implementing measures have considerable transposition 
delays, a finding that was paramount in later analyses.
• Gold-plating is common:
Yet, it is not only the commonness of tardy transposition that raises major con-
cerns about efficient and effective policy-making. Following the discussion 
of ‘gold plated’ EU legislation in EU member states which is embedded in 
the broader EU better regulation discourse (for example the Davidson Re-
port in the UK, 2006), the picture is even worse.74 Not only late transposition 
but also early transposition is problematic. Early transposition requires national 
businesses to adapt to new legislation before their European counterparts, 
an action that may lead to a competitive disadvantage in the Single Market 
(Stephen, 2004). The EU 1995- 2004 transport transposition data uncover that 
20 percent of the national implementing measures had been in force more than six 
months before their deadlines. In the end, not only a 47 percent of the national 
implementing measures jeopardize the effectiveness of the internal market 
because of its tardiness. No, in sum, almost 70 percent of all national legal mea-
sures transposing the EU transport acquis in nine member states, cause problems,
74 A gold plate is any burden placed on national businesses that is not strictly required by the 
original EU directive. In other words, anything beyond the minimum requirements neces-
sary for meeting a directive can be considered gold plate (Bellis, 2003; Ambler, Clittenden 
and Obodovski, 2005).
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either because they are transposed too late, risking the opening of an infringe-
ment proceeding, or because they are too early, risking warping effects on the 
regulatory environment for business and citizens in the EU alike.
All in all, the EU has a transposition problem, both in terms of delay and over-im-
plementation – a problem which has yet not found its way into the scholarly 
debate. Next to the Commission scoreboards and the ECJ infringement data, 
both of which represent rather conservative measures of the transposition 
problematic in the EU (Börzel, 2003; Mbaye, 2001), this new data is much 
more reliable.
In line with the second round of implementation data in the field (Masten-
broek, 2003; Berglund et al., 2006; Haverland and Romeijn, 2007; Kaeding, 
2006) this book has also provided some progress regarding the conditions 
under which transposition performance of member states could be improved. This 
progress is in the identification of seven potential European and national driv-
ers and constrainers for timely transposition. These factors should especially 
interest those people in power, because some of the drivers and constrainers 
may have a bearing on underlining that better regulation is ‘also a matter for 
Member States to implement their domestic law-making and in the transposi-
tion of Community law’ (Council of the European Union,  2006: 22).
11.1.2 Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU:
• Policy design and implementation affect each other
Focusing on EU transposition delays, this study identifies three sets of cat-
alysts for policy change (see table 11.31). In line with the implementation 
studies from the 1970s (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 178), this study, in 
particular, shows that we must not separate policy design from implementa-
tion. That is, we consider European directive specific characteristics as well 
as national transposition instrument features; we also recognize the different 
effects on the timeliness of national transposition processes. Differentiating 
between policy design- related (European-level), policy implementation- re-
lated (national-level) and crises-related, the study argues that each set has a 
different impact on the dependent variable: timeliness. It seems that serious 
delays, those longer than six months, are homemade in the capitals of member states. 
The specific features of European directives, on the other hand, especially their techni-
cal aspects, account for short term delays: those of six or less months. Crises, which 
are understood as sudden situational changes of the internal or external envi-
ronments, account for both short and long delays. In this sense, this study agrees 
that ‘implementation should be part of design’, suggesting that policy theory is for-
mulated ‘with a view toward execution’ (Pressman and Wildawsky, 1973: 189).
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• Transposition delay is caused by legal, administrative and political factors
Furthermore, the study has illustrated that transposition is more than just a 
legal or administrative process run by civil servants in public administrations. 
Next to legal and bureaucratic practices and procedures it is politics that matter. To 
put it differently, this study has shown that ‘implementation is the continu-
ation of politics by other means’ (1973: 189) (to paraphrase a famous Clause-
witz dictum), so to say the continuation of ‘who gets what, when, where, and 
how’ (Lasswell).
EU-level factors causing short delay (< 6 months) – 
Policy design related
– Transposition time constraints
Administrations must always act under time constraints, regardless of 
whether administrators like them. The fact that administrations are obliged 
to act within a legally fixed periods compels them to improve their co-ordi-
nation and organization to respect deadlines (Gil Ibánez, 1998: 165). From 
the equally important legal point of view, time constraints are required by 
the principle of legal certainty. This study has found that the transposition 
time set in the directive is significant and, moreover, the deadline is usually a 
necessary condition for apt transposition. Furthermore, the importance of a 
generously set transposition deadline is clear. In the German case (case study 
3), it was discussed that the EU Directive 2002/59/EC guaranteed a com-
fortable 18 month deadline, compared to the average transposition time of 
13 months for maritime directives. Interestingly, as interview partners have 
uncovered, apparently, the deadline could be traced back to the Commission. 
It was especially the ‘Commission’s colloquial approach towards member 
states’ (IP12) that allowed  member state’s to raise concerns and thereby in-
Table 11.31: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU.
Factor Effect
Policy design related 
(European-level)
Transposition time constraints
Delays < 6 months
Problem of discretion
Policy implementation 
related 
(National-level)
Political priority
Accelerating and retarding effect
Election timing 
Number of transposition actors Delays > 6 months
National transposition package 
Crisis related Transport related accidents Accelerating effect
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fluence the content and  the transposition deadline considerably. Substantial 
consultation efforts by the Commission, hence, guaranteed that the deadlines 
imposed on member states could sufficiently reflect the internal constraints 
of those states, i.e. decentralized political structures. The right to be heard in 
the national context means that the prescribed transposition time should be 
long enough to allow member states to: ‘present an available defense, consult 
the central, regional, or local public entities involved, co-ordinate the admin-
istrative actions of the different entities involved, and confirm or rebut every 
piece of evidence presented by the Commission’ (Gil Ibánez, 1998: 196).
More surprisingly, despite their great significance in national policy-making, 
there is no clear rule about how transposition deadlines should be deter-
mined. It is the Commission’s job to set the transposition deadline in a pro-
posal sent to the Council and Parliament. This starts the European legislative 
process. Here, however, much depends on an individual civil servant in the 
Commission to gather information about national member states’ potential 
problems with the draft proposal. The transposition deadlines, then, are often 
integral parts of the negotiation process (Häge and Kaeding, 2007).75
Transposition deadlines receive different levels of consideration, varying 
from case to case. The Commission, being part of the recently valorized im-
pact assessment studies (Renda, 2006), may first make an evaluation of the 
transposition’s complexity by conducting a tour d’Europe. Then, after this tour, 
a deadline will be imposed. More complex cases require longer time-limits. 
Interestingly, this study’s figures, covering the early 1980s until 2004, display, 
however, that since the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, the average guaranteed 
transposition time has steadily decreased from 18 to 13 months. Despite the 
84 percent increase in numbers of directives to be transposed over the years 
(Wessels, Maurer and MIittag, 2003: 46-47), the average transposition time 
agreed upon in the Council has decreased by 24 percent (Kaeding, 2006). 
Thus, in periods of high legislative output, all things being equal, transposi-
tion delays seem inevitable.
– Problem of discretion
Discretion is a difficult concept to define in general terms. Discretionary 
power may be defined as the margin of freedom granted to an administration 
to take action; power is granted, explicitly or implicitly, by the law. Discretion 
depends on several factors, such as: types of rules, a member state’s legal 
culture, and the social and personal values and traditions that surround the 
75 The recently adopted energy efficiency directive illustrates this point nicely. Whereas the 
Commission proposal foresaw a one year transposition deadline, the member states draft-
ed their common position with a deadline set for two years. The EP disapproved, contend-
ing that two years was too long a deadline for such an urgent issue. Ultimately, the Council 
and the EP agreed on a one year deadline, but added derogation arrangements for some of 
the directive’s provisions.
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relevant person or organization (Gil Ibánez, 1998: 199). The statistical analy-
sis shows that the level of a member state’s discretion in transposing an EU 
directive is a significant positive indicator for short delays. The Spanish case 
(case study 2) highlights the potential problem with a relatively high level of 
discretion. While European Directive 2001/14/EC left considerable leeway 
of interpretation to the member states, it resulted in a ‘wait and see’ attitude 
in the Spanish transport ministry and railway body. Before taking any trans-
position actions, the Spanish watched and consulted other member states’ 
transport ministries and railway companies ‘to see which interpretation was 
pursued’ by them (IP6), and later to finally cut their own path.
Despite what EC law, and some ECJ case law, says, it is clear that some degree 
of national discretion is unavoidable. Since the Commission does not have 
enough resources to control them, member states have a lot of discretion in 
the day-to-day applications of transposition. In other words, member states de 
facto already have a wide discretion in enforcing EC law. It should be taken into 
account, however, that national enforcers can sometimes be better placed than 
Commission officials to assess the optimal level of discretion, and to recognize 
the problems of enforcement and application of Community law. In fact, it may 
be said that Commission action reduces the capacity of national governments 
to respond to divergent and changing problems with appropriate flexibility. 
On the other hand, if member states do not respect the goals of EC law, then 
they could risk future restraints in discretionary power (Gil Ibánez, 1998: 25). 
Whatever either side contributes, the Commission and member states must 
strike a balance of power to determine suitable levels of discretion.
National-level factors causing long delay (> 6 months) – 
Policy implementation related
– Political priority
When a directive is attributed with high political priority, timely transposition 
is a natural outcome. With the assumption that cabinet ministers behave as 
perfect agents of their parties and are able to act as virtual dictators in the pol-
icy areas they control (Laver and Shepsle, 1996), this analysis showed that it is 
the ministers who assign levels of priority to the transposition process. While 
coalition governments, which rule in 18 of the 25 member states, provide con-
siderable discretion to ministers in drafting legislation (Gallagher, Laver and 
Mair, 2001; Laver and Shepsle, 1994; 1996),76 it is the minister in charge of the 
relevant department who presents the policy proposal at cabinet, giving him 
or her a privileged position in the policy area in question (Gallagher, Laver 
and Mair, 2001: 56). Ministers set the government agenda in their policy (Mar-
76 One-party government in the EU-25 include: UK (Labour Party), Malta (Partit Nazzjonalis-
ta), Spain (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), Greece (Nea Dimokratia), Sweden (Social-
demokratiska Arbetarepartiet), France (Union pour un Mouvement populaire) and Portugal 
(Partido Socialista) (www.parties-and-elections.de).
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tin, 2004; Martin and Vanberg, 2004; 2005; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) and, 
consequently, ministers have considerable control over the length of the na-
tional transposition process and over the transposition outcome in particular.
Political priority represents a significant usually-necessary condition for time-
liness because it denotes a change in the usual order of things in the political 
realm. That is, under special circumstances, the political priority of transpos-
ing a directive is unusually high, for any number of reasons. But, sometimes 
directives simply do not garner much priority – for electoral, economic and 
strategic reasons.
This analysis  showed that the most important concern for ministers is pleas-
ing their electorate. The Spanish and German cases showcased ministers 
who were involved with priorities other than transposing directives. The 
Spanish transport minister, Magdalena Alvarez, extended the reflection time 
needed after the Atocha bombings by one year, in order to also consult with 
the stakeholders affected by the railway reform. Because Álvarez was in-
debted to these stakeholders for helping her and her party group to win the 
elections, she prioritized their needs and put the transposition of Directive 
2001/14/EC on the backburner. Ultimately, because it was not high in politi-
cal priority, the directive was transposed two years late. In the German case, 
the 2002 elections gave the newly appointed minister of transport, Stolpe, an 
added portfolio –  that of a special appointee for the new federal Länder. This 
new portfolio attracted most of his attention because it had special meaning 
on the heels of the devastating hundred-year flood. It was  the flood afflicted 
new German Länder that tipped the scales in favor of the ruling socialist-
green government. After efforts in this area, Stolpe had little time to focus 
on the transposition of Directive 2002/59/EC. Low in priority, the directive 
was ultimately transposed one month late, despite the Pallas accident on 
German waters that was still strong in sentimental and political presence at 
the transport ministry.
Besides electoral concerns, economic and strategic considerations also influ-
ence the priority assigned to a particular transposition procedure. This was 
evident in the second French case study. In 2002, Directive 2001/53/EC was 
set for transposition by a ministerial order, which called for the involvement 
of the transport ministry and the notified body (Bureau Veritas). This directive 
had the unwavering attention of both departments, for it was considered a 
‘terrible weapon for the industry’ (IP10) of the marine equipment industry. 
The notified body controls the certification of marine equipment for France 
which makes it a powerful and profitable organization. For obvious reasons, 
Directive 2001/53/EC was given a very high political priority.
The third case study, however, illustrates how rapidly a political and eco-
nomic issue can be buried in oblivion. Despite the ecological disaster caused 
by the tanker Erika in December 1999 breaking in two 40 miles off the coast of 
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Brittany (France) and spilling about 10,000 tones of heavy fuel, the Commis-
sion had to initiate legal proceedings against ten member states for failure of 
compliance with the Erika I package that had been adopted by the Ministers 
of transport in December 2001.  Only Spain and France who had been directly 
affected by the ecological disaster adopted national implementing measures 
for the Erika I package ahead of time – six months and five months respective-
ly. The reason for the delayed action by the other member states can be found 
in the lack of political priority attached to the dossiers by the administrative 
apparatus headed by the minister. A minister’s signature on a directive, however, 
‘should be a firm commitment’ for a swift and problem-free transposition process and 
not just ‘a vague aspiration’ (McCreevy, 2005).
– Election timing and change of minister
Election timing is another strong indicator, and a necessary condition, for 
the timeliness of national transposition processes. In line with Smith and 
Stam (2004: 125) who argue that election timing affects both the outcome of 
elections and the government’s subsequent performance, this study sees a 
relationship between the timing of general elections and transposition per-
formances of member states. Depending on whether an election falls at the 
beginning or end of the fixed transposition period, the national transposi-
tion process is either retarded or accelerated. The argument is that ministries 
and agencies are bound by the legislative program for the whole year, or 
sometimes even an entire legislative term. In Denmark, for example, because 
of the way the parliamentary year is organized, all bills must be dealt with 
within one and the same parliamentary year. All outstanding bills must be 
withdrawn, and then submitted again in the new year (Mandrup, Raudi and 
Pennings, 2002: 6).
Furthermore, the fuzzy set techniques unveiled that it is not simply the tim-
ing of general elections but specifically the reshuffle of minister portfolios 
that matter because electoral campaigns or major government crises affect the 
national transposition records. Linking ministers’ resignations with transpo-
sition performance, this study showed that before a minister resigns, open 
files are sought to be closed. Alternatively, a new minister and his or her en-
tourage require a period of vocational adjustment before business-as-usual 
can take off.
So, elections, in general, and government reshuffles77, in particular, acceler-
ate transposition processes that are already in their last months. However, for 
transposition processes that have only just begun, elections and government 
reshuffles actually yield a delaying effect.  For example, the Spanish legisla-
tive act transposing Directive 2001/14/EC was introduced near the end of the 
77 For push and pulls of ministerial resignation see, for example, Fischer, Kaiser and Rohlfing 
(2006).
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Aznar government on 17 November 2003. However, the national transposing 
instrument was not to come into force before 18 May 2004 – six months later 
– which is referred to as the so-called vacatio legis. Hence, the Aznar govern-
ment never got around to enforcing the instrument before the general elec-
tions in March 2004. With the change of government, it was the responsibility 
of the newly elected party, and specifically of the newly appointed transport 
minister, to transpose the directive. By the time the new minister learned the 
ropes, Directive 2001/14/EC had been on the backburner for a long time. In 
the end, the national transposing instrument for Directive 2001/14/EC was 
selected on 18 May 2004, two years after the deadline.
– Coordination problem (Number of veto players)
The analysis corroborates earlier findings in the field (Haverland, 2000; 
Giuliani, 2003; Treib, 2003; Steunenberg, 2006) that the number of veto play-
ers affect implementation outcomes. Depending on the type of legal instru-
ment chosen to transpose a directive, the numbers of ministries involved dif-
fers, as does the requirement of the parliament’s approval, and so on and so 
forth. Legislative acts, for example, which rank highest in the hierarchy of 
legal instruments, are lengthy processes. Some studies argue that in some 
countries, parliament may be hesitant to cooperate with a legislative act if 
not consulted at an early stage (Krislov et al., 1986: 80). Since there is such 
variation, the speed of the national transposition processes can be affected in 
many ways. The first French case (case study 1) exemplifies the importance 
of the number of national transposition actors. Whereas all signs pointed to a 
swift and problem-free transposition, the large number of ministries directly 
involved in the ministerial order ultimately retarded the final adoption of the 
French transposing measure by several months.
Earlier public policy scholars, who wrote in the 1970s and 1980s, have shown 
that ‘problems of coordination and communication are to be expected when 
the implementation of a statute involves the participation of several imple-
menting agencies with varying degree of commitment to the achievement of 
statutory objectives’ (Mazmanian, and Sabatier, 1981: 13). In addition, recent 
evaluations of national administrative models for implementing EU legisla-
tion (Kassim, 2005) argue that the number of veto players is a reoccurring 
but unavoidable (because legally enshrined) problem. Another unavoidable 
problem is this of ‘Chinese walls’ – a metaphor referring to the practice of 
making sure that preparation and transposition divisions of ministries and 
across ministries are kept apart so that information does not circulate free-
ly and to prevent conflict of interests (From and Stava, 1993: 65; Ciavarini 
Azzi, 2000; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001: 447) – is a reoccurring but unavoidable 
(because legally enshrined) problem. More specific, in France, for example, 
although compulsory hearings and consultations of interest groups cannot 
change any text of the national legislation, they cause considerable delays. 
This is because these institutionalized meetings are very infrequent, and ad-
ministrations may have to wait a long time before one actually occurs. For 
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example, the special committee Commission spéciale des installations nucléaires 
de base secrètes and the Agence française de la sécurité sanitaire des aliments meet 
only once a year (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005: 116). On average, delays 
caused by the infrequency of advisory committee meetings are between three 
and six months (Philip, 2004).
– Occurance of national transposition  package
Member states often use one national implementing measure to transpose 
a handful of EU directives at the same time, in what is known as a national 
transposition package. Member states commonly use transposition packages 
to implement EU directives that cover similar policy issues to reduce redun-
dancy and complexity. The package approach, however, affects the timeliness 
of the notification of national implementing measures to the Commission. 
Depending on the number of EU directives included in the package, and the 
parameters of their different deadlines, the package approach has either a 
significant delaying affect, or a significant accelerating affect.
This study qualified national transposition packages as a significant usu-
ally necessary condition for the fast transposition of the last directive in a 
package. Furthermore, two out of four of the case studies in this research 
illustrated the relevance of the package approach in affecting the timeliness 
of transposition. In the German case study (case study 3), the German min-
istry of transport transposed four European directives, whose transposition 
deadlines differed between 25 months, with one national instrument. In the 
end, the decision to apply a transposition package caused a considerable 
delay for the first measures in the package (almost 15 months), but had a 
speeding effect on the last directive in the package (about 1 month). The first 
French case study highlights the delaying effect of the first EU directive in 
the package (3 months delayed), and the accelerating effect of the last direc-
tive (8 months early).
But because of the characteristics of a national transposition package, par-
ticularly its size and the difference between deadlines, matter, we are not able 
to say, for example, that using one invariably produces late transposition of 
the directive with the earliest deadline. As a case in point, in the Spanish case 
study (case study 2), it was shown that although railway policymakers trans-
posed three railway directives with one legal instrument, no effect whatso-
ever was found to affect the timeliness of transposition. This was because 
all three EU directives went into the package with the same transposition 
deadline.
From a broader point-of-view, however, the national package approach defi-
nitely distorts the regulatory framework in which businesses operate. Ac-
cording to the Commission’s simplification policy (2005) that ensured that EU 
legislation is ‘clear, understandable, up-to-date and user-friendly’, national 
rules must also be addressed. In doing so, it is thereby important to acknowl-
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edge the  distoring effect of national transposition packages for the timeliness 
of national transposition processes in particular and the regulatory environ-
ment which affects the competitiveness, growth and employment perform-
ances in general. Generating a high quality of regulatory environment with 
legal certainty for consumers and business requires simplification of national 
measures falling under the responsibility of the member states. The problem 
with national transposition packages is, however, that the number of direc-
tives included are applied arbitrarily. National transposition packages, in 
terms of a high quality of the regulatory environment, appear counterpro-
ductive.
– Effects of external shocks
Events that, quite suddenly, drastically change the external or internal envi-
ronments affect the political, cultural, economic, and legal climates of member 
states. Over the last two decades, the relationship between crises and reform, 
in particular, has found its fervent advocates in economics (Drazen and Grilli, 
1993) and political science literature (Almond, Flanagan and Mundt, 1973; 
van Waarden, 2006). For the purposes of this study, another important factor 
accelerating the national transposition process is transport-related accidents.
The accelerating effect of national transport-related accidents
In terms of national transposition processes, transport-related accidents 
occur in two dimensions: time and space. They occur before, during, or after 
a transposition process, and they occur either near or far from national soil. 
The timing of a transport-related accident is, of course, important. Events 
that occur during a transposition process invariably accelerate transposi-
tion times; critical junctures (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) in which existing 
policies come under pressure may even ‘jeopardize their self-evident legiti-
macy and de-institutionalize governance ‘(Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius, 
2005: 122-123). But the more important variable of crises is where they occur. 
Transport-related accidents on national soil are usually necessary conditions 
for swift and problem-free transpositions. This is because such crises require 
immediate reactions from political actors in a particular member state.  Win-
dows of opportunity, such as these, must be taken (Keeler, 1993; Kingdon, 
1995; Cortell and Peterson, 1999) to affect policy change; like general elec-
tions, crises make it possible for the government elites to reshuffle an action 
that would have not been politically feasible in normal times. If a crisis hap-
pens near national soil, it strongly accelerates transposition times. Even if a 
crisis occurred years ago and, was near national soil, it can and does have the 
effect of speeding up transposition. In combination with high political prior-
ity and an election set at the end of the transposition period, the combination 
of conditions represents a sufficient factor for timeliness.
Consider, for example, the case study of the German transposition of EU di-
rective 2002/59/EC. This directive was about a Community vessel traffic 
monitoring and information system. Two crises were linked to this trans-
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position process. The first was an ecological disaster of Galacia, Spain that 
occurred during the transposition process. The second was also an ecologi-
cal disaster, but it occurred much closer to Germany, in the North Sea, about 
four years before the transposition process of 2002/59/EC. Despite the facts 
that the Galacia accident attracted lots of German media attention and was so 
pertinent to directive 2002/59/EC, it had no effect on the timely completion 
of the transposition process. It was, instead, the 1998 Pallas accident in the 
North Sea that expedited Germany’s transposition of EU directive 2002/59/
EC. By all accounts, and despite a four year time-lag, the Pallas accident, so 
close to German soil, was still very present in administrators’ minds. The ac-
cident was referred to by all of this study’s German interviewees.
11.1.3 To what extent will our findings on the national transposition processes of 
transport policy generalize to other EU policies?
In the past, studies in the area of EU implementation have focused on envi-
ronment and social policy. But, since I wanted both to broaden the implica-
tions of my research and to look at a somewhat ignored but theoretical inter-
esting area, I opted to study transport policy. Besides being another area that 
represents the dominant regulatory nature of EU policies, the transport sector 
simply deserves more attention.
Little is known about EU transport policy. In political science and public ad-
ministration edited volumes that cover a wide variety of EU policy processes, 
information about transport policy is poignantly amiss (Wallace, Wallace and 
Pollack, 2005). Therefore, this study started from the beginning. It explored 
the development of EU transport policy and the five transport sub-sectors, 
and this exploration, in turn, informed  the case study selection and time-
frame for this analysis. The uncovered five-fold characteristics of EU trans-
port policy (recent, gradual, uneven, complex, and crisis-driven), then, guid-
ed the theoretical framework for apt transposition.
Furthermore, there is almost nothing exceptional in the transport case that 
would make the study’s findings non-generalizable to other policy areas. 
The European-directive specific and national legal instrument specific vari-
ables all hold for the different domains of EU policy-making where we find a 
considerable number of directives (for an overview of EU legislative output 
see Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht, 2005: 298). Only regional aid does not 
dispose any directive, whereas the numbers of EU initiatives in all other EU 
policy areas range between 1 (international relations and foreign aid) to agri-
culture and fishery (484), sectoral business relations (650) and common mar-
ket (890). Transport (121) claims the middle-field with environment (193) and 
with social policy (178). In terms of the crisis component, most policy areas 
are also endued with internal or external situational changes, a trick that ‘cre-
ates in the minds of the incumbent decision-makers of a state a perceived 
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threat from the external environment to the basic values to which to which a 
responsive decision is deemed necessary’ (Brechner, 1977: 32). Money and fis-
cal policy are vulnerable to financial market crises, like we have experienced 
in East Asia in 1997-1998 and its disastrous consequences for Europe, crises, 
like those experienced in East Asia in 1997-1998 and its disastrous conse-
quences for Europe. However, crises in, for example, the field of environment 
and consumers’ protection (BSE, SARS…) are very much present in peoples’ 
mind. 
Lastly, from an empirical point of view, the Lisbon goals, drafted in 2000, were 
intended to make the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
driven economy by 2010’. Transport policy may differ in economic, numeric, 
and organizational terms from other industrial sectors, but it is definitely 
crucial to understand in order to achieve the ambitious Lisbon goals on eco-
nomic competitiveness and employment. If your transport system does not 
work you cannot move goods around the country/Union and you will not be 
economically viable. A fundamental catalyst for the fulfillment of these goals 
until 2010 is the timely transposition of EU directives – not only to meet the 
ambitious goals, but to appear credible. This study of the transport area does 
not cover the entire range of European policies. But, it does identify and stress 
those systematic aspects of regulatory policy that are heuristically significant 
in all EU policies.
11.2  Methodological contribution
In order to initiate a more valid and reliable account of transposition varia-
tions across member states in the EU, this research combined two assets for com-
parative social research. Both are methodological in nature. The first goal was 
to answer the research question about: determinants of transposition delay, 
the causal mechanisms lying beneath them and necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for transposition delay. In order to increase the model’s strength of 
inference and robustness, this study followed Lieberman’s guide (2005) for 
carrying out a combined research design, which is often found in behavioral 
sciences (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003), but which has hardly been applied in 
EU implementation studies. While statistical analyses guided the case selec-
tion and provided direction for more focused case studies and comparisons, 
it was also used to provide, thereafter, an additional test of the adjusted the-
oretical model generated from small-n research. The second asset concerns 
data. In line with Denzin’s (1978) term ‘triangulation,’ which involves com-
bining data sources to study the same social phenomenon, this study relies 
on different sources of data and adds to existing data in the field (Gabel, Hix 
and Schneider, 2002). In the end, this book follows a truly mixed-method ap-
proach, incorporating multiple approaches in all stages of the study, namely: 
the research question, data collection and inference.
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11.2.1 ‘Dictatorship of the research question’:
In an ideal world, the paradigmatic position of the researcher would not de-
termine what design will be used in a study. And, the selection of methods 
would not be made before the research question is formulated; a method 
would be chosen on the basis of it being the best way to answer the question. 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) refer to the ‘dictatorship of the research ques-
tion,’ which, however, requires scholars to use research tools for a variety of 
research questions, such as the one driving this study.
The study was driven by the three sub-questions: what, how and to what extent. 
The first research question of my study was what determines transposition de-
lays in member states? To best address this question, the statistical analysis of 
the quantitative data analysis (ordered multinomial logistic regression) un-
covered the effects of explanatory variables on the timeliness of the national 
transposition procedures of legal instruments. The second research question 
was how do these determinants influence the timeliness of national transposition 
processes? The third research question was about the relative significance of 
the single effects and combinations of them. These last two questions were 
mainly answered by the process-tracing efforts for four case studies and fur-
ther tested by the middle-range-n fuzzy set technique.
This analysis presents an alternative way to understand the transposition prob-
lematic across EU member states by leaving aside the qualitative/quantitative divide 
in the field. Whereas scholars have applied either quantitative (Mbaye, 2001; 
Bursens, 2002; Giuliani, 2003; Mastenbroek, 2003; König, Luetgert and Mäder, 
2005; Borghetto, Franchino and Giannetti, 2006; Perkins and Neumayer, 2007) 
or qualitative research tools to explain EU implementation outcomes (Knill 
and Lenschow, 1998; Haverland; 2000; Héritier et al., 2001; Falkner et al., 2005; 
Berglund, 2007), this study makes a call for combined designs. Starting with a 
regression- based method focused primarily on the problem of estimating the 
independent effect of each variable included in the analysis in the outcome I 
continued with process-tracing of four case studies – representing well-ex-
plained and deviant cases. Four comparative advantages make case studies 
almost ‘a part of a social scientist’s complete armamentarium’ (Yin, 1993: xi), 
namely: (1) great potential for achieving high conceptual validity of depend-
ent and independent variables; (2) strong procedures for fostering new hy-
potheses; (3) value as a useful means of closely examining the hypothesized 
role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and (4) capacity 
for addressing causal complexity. It is the case study based on earlier statistical 
findings that provides greater in-depth analysis, in which cases are more easi-
ly comparable, and causal mechanisms of the national transposition processes 
(microfoundations) are more clearly elucidated through process-tracing.
However, the case study method also has its Achilles’ heel. Specifically, ‘it suffers 
from the inability to support broad and well-bounded propositions, it tends 
to lack representativeness, and causal effects and probabilistic causal relations 
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cannot be estimated’ (Franchino, 2005: 250; George and Bennet, 2005; Gerring, 
2004). In order to examine the extent to which the previous findings were unique 
to the initial four cases, or relevant to a wider group of cases, therefore, I applied the 
diversity-oriented fuzzy set approach. It helped shed additional light on the cor-
relational and small-n analyses in this study. If we can observe a strong cor-
relation in one set of data, then, it is far from certain that the same correlation 
will be observed in other data. Only if one assumes that regularities remain 
unchanged into infinity, the approach is a valid inference. Political priority, a 
variable derived from the case study analysis, has remained a significant vari-
able explaining the timeliness of national transposition processes.
In addition, the fuzzy set technique offers some interesting alternative when 
one is confronted with coding problems linked with dichotomization. The 
conception of variables in terms of fuzzy set membership (Ragin, 2000) pro-
vides a way to operationalize and typologize phenomena that stick closer 
to theoretical discourse (Rhioux, 2006: 691). Indeed this study demonstrated 
how fuzzy set can be used to perform precise operationalizations of theoreti-
cal concepts such as timeliness. In line with the findings of Katz, vom Hau 
and Mahony (2005) it enriched the conclusions reached by prior analysis 
while focusing on necessity and sufficiency and combination of conditions.
However, fuzzy set should not be used in isolation. It is in combination with 
large-n and small-n studies that the fuzzy set research technique can resolve 
problems related to the quantitative and qualitative approaches, such as: au-
tocorrelation, multicollinearity, selection bias, heteroscedasticity, and idio-
syncrasy (Pennings, 2002). So, fuzzy set is a compatible technique and can be 
combined more systematically with other techniques. Surprisingly, the fuzzy 
set methodology has not yet been widely addressed in EU research.
To summarize, mixed strategy designs added ‘breadth or depth to our anal-
ysis’ (Fielding and Fielding, 1986: 33) by increasing ‘scope, depth and con-
sistency in methodological proceedings’ (Flick, 1998: 230). Different vantage 
points, provided by the mixed method, allowed a fuller and more complete 
picture of the phenomenon concerned. It was, for example, not only the oc-
currence of national general elections, but also the reshuffling of government 
portfolios that hampered timely transposition. The identification of a correla-
tion established that a relationship exists between general elections at the end 
of a national transposition process and the timeliness of the latter. But unless 
we understand the underlying mechanisms that caused it, we would have 
not known how the variable affects the other. In this respect, despite some 
limitations of the fuzzy set methodology (for references see Rhioux, 2006), the 
debate on implementation performance of member states in the EU profited 
from the capacity of fuzzy sets ‘to capture the causal patterns behind complex 
and vague phenomena which remain largely invisible or are even misrepre-
sented when conventional quantitative and qualitative approaches are used’ 
(Pennings, 2002: 18).
190 Chapter 1Chapter 1
Ultimately, this study is in line with Lieberman (2005) that the mixed-method 
approach is particularly well suited to cross-national analysis, where investi-
gators tend to be interested not only in general patterns but also in the analy-
sis of specific country cases. In this respect, the mixed-method design was 
further developed, especially by combining information from different data 
sources to understand the same phenomenon.
11.2.2 ‘Who is afraid of cumulative data?’ 78
As a relatively young polity, however, the EU has until recently offered only 
few ready-made empirical resources, such as extensive databases, available to 
scholars. It has been noted that, ‘although the study of EU politics has devel-
oped considerably, we still lack scientific maturity in the key area of data accu-
mulation and integration … few research communities [in the many areas of 
EU research] have built a common data set that is sufficient to advance knowl-
edge’ (Gabel, Hix and Schneider, 2002: 482). Generally speaking, ‘European 
integration studies have found it difficult to produce cumulative research’ 
(Hooghe, 2001: 1).
This study is a good example of several pioneering projects across EU imple-
mentation studies that have begun to further develop the vastly untapped, 
but collectable or collected, EU data (Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2005; EUP 
special issues in 2005 and 2006). To address the concern of missing system-
atic collected data on EU politics, this study provided a collection of different 
data sources that accumulate knowledge about EU politics, in general, and 
national transposition processes across EU member states, in particular. The 
exercise is part of the second round of quantitative studies in the field, whose 
intention is to improve the quality of existing EU implementation data.
This study opted to focus on only recent cases of EU national implementation 
instruments in the area of transport. In doing so, it covered almost ten years 
(1995-2004) and nine member states, namely: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK. Despite highly theo-
retically relevant for this study, about some of these states, little work had 
been done in implementation research before.
Furthermore, this study conducted data triangulation, which is the use of 
multiple cross-checked sources. For the statistical analysis, information about 
the EU transport directives was taken from the official legal EU databases – 
Celex and Eurlex. To compare and control for the quality of the existing EU 
data, each Transport Ministry in the nine Member States was contacted. From 
them, a full list of transport acquis from their national transposition databases 
was obtained. These lists dated back to the very first directive, which helped 
78 Gabel, Hix and Schneider (2002)
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me compile an almost complete data set.  In order to translate the crisp scores 
of the dependent and independent variables into fuzzy set partial member-
ship scores, information was again derived mainly from Celex, Eurlex, and 
national transposition databases. Also, information was added from official 
government websites of the selected five Member States, from the annual re-
view of national politics by the European Journal of Political Research, and from 
five major national newspaper archives, namely: The Guardian (UK); Le Monde 
(France); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany); Corriere della Sera (Italy); 
and El País (Spain). The data for process tracing included, in addition to afore-
mentioned EU legal data bases, information from press accounts, European 
official documents, and interviews. Information about negotiation phases 
were found in Prelex. Information on the timing of national elections and the 
change of transport ministers were again found in the annual political data 
provided by the European Journal of Political Research. Information on national-
level transport related accidents was studied through content analysis (Krip-
pendorf, 2004) of newspapers. For cross-checking purposes and the procure-
ment of additional data for these theoretical informed case studies, a total of 
thirty interviews in Brussels and in different member states were conducted 
between January 2003 and November 2006.
11.3  The outlook
As it stands, this study attempts to address some shortcomings in the existing 
transposition literature while representing another step in improving existing 
knowledge in the field of EU implementation studies. For future studies that 
build on its results and aim at understanding the transposition of EU legisla-
tion and Europeanization more generally, two elements in particular deserve 
attention. Based on the study’s findings, the first element relates to the theo-
retical framework used to model national transposition processes; the second 
centers around issues of research design.
From a theoretical point-of-view, the EU implementation literature will bene-
fit from attempts like this to theorize and research the role of domestic politics
(Treib, 2003; Steunenberg, 2006; 2007) and administrations (Knill, 2001;
Hille and Knill, 2006) on the process of implementation. A more theory-
guided evaluation of the different stages of the implementation process 
will help further strengthen our understanding of EU implementa tion, in 
general, and its efficiency, efficacy and efficiency. Scholars (Falkner, Causse
and Wiedermann, 2006) have shown that adapting to EU law willremain
a EU-wide ambition, at least on the level of the statute books, including
the new member states after the 2004 enlargement where the transposi-
tion of EU legislation remains dead letters instead of becoming living
rights (Treib and Falkner, 2007). Whereas here the effect of domestic op-
position on timely transposition is mediated by a member state’s cul-
ture of implementation, studies will further profit acknowledging that 
policy design as well as policy implementation related variables matter. 
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Inspired by the 1970s public policy implementation studies and in line with 
the recent implementation study by Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber (2005) 
this contribution argues that the link between the adoption phase and the subsequent 
implementation phase is crucial; i.e. that ‘implementation should be part of design’ 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 189). Explanations of implementation out-
comes should consider, among other things, policy design related factors.
While, until recently, regulations and directives have been the dominant policy 
instruments in the EU, new modes of EU governance  that are not based on leg-
islation have increased in salience in European policy-making (Héritier, 2003; 
Caporaso and Wittenbrinck, 2006). The newly adopted open method of coor-
dination, for example, which is applied in a number of EU policy fields (Borrás 
and Jacobsson, 2004), entails clear procedural mechanisms; it also includes a 
high-level of political participation, including the monitoring phases, and in-
volves more mutual commitments and peer pressure mechanisms, where po-
litical priority palys an important role.  Future studies comparing implementa-
tion patterns in hard and soft law traditions will need to engage in an intricate 
web of politics, economics and law. European Community law virtually cries 
out to be understood by means of interdisciplinary, contextual approach to law. 
Explanatory factors will be by nature administrative, legally and political motivated.
Last but not least, this study is somewhat forward-thinking in relation to 
the relatively young EU research community. From a methodological point-
of-view, and in line with a relatively large number of studies in social and 
behavioral sciences in general (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003), this study has 
shown  that the use of a mixed-method design (Lieberman, 2005) may im-
prove results of simple mono-strand designs. In order to answer the initial 
questions about the timeliness of national transposition processes, this contri-
bution subjected the theoretical framework to a battery of tests, including or-
dered multinomial logistic regression, process-tracing and fuzzy set analysis. 
In addition, it has sought to use as wide a variety of existing and new evidence 
as possible by accumulating existing data. It is important for the quality and 
scope of the implementation debate that not only the data, but also the meth-
ods that are used to analyze them, are as adequate.  The results of the efforts 
are promising, and may strongly encourage EU scholars to consider moving 
beyond methodological dichotomies and leave some of the cut-and-dried 
opinions behind. To date, little effort has been done to accomplish this. Particular 
attention may be paid to the fuzzy set methodology, a research technique that has been 
widely applied elsewhere, but may be still an underestimated treasure for EU studies.
In any case, in terms of an ever important European project, and before we 
get lost in translation, it is time again to go full steam ahead in response to 
the challenges of EU law. After transposition, as generally known, is before 
transposition, with a European Commission having just issued 111 additional 
internal market directives in 2004 and 89 in 2005 79 respectively.
79 I am greatful to Dimiter Toshkov who provided the data.
Samenvatting
Betere regelgeving kan niet worden bereikt zonder serieuze aandacht voor 
de omzetting van EU recht naar nationale wetgeving. Dit boek analyseert de 
punctualiteit van nationale transpositieprocessen en behandelt de volgende 
hoofdvraag: Waarom missen lidstaten deadlines bij het omzetten van EU richt lijnen 
voor de interne markt?
Het boek is op te splitsen in vier delen. Het eerste deel introduceert de lezer 
met hiaten in de bestaande EU implementatie literatuur, en met de belang-
rijkste kenmerken van het EU transportbeleid. Het tweede deel kenschetst de 
transportsector en legt daarmee de grond voor de toepassing van het actor-ge-
richt theoretisch kader. Doel hiervan is om het verloop van transpositieproces-
sen te verklaren. Deel drie is gewijd aan de analyse van het onderzoek. Hierin 
wordt allereerst gepresenteerd hoe de kwaliteit van de bestaande EU data ver-
groot kan worden. Vervolgens wordt nauwgezet ingegaan op de problema-
tiek rondom de implementatietekortkomingen. Met behulp van kwantitatieve 
en kwalitatieve data worden de in het theoretisch hoofdstuk geformuleerde 
verwachtingen met betrekking tot de punctualiteit van nationale transpositie-
processen getoetst. Een grote-n analyse wordt gevolgd door vier casestudies 
die de eerdere bevindingen verder uitwerken en een belangrijke missende fac-
tor aanwijzen. Vervolgens test de zogenaamde ‘fuzzy set technique’ de hypo-
theses die voortkomen uit het grote-n en kleine-n onderzoek. Deze techniek 
maakt het mogelijk om de relatieve significantie van enkele of een combinatie 
van omstandigheden beter te meten. Het vierde deel van deze studie vat de 
bevindingen samen en zoemt in op hun bijdrage aan de weten schappelijke 
discussie en hun bredere implicaties voor betere regel geving in de EU.
De vier genoemde delen worden in dit boek in elf afzonderlijke hoofdstuk-
ken besproken. Na een inleiding en eerste hoofdstuk, geeft hoofdstuk twee 
een kritische evaluatie van de bestaande literatuur die op het theoretische, 
methodologische en empirische vlak relevant is voor deze studie. Het legt de 
grote problematische kenmerken bloot van de literatuur over implementatie 
van EU regelgeving: ad-hoc, weinig verklarende kracht bezittend, deterministisch, 
kortzichtig en bevooroordeeld. In het bijzonder omarmt dit hoofdstuk de recente 
inspanningen van de zogenaamde ‘derde golf’ implementatiestudies. Deze 
stroming onderzoekt de rol van de binnenlandse politiek op implementatie-
processen om duidelijkere voorspellingen te kunnen genereren die empirisch 
getest kunnen worden. Deze studie bouwt op deze recente verbeteringen en 
voert deze door ten aanzien van de theoretische, empirische en methodologi-
sche tekortkomingen van de voorgaande EU-implementatiestudies.
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Hoofdstuk drie richt zich vervolgens op de historische ontwikkeling van het 
EU transportbeleid. Na een bespreking van de politicologische literatuur op 
het gebied van EU transportbeleid presenteert dit hoofdstuk het instituti-
onele landschap op EU-niveau met betrekking tot het transportbeleid. Het 
integratieproces op dit terrein kan gekarakteriseerd worden als recent, gelei-
delijk, ongelijk, complex en crisisgedreven. De inhoud van het huidige EU trans-
portbeleid is het resultaat van (a) de verschillende uitbreidingsronden van de 
EU, (b) veranderingen in de benadering van de Commissie met betrekking 
tot transport, en (c) een aantal crises dat zich in de transportsector heeft voor-
gedaan. 
Hoofdstuk vier ontwikkelt een actor-gedreven theoretisch kader voor de 
punctualiteit van nationale transpositieprocessen. Het presenteert een 
serie van testbare hypotheses, afgestemd op de transportsector, die echter
kunnen worden gegeneraliseerd voor elke EU beleidssector. Transpositie
is een zogenaamde onderhandelingsspel. Wie de implementatieonderhan -
de ling beëindigt en wanneer hangt af van de verwachte beloning van de spelers.
Met andere woorden, voor de actoren is de perceptie van de kosten/baten
structuur met betrekking tot het wachten met de omzetting doorslag gevend. 
Terwijl de omvang van de baten positief gerelateerd is aan de renteverde-
ling en negatief gerelateerd is aan de tijd, wordt de omvang van de kosten
bepaald door de spelers’ kosten en tijd. Bovendien wegen verwachte toe -
komstige baten sterk mee in de beslissing van de speler of er vertraagd, 
gewacht, of uitgesteld wordt; met andere woorden: wachten in de hoop
dat de ander een significante concessie doet. Aan de hand van deze ‘war of
attrition bargaining game’-logica komt in dit hoofdstuk eerst de manier waar-
op beleidsverandering tot stand komt aan bod. Daarna wordt ingegaan
op de effecten van beleidsverandering. Als aanvulling op de eerste twee delen
van het theoretisch kader wordt in dit hoofdstuk de specifieke rol van transport-
gerelateerde incidenten in de omzettingsfase uitgelicht.
Vervolgens presenteert hoofdstuk vijf een dataset van standaardvariabelen 
die essentieel zijn voor een deductieve, systematische, empirische, en ana-
lytische studie van de EU transpositieprestatie van de lidstaten. Deze nieuwe, 
betrouwbaardere dataset omvat bijna tweederde van de volledige EU transport acquis 
van 1995 tot 2004. Het bevat de kenmerken van elke EU richtlijn en van de 
nationale implementatie-instrumenten van negen lidstaten, te weten: Frank-
rijk, Duitsland, Groot-Brittannië, Nederland, Griekenland, Spanje, Ierland, Zweden
en Italië. Eerst bespreekt dit hoofdstuk de keuzes voor het beleidsveld, de 
lid staten en de tijdsperiode van het onderzoek. Vervolgens presenteert het 
de informatiebronnen en beoordeelt het in hoeverre de dataset compleet is. 
Hierbij wordt enige aandacht besteed aan de missende waarden.
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Hoofdstuk zes biedt een eerste beschrijvende analyse van de nationale 
implementatie-instrumenten. Het laat zien dat vooral Nederland, Frankrijk, 
Italië, Ierland, Griekenland en Duitsland errnstige transpositieproblemen hebben 
in de transportsector. Gebaseerd op de informatie van 367 nationale implemen-
tatiemaatregelen laat dit hoofdstuk zien dat het EU transpositie deficit meer 
is dan alleen een statistische illusie. Bijna 50 procent van de richtlijnen wordt 
niet op tijd omgezet en leidt tot een vertraging die kan oplopen tot tot bijna vijf jaar. 
De variatie tussen landen is behoorlijk, het verschil tussen de achterblijver 
Nederland en de winnaar Zweden is aanzienlijk. Verder laten de verschillen 
in mediaan en het gemiddelde zien dat 70 procent van de vertraagde richt-
lijnen meer dan zes maanden te laat is. Tot slot identificeert dit hoofdstuk drie 
groepen van uitkomsten: implementatie die op tijd is, implementatie die minder dan 
zes maanden te laat is, en implementatie die meer dan zes maanden te laat is. Deze 
driedeling is voor de meer geavanceerde analyse belangrijk.
In hoofdstuk zeven worden de onafhankelijke variabelen geoperationali-
seerd en worden de volgende onderzoeksmethoden gepresenteerd. Met een 
afhankelijke variabele die in een driedeling is gecodeerd (geen vertraging, 
korte- en een lange vertraging) wordt een ‘ordered multinominal logistic 
regression’-analyse uitgevoerd. Hierdoor worden bestaande argumenten in 
de literatuur ter discussie gesteld of bevestigd. Wanneer de drie groepen van 
transpositie-uitkomsten worden vergeleken, wordt duidelijk dat korte vertra-
gingen verklaard kunnen worden door kenmerken van de individuele EU-richtlijn 
terwijl lange vertragingen verklaard worden door nationale factoren. De statistische 
resultaten ondersteunen duidelijk het centrale argument dat het Europese niveau, 
het nationale niveau, en crisisgerelateerde factoren samen verantwoordelijk zijn voor 
transpositievertragingen en dat een actor-gecentreerd model enige verklarende 
kracht daarvoor geeft.
Er zijn duidelijke voordelen bij het gebruik van een grote-n studie in com-
binatie met een aanvullende casestudie als onderzoeksontwerp in EU im-
plementatiestudies. Als voorbeeld van hoe een dergelijke uitdaging onder-
nomen kan worden houdt hoofdstuk acht zich bezig met de casusselectie, 
voordat het hier opvolgende casestudie hoofdstuk zal helpen om de bevin-
dingen verder te verfijnen en voordat het enkele overgebleven beperkingen 
van de eerste resultaten zal behandelen. Eerst worden de selectiecriteria 
toegelicht. De geschiktheid van een casus hangt af van de mate waarin het 
statistische model toereikend is, hetgeen op zijn beurt weer afhangt van de 
berekende ‘deviant residuals’. In deze studie is gekozen voor het gebruik van een 
model testende en -verbeterende benadering. Een ‘meest gelijk danwel meest ver-
schillend’ ontwerp is richtinggevend voor de selectie van vier nationale im-
plementatiemaatregelen: twee goed verklaarde (on-the-line) cases en twee 
afwijkende (off-the-line) casussen. De vier casussen omvatten drie landen en 
twee transport subsectors.
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In hoofdstuk negen wordt dan een gecontroleerde casestudie analyse uitge-
voerd. De structuur van de vier casussen wordt uitgetekend door de metho-
de van process-tracing. De geselecteerde cassussen zijn: (a) het Franse im-
plementatieproces van de richtlijn 98/55/EC van juli 1998 met betrekking tot 
minimum vereisten voor de scheepvaart, (b) het Spaanse transpositieproces van 
richtlijn 2001/14/EC met betrekking tot de allocatie van de capaciteit van spoor-
weginfrastructuur, (c) het Duitse transpositieproces van richtlijn 2002/59/EC 
met betrekking tot het monitoring- en informatiesysteem voor het scheepvaartverkeer 
binnen de EU, en (d) het Franse implementatieproces van richtlijn 2001/53/
EC over de marine-uitrusting. Het bewijs uit deze casussen laat zien dat pro-
cess-tracing een nuttig onderzoeksinstrument is en bijdraagt aan het meer-
voudige-methode (‘mixed-method’) onderzoeksontwerp van dit boek. De 
uitkomsten van deze methode bevestigen duidelijk de verwachtingen over 
de condities waaronder lidstaten de transpositiedeadlines missen. Het wijst 
ook op een factor die geen verklaringskracht heeft: de mate van politieke priori-
teit verbonden aan het specifieke transpositieproces.
Omdat het problematisch is om voor 365 casussen de politieke prioriteit vast 
te stellen wordt een derde methode geïntroduceerd. Hoofdstuk tien comple-
teert het gecombineerde ‘mixed-method’ ontwerp door een aanvullende test 
van de uitgebreide lijst van hypotheses, gegenereerd door middel van het 
kleine-n onderzoek, voor een ‘middle range’ set van data. Verder identificeert 
de ‘fuzzy set technique’ een set van voorwaarden die gewoonlijk voldoende, 
of noodzakelijk is om tijdig te kunnen implementeren. Deze techniek legt de 
beperkingen van eerdere analyses bloot. De ‘calibrated data’ van de uitkom-
sten en de causale factoren laten individueel zien dat de logica van ‘partial 
membership’ er beter in slaagt de diversiteit van de echte wereld te laten zien 
dan de gekunstelde onderzoeksdichotomieën van ja/nee opdrachten. Het 
resultaat van vier omstandigheden die gewoonlijk noodzakelijk zijn, die in isolatie 
van alle andere factoren van invloed zijn en die aanwezig zijn in alle voorbeelden van 
uitkomsten, worden besproken.
In hoofdstuk elf worden de bevindingen van het empirisch onderzoek sa-
mengebracht. De bevindingen van deze studie zijn voornamelijk tweeledig, 
namelijk: empirisch en methodologisch. Vanuit een empirisch gezichtspunt 
beargumenteert de schrijver dat de EU een implementatieprobleem heeft met 
meerdere facetten. Het blijkt dat bijna 70 procent van alle nationale implemen-
tatiemaatregelen voor het omzetten van het 2004 transport acquis problemen 
oplevert. Dit kan ofwel zijn doordat ze te laat omgezet worden waardoor een 
infringement procedure geriskeerd wordt, ofwel doordat ze te vroeg omgezet 
worden (‘gold-plating’). Dit laatste kan negatieve gevolgen hebben voor de 
regelgeving omdat deze voor alle bedrijven en burgers in de EU gelijk zou 
moeten gelden.
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Zeven drijvende factoren die cruciaal zijn voor de punctualiteit van nationale 
transpositieprocessen van EU wetgeving worden geïdentificeerd. Ze worden 
onderverdeeld in drie brede groepen: beleidsontwerp gerelateerd (op niveau 
van de EU), beleidsimplementatie gerelateerd (op het nationale niveau), en 
crisisgerelateerde factoren. Het blijkt dat deze zeven factoren verschillende 
effecten hebben op de lengte van het implementatieproces. Wanneer een 
onderscheid tussen op tijd, een korte en een lange vertraging gehandhaafd 
wordt, blijkt dat de kenmerken van de richtlijnen verantwoordelijk zijn voor 
korte vertragingen. Langdurige vertragingen (van meer dan zes maanden) 
zijn het resultaat van factoren op het nationale niveau. Verder zijn ook de 
timing van nationale verkiezingen in een lidstaat en crises gerelateerd aan de 
beleidssector vertragend of accelereren ze juist het transpositieproces omdat 
de politieke prioriteit die aan de transpositie wordt verbonden een signifi-
cante voorwaarde is voor punctualiteit.
Vanuit een methodologisch gezichtspunt wordt geopperd in deze studie 
dat het, ondanks epistemologische onvolkomenheden, mogelijk is om cor-
relaties, casestudie en de ‘fuzzy set technique’ te gebruiken. Juist omdat deze 
technieken gezamenlijk nog niet eerder gebruikt zijn in EU studies, kunnen 
ze de kennis over implementatie van EU wetgeving verrijken. Terwijl de re-
gressieanalyse duidelijkheid verschaft over de effecten van een oorzaak en de 
casestudies over de oorzaken van de effecten, staat de ‘fuzzy set’ methode toe 
dat er gevraagd kan worden onder welke omstandigheden bepaalde causale 
factoren voldoende of noodzakelijk zijn voor een bepaalde uitkomst. Kortom, 
de ‘mixed-method’ benadering in het algemeen, en de ‘fuzzy set technique’ in het bij-
zonder blijken voor EU implementatiestudies ‘diamonds in the rough’.
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Annex 1: EU transport transposition data set 1995-2004.
Directives Title Publication 
in Official 
Journal
Date of 
transposition 
deadline
2002/0059 Suivi du trafic des navires 5.8.02 5.2.04
2002/0084 Sécurité martitime/prévention pollution 29.11.02 23.11.03
2000/0056 Permis de conduire 21.9.00 30.9.03
2002/0030 Restrictions exploitation aéroports 28.3.02 28.9.03
2002/0006 Formalités déclaratives des navires 9.3.02 9.9.03
2001/0096 Chargement/déchargement vraquiers 16.1.02 4.8.03
2001/0105 Inspection et visite des navires 22.1.02 22.7.03
2001/0106 Contrôle par l’Etat du port 22.1.02 22.7.03
2001/0016 Interopérabilité ferroviaire conventionnel 20.4.01 20.4.03
2002/0075 Equipements marins 23.9.02 23.3.03
2001/0012 Modif.91/440/CE dévelopt chemins de fer 15.3.01 15.3.03
2001/0013 Modif.95/18/CE licences 15.3.01 15.3.03
2001/0014 Capacités d’infrastructure ferroviaire 15.3.01 15.3.03
2001/0011 Contrôle tech. Véhicules utilitaires 17.2.01 9.3.03
2002/0035 Sécurité navires de pêche + 24m 27.4.02 1.1.03
2002/0050 Equipement sous pression 7.6.02 1.1.03
2000/0059 Installations portuaires - déchets 28.12.00 28.12.02
2001/0007 Transp. march. dangéreuses route 1.2.01 31.12.02
2001/0006 Transp. march. dangéreuses par fer 1.2.01 31.12.02
2002/0025 Modif.98/18/CE sécurité navires 15.4.02 15.10.02
2000/0030 Contrôle tech. Véhicule utilitaires 10.8.00 10.8.02
2001/0009 Contrôle tech. Véhicules utilitaires 17.2.01 9.3.02
2001/0053 Equipements marins 28.7.01 17.2.02
2001/0026 Transp. march. dangéreuses route 23.6.01 23.12.01
2001/0002 Equipements sous pression 10.1.01 1.7.01
1999/0036 Equipements sous pression 1.6.99 1.7.01
2000/0062 Transp. march. dangéreuses par fer 1.11.00 1.5.01
2000/0061 Transp. march. dangéreuses route 1.11.00 1.5.01
1999/0097 Contrôle par l’Etat du port 23.12.99 14.12.00
1999/0035 Visite sécurité transbordeurs 1.6.99 1.12.00
1999/0052 Contrôle technique 5.6.99 1.10.00
2000/0018 Conseillers sécurité march. dang. 19.5.00 19.8.00
1999/0019 Sécurité navires de pêche + 24 m 27.3.99 31.5.00
1996/0035 Conseillers sécurité march. dang. 19.6.96 31.12.99
1998/0074 C.mini.Navires March. Dangereuses 13.10.98 2.11.99
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Directives Title Publication 
in Official 
Journal
Date of 
transposition 
deadline
1998/0076 Accès prof. Transp. par route 14.10.98 1.10.99
1999/0028 Modification annexe dir.92/14/EC 6.5.99 1.9.99
1999/0048 Transp.march. dangereuses par fer 5.7.99 1.7.99
1999/0047 Transp.march. dangereuses route 5.7.99 1.7.99
1998/0035 Formation des gens de mer 25.5.98 25.5.99
1998/0085 Equipements marins 25.11.98 30.4.99
1996/0048 Interopérabilité ferroviaire TGV 17.9.96 8.4.99
1998/0020 Limitation exploit. des avions 7.4.98 28.2.99
1998/0055 C.mini.navires march. dangereuses 1.8.98 31.12.98
1997/0070 Sécurité navires de pêche + 24m 9.2.98 31.12.98
1998/0042 Contrôle par l’Etat du port (PSC) 27.6.98 30.9.98
1997/0058 Inspection et visites des navires 7.10.97 30.9.98
1998/0025 Contrôle par l’Etat du port (PSC) 7.5.98 1.7.98
1998/0018 Sécurité navires à passagers 15.5.98 1.7.98
1996/0098 Equipements marins 17.2.97 30.6.98
1996/0050 Certif. conduite navigation int. 17.9.96 7.4.98
1996/0096 Contrôle technique 17.2.97 9.3.98
1997/0026 Permis de conduire 7.6.97 1.1.98
1997/0015 Normes Eurocontrol 10.4.97 1.12.97
1996/0067 Assistance en escale 25.10.96 25.10.97
1997/0034 C.mini.navires march. dangereuses 17.6.97 30.9.97
1996/0053 Dimensions max. véhicules routiers 17.9.96 16.9.97
1996/0039 C.mini.navires march. dangereuses 7.8.96 7.8.97
1995/0018 Licences entreprises ferroviaires 27.6.95 27.6.97
1996/0040 Carte d’identité insp. PSC 7.8.96 1.2.97
1996/0075 Modalités d’affrètement nav.int. 27.11.96 1.1.97
1995/0050 Transp.march. dangereuses route 17.10.95 1.1.97
1996/0087 Transp.march.dangereuses par fer 24.12.96 31.12.96
1996/0086 Transp.march. dangereuses route 24.12.96 31.12.96
1996/0049 Transp.march.dangereuses par fer 17.9.96 31.12.96
1996/0047 Permis de conduire 17.9.96 30.6.96
1995/0021 Contrôle par l’Etat du port 7.7.95 30.6.96
Source : European Commission (DG Transport)
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